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Dynamics of Immigrant Resentment in Europe

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Abstract

Dynamics of Immigrant Resentment in Europe

by Katja Salomo*

A test of social explanations of immigrant resentment – contact, threatened responses, grievances, social disintegration, political persuasion, socialization contexts – across 30 European countries between the years 2002–2016 ($N=308.430$) provides the background for a comprehensive discussion of how these mechanisms interact and connect to migration patterns.

Most susceptible to resentment are those (1) lacking opportunities or (2) easy to persuade. (1) Socioeconomic status, place of residency, grievances, social disintegration, immigrant presence, birth cohort interact to provide/inhibit opportunities for social, economic participation (for natives *and* migrants) leading to less/greater resentment. (2) Threatened responses are concerns over potential consequences of certain kinds of immigration and are linked to individual characteristics that increase exposure and susceptibility to party cueing, policy signaling and media bias.

At the contextual-level, these processes are self-mitigating: Affluent, high-immigration countries more easily sustain tolerance for the same reasons they attract immigrants (opportunities) but are more prone to threatened responses since these are provoked by immigration characteristics overrepresented in affluent countries. While this dynamic is reversed in less advantaged countries, it is also vulnerable to disruption explaining higher resentment in certain countries. Self-mitigating shapes resentment in urban areas as well, but urbanization disrupts regional dynamics, leaving rural Europe especially susceptible to resentment.

Keywords: immigration attitudes; contact; threat; deprivation; disorder; party cues; geopolitical threat

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INTRODUCTION

Resentment towards immigrants and immigration increasingly destabilizes European politics. The consequences of rising negativity towards immigration go beyond its ramifications for immigration policies and the successful integration of migrants. As the most common denominator of nationalist parties, anti-immigrant sentiment is embedded within anti-democratic ideologies that also denigrate various social minorities including women (Zick, Hoevermann and Kuepper 2011). Since 2010, nationalist parties have gained or retained seats in federal parliaments within Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Spain (Volkens et al. 2018). Anti-immigration views motivated the British vote to leave the European Union (Evans and Menon 2017) and the destabilizing effects of this decision are felt even outside of Europe. Understanding these challenges to democracy means understanding the roots of anti-immigration attitudes. This article gives a detailed and comprehensive overview of empirically supported social explanations of anti-immigration attitudes brought forward by sociology, political science, economics, urban studies, and psychology, tests them using survey data from 30 European countries spanning the years 2002 to 2016 and provides an estimation of their combined explanatory power.

Attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are a wide concept, suggestions on suitable indicators range from exclusionist and discriminatory attitudes, negative stereotypes to voting behavior (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 314, 321). Here, resentment towards immigration/immigrants means opposing the admission of immigrants into the country (admission scale) – from the same or different ethnic group as the majority of the country or poorer countries out-side the European Union – and believing in a negative impact of immigration

on the country's economy, culture and as a place to live (threat scale). Although studies comparing different dimensions of attitudes towards immigrants/immigration are rare (e.g. Sides and Citrin 2007), the literature in its entirety suggests, that they share most predictors among them.

Theories about immigrant resentment are derived from social identity theory (Stets and Burke 2000): The formation of attitudes towards other groups necessitates self- and contra-identification into an ingroup opposed to outgroups. By attributing favorable characteristics to the ingroup and, in extension, negative characteristics to the outgroup, individuals achieve a positive distinction that confirms the ingroup's elevated position in society and with it one's own. While these basic psychological processes might be universal to a minor extent, factors that exacerbate self-/contra-identification, ingroup favoritism and negative outgroup bias are "causes" of resentment. "Social causes", the focus of the current study, are social mechanisms (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010) that trace the roots of resentment back to policies, politics, economic conditions, the demographic and social structure of society within specific historic backgrounds.

Arguments that have been brought forward with that intent are plentiful, they are clustered here according to their overarching arguments into theories about contact, threatened responses, grievances, social disintegration, political persuasion, and socialization contexts. Briefly introducing each approach culminates in hypotheses that both replicate and extend prior insights. Results of the analyses serve as background for discussing how these social mechanisms interact empirically and drive immigrant resentment in the context of migration patterns and historic divides across Europe.

SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF IMMIGRANT RESENTMENT

Given their omnipresence within the literature, this review begins with the contact and threat theses, followed by the grievances and social disintegration approach that are both, arguably, urban-centric and closes with mechanisms of political persuasion and the tentative knowledge about the relevance of different socialization contexts for both inter- and intra-generational differences in resentment.

Contact: Social relationships, habituation, cultural exposure


Exposure to other cultures challenges prejudice views by overruling opportunities for social learning. Forming positive relationships to immigrants acts as antidote to prejudice by reinforcing empathy and perspective taking in natives and decreases anxiety about further contact with migrants, somewhat less so by helping natives to see similarities between them and migrants (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). Having migrant friends especially challenges resentful views among natives (e.g. Turner et al. 2010). Although natives form relations to members of specific immigrant groups, the outcomes of social contact generalize beyond attitudes towards specific migrant groups to attitudes towards immigration and immigrants in general (Pettigrew 2009).

Contact can have positive outcomes even in the absence of emerging social relationships. Just by repeatedly *observing* immigrants, resentment and anxiety towards immigrants decreases (Rhodes, Halberstadt and Brajkovich 2001). Exposed to immigrants doing everyday activities similar to those carried out by themselves, natives habituate to their presence (Weber 2015). It can be negative, too, as situational framing experiments illustrate: Prejudice is reinforced if natives encounter migrants predominantly and only sporadically within local contexts marked by disadvantage or social disorder (Havekes, Coenders and van der Lippe 2013). Experiencing

language barriers and general exposure to foreign languages, too, tends to reinforce immigrant resentment (Newman, Hartman and Taber 2012).

The likelihood of social relationships and habituation to immigrants usually increases with opportunity, i.e. with larger presence of immigrants within a country, region and locale (e.g. Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). However, high segregation between natives and immigrants – residential, school, labor force and other forms of segregation – impedes contact and habituation (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011). The likelihood of social relationships to immigrants further suffers, supposedly, under the same conditions that make building social relationships in general more challenging. Within the local context, as interconnectedness between residents suffers under economic deprivation and social disorder (e.g. Laurence 2011, see further below), so should contact between natives and immigrants. By the same token, people that are less well socially integrated – for myriad reasons – probably establish fewer social relationships to immigrants as well.

Figure 1. Hypotheses contact



Opportunities to form friendships with migrants are not distributed equally across generations: Given that immigration levels steadily rose across European countries during the last

decades and that lasting and meaningful friendships are especially likely to be formed during young adulthood (Rawlins 1992), younger birth cohorts likely report social ties to immigrants more frequently. Incidentally, since longer educational attainment plays an important role in the formation of friendships during young adulthood, rate of educational attainment predicts the likelihood of friendships to migrants (although the causal relationship could be reversed) (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993).

Contact beyond social relationships and habituation, too, helps to build tolerance towards immigration. Periods of living/working abroad (Haubert and Fussell 2006) or cultural exposure during the course of higher education (other than building friendships) furthers acceptance and understanding of migrants from different cultures (Coenders and Scheepers 2003).

Figure 1 illustrates hypotheses concerning the different forms of exposure to immigration.

Threatened responses: Sociotropic concerns and distributional conflict

Immigration can induce resentment among natives if they fear negative consequences for their own social group (Stephan and Renfro 2016) – often interpreted as their own country (e.g. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) – or themselves individually (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Threatened responses (here) denote resentment that develops mainly in reaction to certain characteristics of immigration – its extent, speed, the skill and gender composition of migrants as well as their cultural backgrounds.

Threat historically has been understood as reaction to increased and increasing levels of immigration – today, more than a hundred studies attest that higher country-level immigration and pronounced increases thereof most often coincide with more pronounced anti-immigrant attitudes (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018 provide a meta-analysis). Immigration at higher geographical scales cannot be experienced directly by individuals, it is but a number


(Pettigrew, Wagner and Christ 2010). Instead, individuals are exposed to medial discourses about immigration, which routinely frames immigrants in a negative light across Europe (Eberl et al. 2018), indeed raising concerns about how immigration affects society (Schlueter and Davidov 2013). Sudden influxes of immigration into a country especially evoke increased media coverage (Czymara and Dochow 2018) – insofar, the link between increased/increasing levels of immigration and resentment (Kaufmann et al. 2018) may reflect various sociotropic concerns provoked by exposure to this kind of media coverage.

Since the link itself does not provide any insight as to what motivates individuals to object to immigration, researchers increasingly aim to connect resentment to specific characteristics of the migrant population that may give rise to concerns over negative impacts of immigration for the country as a whole. Such sociotropic concerns can be motivated by considerations about the economy or cultural homogeneity of a country (Hainmueller et al. 2014). Regarding the latter, concerns that immigrants will not fit into society in terms of language proficiency or value orientation especially contribute to the fear of cultural alienation (e.g. Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Chambers, Schlenker and Collisson 2013).

Alienation fears, at times operationalized as overblown estimates of immigration levels (e.g. Schlueter et al. 2010), therefore are less a reaction to higher levels of immigration in general than to cultural-distant immigration, i.e. migrants with different ethnicity or religion than the majority (e.g. Pettigrew et al. 2010). Mass media likely exasperates alienation fears by increasing the salience of certain immigrant groups: Across Europe, cultural-distant migrant groups and specifically male migrants belonging to that group are more consistently depicted as cultural threat than other migrants (Eberl et al. 2018). Greater presence of these immigrant groups within countries therefore may provoke fears of alienation especially. The same applies to refugees and asylum seekers who become more from 2017 onwards (beyond the

reach of the current sample) (Eberl et al. 2018). In this context, a stronger, well-funded public media sector helps mitigating resentment (European Broadcasting Union 2016) likely by providing more balanced reporting.

Figure 2. Hypotheses threatened responses



Note. ^aEducational attainment in general is assumed to predict greater tolerance but depending on whether immigrants are higher/lower skilled compared to natives, high-skilled natives ought to be less tolerant and low-skilled natives are more resentful.

^bWhile high-income individuals are expected to be generally more tolerant, their tolerance should decrease in countries where immigrants are less skilled than natives and national social expenditure are high.

^cLow-income individuals are expected to be less tolerant towards immigrants in general, their tolerance should decrease further in countries with higher proportions of low-skilled immigrants and higher social expenditure.

Although local immigration most often is connected to an increase in intergroup contact, geographic proximity may feed into alienation fears simply by increasing the salience of immigration. Halo effects are a case in point: Residents living close but not within high-immigration

neighborhoods tend to show increased resentment (e.g. Rydgren and Ruth 2013). The difference between threatened responses and contact are not “national” versus “local” level processes but rather immigration that remains abstract, distant and open to misperception (Pettigrew et al. 2010) versus immigration that is experienced through personal encounters and cultural exposure. By the same token, individuals less interested in socio-political issues likely are prone to alienation fears and outsized beliefs about the national immigration population. The thesis will be tested by attempting to replicate known individual level predictors of political disinterest – lower education attainment of respondents and their parents, being younger and female, lower socioeconomic status. For a more detailed discussion of how these factors relate to information seeking strategies learned through socialization see *Political persuasion* below.

Regarding economic concerns, natives prefer well-educated immigrants trained in higher professions over low-skilled (low-status) immigrants which are stigmatized as lazy, undeserving and economic burdens (Helbling and Kriesi 2014) – prejudiced views reflective of resentment towards the lower educated in general (Kuppens et al. 2018). Evidence of educationism aimed at immigrants comes from survey experiments (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015) and reminiscent of situational framing (see above), but it remains to be seen if more low-skilled compared to high-skilled migrants is tied to higher immigrant resentment across countries. The preference for highly skilled migrants might be limited by another fear: societal influences concentrated among “foreigners”. German reunification serves as a related example: Influential job positions in all areas of society were unproportionally conceded to West German applicants after the fall of the Berlin wall, which fuels alienation (with West Germany) in East Germany today (Vorlaender, Herold and Schaeller 2016: 132). While data offering this level of detail

concerning migrants' job positions is largely unavailable, a comparison between the skill-level of natives and migrants serves as approximation.

In addition to sociotropic concerns, natives contemplate the consequences of immigration for them personally (Scheve et al. 2001). They fear having to compete with immigrants for jobs/wages within similar skill-groups (Facchini and Mayda 2009) or economic sectors/occupations (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013). High-income natives worry about the fiscal burden of immigration within countries where social expenditure (per capita) are high and immigrants are less skilled than natives (Facchini et al. 2009). Simultaneously, low-income natives worry over the extent of low-skill immigration since it may put constraints on welfare benefits in high-expenditure countries (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Trade unions provide some (perceived) armament against feared wage dumping in the wake of higher immigration for their members and beyond: Both, individual trade membership (Mayda 2006) as well as higher union density across countries (Heizmann 2015) indicate less resentment.

Perceived competition goes beyond the labor market and redistribution of wealth: Women, all else equal, express more liberal views on immigration compared to male respondents (Fussell 2014: 489). One possible explanation is fear of mating market competition felt by men – in contexts where local native sex ratios are skewed towards men within the age when partnerships are most likely formed (Dancygier et al. 2019; Salomo 2019b), especially if meet by propaganda from nationalist parties evocative of this kind of competition (Dancygier et al. 2019).

Figure 2 (above) shows hypotheses concerning threatened responses (data is insufficient on halo effects, sectoral competition; the European Broadcasting Union declined access to data on the strength of public media across Europe).

Grievances: Deprivation, inequality, anxiety

Economic deprivation and inequality begets the denigration and scapegoating of immigrants among other social minorities (Swank and Betz 2003). For those less fortunate, economic inequality undermines their sense of status within society as they compare allocated resources to those of reference groups and judge (perceived) disadvantages to be unfair (Gurr 1970). One remedy to restore a beleaguered sense of status is to strengthen their identification as members of *nation* instead (Shayo 2009). This psychological response not only further denotes immigrants as *others* but also devalues them as members of *nation* construe their group as “dominant” out of the need for positive distinctiveness (Esses et al. 2001). Zero-sum beliefs about gains made by immigrants being only possibly at the expense of natives (Esses et al. 2001) further increase the scapegoating immigrants for (perceived) grievances.

Inequality thus begets inequality: Within societies that have high levels of income inequality, low-income voters are especially supportive of nationalist parties compared to fairer societies (Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018; Han 2016) and economically deprived individuals with lower household income, lower occupational status and lower educational attainment are generally more resentful towards immigrants (e.g. Carvacho et al. 2013; Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun 2013). Even more than objective economic deprivation, perceived grievances – status anxiety (fearing a future loss of social status), relative deprivation (feeling disadvantaged compared to a perceived majority), income anxiety (worrying about one’s livelihood) – are reliable predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes (Scheepers, Gijsbert and Coender 2002; Sides et al. 2007; Salomo 2019b). While these forms of economic anxiety are a reaction to economic deprivation (Salomo 2019b), non-economic factors matter. Socially isolated individuals, for example, might be more anxious as they lack a safety net providing financial, material, or emotional support if needed (Farmer and Sundberg 2010).


The local context, too, reinforces economic anxiety since low-status environments – shaped by, e.g., heightened poverty and unemployment among locales – exert pressures on residents owing to scarce resources, insufficient public services, more street crime, and other signs of heightened social disorder. This contextually induced anxiety sets in motion similar psychological responses as anxiety rooted in individual circumstances, i.e. exerts the same negative influence on attitudes towards immigration (Havekes, Coenders and Dekker 2013; Salomo 2019b).

Rural communities feel deprived compared to urban communities specifically – insofar as residents impute these grievances towards liberal politicians/parties that are associated more closely with urban-centric politics, it renders rural residents more inclined to support right-wing politics (e.g. Cramer Walsh 2012). Beyond this rural-urban divide, adverse consequences of urbanization and larger emigration movements affect rural communities disproportional in various Southeastern and Eastern European regions: Prolonged loss of population resulting in aging societies, fewer children, and sex ratios skewed towards men within the “mating” population (Salomo 2019b).

This demographic homogeneity leaves residents feeling disadvantaged compared to others and anxious about loss of status (Salomo 2019b). Similar to disadvantaged urban areas, service facilities, events and infrastructure thin out under the lack of customers/participants (European Commission 2000) but with steeper consequences as alternatives are out of reach, buildings fall into decline to the dismay of residents (Alexander 2013) as vacancies abound, social support networks suffer under the loss of younger, better educated and female residents especially (Corcoran et al. 2017). Demographic homogeneity leads to deprivation not because residents cannot afford to take part in societal life, but because society is reduced

to a minimum within these contexts. This form of deprivation has similar consequences for the local political culture as economic deprivation (Salomo 2019b).

Figure 3. Hypotheses grievances



Independent of economic or demographic aspects, in urban or rural contexts alike, local immigration exasperates economic anxiety (Salomo 2019b). Most likely, immigration accentuates the scarcity of local resources, especially among poorer residents (Valentine 2008; Hjerm 2009).

At the country-level, respondents of economically advantaged European nations and regions should be less anxious about their personal economic situation. Beyond national wealth, countries that sustain more generous welfare measures succeed in reducing economic insecurity (e.g. Artiles and Meardi 2014). But the national economic context informs immigrant resentment even more directly: Citrin et al. (1997) first observed, that negative views on the state of the national economy predict anti-immigrant attitudes more or just as reliably as anxiety about personal economic circumstances.

Hainmueller et al. (2014) argue that concerns over the ability of the economy to absorb immigrants explain this finding, linking it back to Quillian's (1995) initial argument about how resentment is a function of relative outgroup size and economic conditions. Against this background, it is possible that sociotropic economic anxiety itself is a reaction to higher immigration under unfavorable national economic conditions. Importantly, factors independent of immigration may contribute to sociotropic economic concerns – challenged to express their view of the national economy, individuals might default to local information – since “no one experiences national conditions” (Reeves and Gimpel 2012: 509). Or, by the same token, they impute their individual economic situation onto the national economy.


Figure 3 summarizes hypotheses concerning grievances (ESS does not provide attitudinal indicators for relative deprivation nor status anxiety).

Social disintegration: Disorder, isolation, mistrust

Acceptance of immigrants is more challenging for communities that suffer from low social cohesion and interconnectedness (Rydgren 2009). Whereas intact social cohesion limits how much individuals are prepared to attach themselves to single, abstract ideas like that of *nation*, social disintegration renders individuals susceptible to the idea of a community-like belonging to *nation* at the expense of denigrating social minorities that threaten its homogeneity (Rydgren 2009: 130–132; Gidron and Hall 2020). Consequently, social isolation (e.g. Hiers, Soehl and Wimmer 2017), and feeling unsafe within the neighborhood (Rustenbach 2010) render it harder to overcome innate biases that negatively cloud the judgement about the trustworthiness of outgroups like immigrants (Dinesen and Sonderskov 2015).

By the same token, individuals that find it hard to trust the generalized other might find it harder still to trust outgroups which helps to explain why lacking social trust is a strong predictor of anti-immigrant resentment (Herrerros and Criado 2009). It might also be a link between contextual conditions and immigrant resentment: Social trust suffers under local social disorder, i.e. the erosion of norms, social cohesion that contribute to increases of street crime and public disturbances (Ross and Mirowsky 2009) and are themselves reactions to individual economic hardship compounded with detrimental local conditions (Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley 2002). Social trust is further heightened among more isolated individual with less developed social support systems (or vice versa) (Ross et al. 2009). Lacking formal education, lastly, impedes social trust, likely owing to the level of cognitive skill required to adhere to an abstract concept like generalized trust (Uslaner 2002).

Figure 4. Hypotheses social disintegration



Higher ethnic diversity, too, has been found to undermine social trust within local communities (Dinesen, Schaeffer and Sønderskov 2020), possibly by undermining actual interconnectivity (Putnam 2007) and perceived social cohesion (Havekes, Coenders and van der Lippe

2014) – at least, it is not a mere compositional effect (Gereke, Schaub and Baldassarri 2018). Studies disentangling the consequences of local diversity and indicators of social disorder come to the conclusion, that social trust suffers least under diversity (e.g. Letki 2008; Laurence 2011).

Explanations of country-level differences in social trust mirror these arguments (Delhey and Newton 2005): Poorer societies display higher levels of generalized mistrust because they are more likely to fail basic needs of citizens. Greater ethnical diversity at the national level has similar detrimental consequences for social trust as local diversity (or approximates the former). A more genuinely national-level argument has been made with regard to income inequality (Elgar 2010): Amplifying the perceived distance between social groups, greater income inequality inhibits trust between people of different backgrounds, i.e. with different social (or *class*) identities (Uslaner and Brown 2005). It follows, that measures aimed to increase equality, e.g. social expenditure and higher unionization, should render trust towards the generalized other more achievable.

Hypotheses concerning the effects of social disintegration are shown in Figure 4.

Political persuasion: Party cueing, policy signaling, political interest

The broader political discourse about immigration – party discourse that cues voters about the “ideological correct” stance on immigration just as much as (symbolic) policies signaling norms that guide society’s responses towards immigrants – persuade people into what to think about the issue. Nationalist parties scapegoat immigration for economic and social problems or frame immigrants as cultural threat (Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2006:

429). If they achieve electoral success, mainstream parties across Europe start to employ similar nationalist rhetoric (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020) and indeed persuade voters to change their stance on immigration accordingly (Czymara 2019).


Voters are most ready to adapt to issue positions of political parties they feel ideological close to (Zaller 1992), although, across Europe at least, this has limits: Since political right-leaning voters already express higher immigrant resentment across Europe (e.g. Bohman 2011), there is less room for persuasion. Nationalist rhetoric of left-leaning mainstream parties, on the contrary, is most effective in predicting resentment, especially among politically left-leaning respondents (Bohman 2011).

Not all voters are equally susceptible to political messages: Political awareness and interest determine if political cues reach voters and trigger cognitive change (Druckman and Lupia 2000: 14–15). While political awareness should, consequently, render respondents more susceptible to nationalist rhetoric it simultaneously enables individuals to put alleged negative impacts of immigration into perspective. Bohman (2011) finds, that political interest does not significantly alter the influence of nationalist rhetoric but that the political interested in general express more tolerant views towards immigration. Since political interest itself is an expression of cognitive ability and comprehension (Denny and Doyle 2008) the political interested arguably are better positioned to recognize and reject prejudice and biased information.

Given this connection, political interest ought to increase (or is confounded) with educational attainment. Beyond that, socialization appears to play an important role in determining the level of political interest, that is noticeably stable among adults (Prior 2010). Parental habit of

discussion politics increases interest (Dostie-Goulet 2009) (approximated here by parents educational attainment) just as political discussion among peers (impossible to test using the ESS), but differences in socialization between genders may also explain why women self-report lower interest (Fraile and Gomez 2017). Socio-economic factors, too, play a role in the level of political interest (van Deth and Elff 2001), partly because individuals exposed to deprivation are more likely to be politically disenfranchised (according to grievance theory, see above) partly because it requires leisure time to stay invested in politics.

Figure 5. Hypotheses political persuasion



Note. ^aRead: Nationalist rhetoric during the last federal parliamentary elections will be especially effective in reinforcing resentment among left leaning individuals with above-average interest in politics.

In cross-sectional studies, political interested is often observed to rise almost linearly with age (e.g. Ehrler et al. 2016) while panel data suggests stability over life stages (Prior 2010), suggesting significant cohort and period effects. While researchers have started to tackle the nature of such effects referring to country-specific political discourse (Grasso et al. 2019), no thesis that applies to Europe at large has been proposed. Regarding country-level predictors, citizens in high-taxation/high-redistribution countries have been found to be more invested

in politics as they identify more closely with their community (Dawson and Jones 2010) but higher income inequality, likewise, has been theorized to increase engagement owing to increased conflict between poorer and richer citizens (Brady 2004). These findings suggest the somewhat obvious: interest in politics is greater if individuals feel political decisions concern them. Given, that immigration has become a highly politicized issue (Grande, Schwarzbözl and Fatke 2019), immigration itself, especially at the local level, may stimulate interest in politics.

Since 2016, it is illegal for asylum seekers and non-EU migrants in Austria to own fire arms under most circumstances, but not so for natives (Schreiber 2018). The law is an example of symbolic politics – policies employed with the (sole) purpose of provoking specific reactions among voters (Edelman 1964). In constituting norms that guide collective behavior, immigration policies can lead individuals to adapt their attitudes towards immigration – more inclusive integration policies are associated with less immigrant resentment in (western) Europe (e.g. Schlueter, Meuleman and Davidov 2013).

Hypotheses concerning political persuasion are summarized in Figure 5.

Socialization contexts: National traumata, period effects, social background

Experiences of ecological or geopolitical traumata in the not too distant past of a country shape its social norms and cultural values towards a less tolerant society. Past territorial conflicts, civil war, occupation, resource scarcity or epidemic diseases lead to “tightened” social norms and weaken tolerance towards deviant behavior (Gelfand et al. 2011). Growing up without “taking survival for granted” (Inglehart and Norris 2017: 443) leaves less capacity for tolerance, as the *other* becomes a threat. Hiers et al. argue, that under exposure to geopolitical threat especially national identities become anchored in “shared ethnic descent as well as common culture and language, rather than [...] the institution of citizenship that binds the

population to “its” state” (2017: 363). National traumata lead to tightened definitions of who belongs to a nation, rendering natives more susceptible towards threats to cultural homogeneity and, in consequence, more resentful towards people of different ethnicity.

But even in the context of different degrees of past national traumata leaving their marks on society, western societies after 1950 enjoyed unprecedented relative peace and prosperity (Inglehart 1977). With trauma and existential insecurity growing more distant, more liberal views on immigration compared to decades prior might be the consequence of generational replacement, each generation on average becoming more tolerant than the last one (Persell, Green and Gurevich 2001).

Education plays a mediating role in generational replacement. More liberalized in the wake of declining economic insecurity and greater tolerance of subsequent generations, the educational system amplifies tolerance among younger birth cohorts especially (Quillian 1996). The educational system is the most direct way for liberal and illiberal society alike to form and reproduce their socio-economic order (Meier 1989). It is therefore no surprise, that the tolerance furthering effect of educational attainment in post-Soviet countries is altogether weaker (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002) given that these countries had highly uniform, state-controlled educational systems during the Soviet era and have significantly shorter democratic traditions compared to western European countries.

Intra-generational differences in immigrant resentment that speak to the impact of socialization are less understood than inter-generational differences, but education is assumed to play a key role. In trying to explain the supposed liberalizing effect of educational attainment, the prevailing wisdom has been, that higher education means individuals have been exposed to the socialization influences of schools for longer (Hello et al. 2002). Researchers have pointed

out, however, that the greater tolerance of the higher educated towards immigration is already manifest at the beginning of secondary education (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). This raises the prospect that, in intra-generational comparison, the liberalizing effect of education actually is a mix of pre-selection, i.e. dependent on the social status of parents since the educational background of parents especially predicts level of educational attainment of children (e.g. Hello et al. 2004), and little understood processes during primary education.

Figure 6. Hypotheses socialization contexts




Figure 6 sums up hypotheses regarding socialization contexts and anti-immigration attitudes.

DATA AND METHODS

Data, missing cases, weighting

I use eight rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted between 2002–2016 and deemed to be one of the most valid and reliable source for data on political attitudes across Europe (Norris 2004). The analysis covers all 30 European Union and European Economic Area countries (including the UK, Switzerland) except Malta and Liechtenstein (Table A1 in Appendix A). Not all countries participated in every ESS wave, that leaves 180 units at the country by wave level. Survey data were gathered from a random probability sample within each country, targeting the population aged 15 and older.

Testing predictions at the local level using the ESS constitutes a certain challenge since it fails to provide localized geo-codes. Therefore, local context is approximated by subjective assessments from respondents about features of their local area (see below) and independent regional data at NUTS level 2, that typically denotes areas with 800.000 to three million inhabitants (European Commission 2015) and are provided by the ESS. Taken together, these indicators may at least offer clues about sub-national level mechanisms.

For some countries, regions are defined as NUTS level 1: smaller countries where NUTS level 2 is equal to the national level (Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg), if only NUTS level 1 codes were provided (Germany, UK) or if countries underwent a NUTS classification reform between ESS surveys and NUTS level 2 codes had to be recoded into NUTS level 1 for consistency (France, Greece). A few coding issues could not be resolved and in some cases the original ESS data did not include NUTS codes (Belgium 2002–2008, Czechia 2006, Finland 2002–2008, Ireland 2008, Switzerland 2002), these cases receive the mean average of any regional variable across all regions of the country and year of survey. All in all, there are 209 units at the regional level across the 30 countries in the sample (1294 regions by ESS wave).

Two items provoked an unusual large proportion of respondents to deny any answer (household income, left-right political alignment), others are not included in the first ESS round (working abroad) or, for various reasons, are not available for specific countries in a given ESS round (e.g. trade union membership for Spain in 2012). In these cases, I used different methods to substitute or impute missing information (see Table A2a in Appendix A). Other than that, cases with missing information were excluded, which concerns about nine percent of all cases, reducing total sample size $N_{total} = 338.757$ to an effective sample of $N = 308.430$.

One of the questions relevant to this study – having immigrant friends – only was included in the first round of the ESS (2002, 21 countries, $N = 35.466$ excluding 4.394 cases with missing information), two more items – perceived local immigrant diversity and perceived extent of national immigrant population – exclusively were asked during the first and seventh ESS round (2002 and 2014, 23 countries, $N = 70.414$ excluding 7.069 cases with missing information). I rely on these subsamples to determine the impact of the pertaining items on immigration attitudes how they affect the explanatory power of other predictors, but otherwise give precedence to estimates based on the full sample. Whereas the subsamples further allow to reliably identify individual-level predictors of being friends with immigrants and perceived extent of national immigrant population, neither subsample can claim to represent Europe the way the full sample of 30 European countries does, which somewhat limits the confidence in estimates of regional- and country-level predictors of these two variables.

Design weights as provided by the ESS correct sampling selection bias and are combined with post-stratification weights to address sampling and non-response errors using information on gender, age, education and region of living (European Social Survey 2014). An additional population weight adjusts the relative sample size of a country/region according to its population size. Respondents are further weighted according to the inverse probability of their country's participation in the ESS, since 15 countries participated in all eight rounds but Latvia and Romania, e.g., took part only once (Table A1 in Appendix A). (For example, respondents from a country that participated eight times are weighted down by a factor of 0.125 whereas respondents from a country that participated twice are weighted down by a factor of 0.5; weighting factors for subsamples are calculated accordingly). This decision places greater importance on inter-country variance and prevents too much distortion from intra-country variance of countries participating often in the ESS. Final weights are *post-stratification including*

design weight × *population weight* × (*1/number of country's participation in relevant ESS rounds*).

Measures

Information on indicators for all individual level variables, their availability, use in comparable studies and any further relevant information are presented in Table A2 in Appendix A. Similar information on variables describing the local/regional and national context are presented in Table A3 and Table A4 in Appendix A.

Analytical strategy

The theoretical models in Figure 1–7 assume a set of direct effects, mediated effects (where a set of exogenous factors is expected to influence immigrant resentment through mediating variables) and moderated effects (where the effect of one variable is conditioned on another). The theoretical assumptions further assume individual as well as contextual (country- and regional-level) effects with the year of survey acting as a further level, since data is pooled across ESS rounds. The general random-intercept-fixed-slope model for multilevel analysis including interaction effects applies (Hox 1995):

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{p0}X_{pij} + \gamma_{0q}Z_{qj} + \gamma_{p0}(XX)_{pij} + \gamma_{0q}(ZZ)_{qj} + \gamma_{pq}(XZ)_{pqij} + e_{ij} + u_{0j} \quad (1)$$

Y_{ij} is immigrant resentment – perceived sociotropic threat or opposition towards admitting immigrants – of individual i in country by year (of survey) j , γ_{00} the grand across-country-by-year intercept, $1...P$ predictors X or interactions between two predictors XX at individual level and γ_{p0} their slopes fixed across countries by year, $1...Q$ predictors Z or interactions between two predictors ZZ at country by year level, and γ_{0q} their slopes, u_{0j} are residual errors at country by year level and e_{ij} the individual-level residual errors. XZ are interaction

effects between $1 \dots P$ individual-level predictors X and $1 \dots Q$ country-level predictors Z and γ_{pq} their slopes. Time-sensitive country-invariant unobserved variance is hold constant via dummies indicating each ESS round, with ESS round 4 (2008, the largest sample) chosen as reference. To account for time-invariant country-specific unobserved variance, all standard-errors are clustered across countries.

Models are implemented as using Stata's 16 GSEM routine. They are fitted via a maximum likelihood estimation, set to reproduce linear regression (Gaussian distribution, identity function), with standard-errors clustered across countries (clustered Huber-White-sandwich estimator), weights apply. GSEM does not provide standardized estimates for regression coefficients; to ease interpretation all variables are z-standardized across all cases (respondents, regions, countries of all ESS rounds).


Since GSEM does not supply coefficients to assess the empirical fit of the theoretical model, generalized linear predictions of observed outcomes are used to calculate R^2 (based on the weighted correlation between observed and predicted values, adjusted for the number of explanatory terms in a model relative to the number of individual cases). Some predictors are only available in certain ESS rounds rendering it impossible to give their combined explanatory power across the whole sample. An approximation is given by, for example, estimating R^2 with all available predictors except *friends to immigrants* with the ESS 2002 sample (R^2_a), again with *friends to immigrants* included (R^2_b) and add the difference $R^2_b - R^2_a$ to R^2 estimated based on the ESS 2002–2016 sample for which *friends to immigrants* is unavailable. For obtaining R^2 at the country-level, the statistical model is replicated without individual level predictors and with the dependent variables aggregated at the country by wave level.

RESULTS

Contact

Figure 7 shows all main results regarding the contact approach.

Figure 7. Results contact



Note. $N_{\text{individual}} = 35466$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 156$, $N_{\text{national}} = 21$. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests). For full model see Table B5 and Table B6 in Appendix B. Please consider that this sample cannot claim to fully represent *Europe* (see Table A1 in Appendix A) – national-level effects are, consequently, less reliable. Among them, the link between integration policies and contact is not a replication of previous findings and may not be replicable with other samples.

Read: An increase of one standard deviation in, e.g., educational attainment increases anti-immigration attitudes for .109 standard deviations across all respondents, net of all other predictors.

^aVariable unavailable in ESS 2002, estimation taken from the full sample with $N_{\text{individual}} = 308430$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 209$, $N_{\text{national}} = 30$ and values for 2002 substituted (Table B1 in Appendix B, for information on substitution see Table A2 in Appendix A).

Social relationships. No other individual-level factor shields more effectively against anti-immigrant attitudes than having immigrants as friends (compare Figure 7–12), in line with extensive prior research (e.g. Turner et al. 2010). Intergroup friendships are generally more likely in European countries (e.g. Pettigrew et al. 2010) and locales (e.g. Schlueter et al. 2010) with higher levels of immigration, but are impeded by more exclusive national immigration policies (Semyonov and Glikman 2009) as well as local social disorder. At the individual level, the higher-educated (Espenshade et al. 1993), better socially integrated, respondents that

were born abroad and younger birth cohorts are more likely to have immigrants among their friends.

Habituation. Higher perceived local diversity, tested against all alternative explanations, directly inhibits immigrant resentment (Weber 2015), less so in high-disorder neighborhoods (Havekes et al. 2013).

Cultural exposure. Although having worked abroad for more than six months contributes to tolerance towards immigration (Haubert et al. 2006), the effect is neglectable. Rate of educational attainment, on the contrary, shows a substantial direct effect on immigration attitudes. Whereas higher formal education indirectly effects resentment in varied ways (see below) its direct effect may partially indicate cultural exposure (Coenders et al. 2003).

Threatened responses

Main results regarding the threatened responses approach are presented in Figure 8.

Sociotropic concerns. The growth of the national immigrant population directly and negatively affects attitudes towards immigration (Kaufmann et al. 2018), specifically concerns about negative societal impacts of immigration (threat scale). The number of refugees further indicates increased resentment, whereas the actual extent of the immigrant population has no significant effect on immigrant resentment nor alienation fears.


Alienation fears increase with salience rather than extent: While it is indeed the cultural-distant immigrant population that informs estimates of the national level of immigration (e.g. Schlueter et al. 2010), respondents in countries having higher proportions of men among their cultural-distant immigrant population specifically are most likely to give outsized estimates – the very immigrant group most overrepresented in European mass media (Eberl et al. 2018). Local immigration, salient to individuals even without exposure to media inflate perceived

levels of immigration. At the individual-level, the most effective predictors of outsized beliefs about immigration levels are the same factors that predict political disinterest – lower education attainment of respondents and their parents, being younger and female (see *Political persuasion* below) – reiterating that alienation fears are informational effects by nature.

A higher proportion of low-skilled immigrants (among migrants within working age) at the national level is linked to greater opposition towards admitting migrants, corroborating experimental evidence (Hainmueller et al. 2015). Respondents not only react negatively to low-skill immigration, likewise they are concerned if migrants are overall higher skilled than natives, maybe fearing concentrated societal influence (Vorlaender et al. 2016: 132).

Distributional conflicts: Low-skilled natives are more resentful towards immigrants in countries where migrants are less skilled than natives, whereas high-skilled natives have a more negative view of immigration if migrants are more skilled than natives (Figure 8), confirming that natives fear labor market competition with immigrants (Facchini et al. 2009). Regarding welfare chauvinism, the analysis supports Facchini et al. (2009) as well as Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010): Within high-expenditure countries, high-income respondents are more resentful if migrants negatively affect overall skill-composition among the population, i.e. they worry about having to pay more for social welfare. Simultaneously, low-income respondents are concerned if the skill-composition among migrants is skewed towards more unskilled, i.e. they worry about receiving fewer social benefits. Union membership has a negative although neglectable effect on immigrant resentment (e.g. Mayda 2006), but anti-immigration attitudes are lower in countries with higher union density (Heizmann 2015) – what matters is the strength of collective bargaining power.

Figure 8. Results threatened responses



Note. $N_{\text{individual}} = 308430$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 209$, $N_{\text{national}} = 30$. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests). For full model see Tables B1 and Table B7 in Appendix B.

^TEstimate shown taken from a model with the threat scale as dependent (Table B2 in Appendix B), as predictor has a significant effect on the threat scale only. Please consider that this sample cannot claim to fully represent *Europe* (see Table A1 in Appendix A) – national-level effects are, consequently, less reliable. Among them, the link between male excess among cultural-distant immigrants and alienation fears is not a replication of previous findings and may not be replicable with other samples.

^aEstimates for perceived immigration levels and its predictors based on ESS 2002/2014, $N_{\text{individual}} = 70414$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 184$, $N_{\text{national}} = 23$. For full model see Table B5 in Appendix B. Please consider that this sample cannot claim to fully represent *Europe* and national-level effects are, consequently, less reliable.

^bRead (following Facchini et al. 2009): Educational attainment in general predicts greater tolerance (see Table B1 in Appendix B), but depending on whether immigrants are higher/lower skilled compared to natives, high-skilled natives are less tolerant and low-skilled natives are more resentful.

^cRead (following Facchini et al. 2009): Whereas high-income individuals in general are more tolerant (not shown) they are less tolerant in countries where immigrants are less skilled than natives and social expenditure are high (for full model with all main effects and partial interactions see Table B1 in Appendix B).

^dRead (following Hainmueller et al. 2010): Low-income individuals in general are more resentful (not shown) especially in countries with higher proportions of low-skilled immigration and higher social expenditure (for full model with all main effects and partial interactions see Table B1 in Appendix B).

Although male excess among the native population (aged 15–44 years) at the local level – here approximated by the regional level – predicts immigrant resentment, mating market competition (Dancygier et al. 2019) may not be the only underlying concern: The interaction effect

between gender and native sex ratio is significant but weak and restricting the interaction to men aged 15–44, to single men, or single men aged 15–44 yields statistically insignificant results (Table C1 in Appendix C). Skewed native sex ratios may, additionally, indicate demographic deprivation (see *Grievances* below).

Grievances

Main results regarding the grievances theses are shown in Figure 9.

Economic deprivation and anxiety. Individual and sociotropic economic anxiety both increase immigrant resentment, concerns about the state of the economy more so than income anxiety (Sides et al. 2007). In terms of contributing factors, both forms of anxiety mirror each other to a large extent and mostly confirm expectations. Individual circumstances (especially and unsurprisingly household income, but also occupational status, educational attainment, social integration) and local conditions (unemployment, social disorder, immigration) are more relevant in explaining individual anxiety, whereas sociotropic anxiety are more strongly dependent on national level factors. Unemployment at the local level, for example, appears to aggravate individual economic anxiety and higher national unemployment rates reinforce sociotropic anxiety (as one of the most widely used macro-economic indicator that is comparably easy to understand and thus might be most salient to respondents).

Local immigration contributes to individual anxiety, especially among respondents with lower household income, i.e. immigrant presence accentuates local deprivation (Salomo 2019b). Mirroring this pattern, country differences in sociotropic anxiety are heavily dependent on immigration levels, especially if economic conditions (national GDP per capita) are unfavorable. The impact of national GDP per capita and unemployment on resentment is entirely mediated by economic anxiety as is the effect of national levels of immigration. (An additional

analysis further did not support a direct effect of GDP per capita on resentment in high-immigration countries as initially found by Quillian in 1995 (Table C3 in Appendix C)).


Against this results, concerns about the state of the national economy can be partly understood as threatened response, and yet sociotropic anxiety may build up without contemplating and has consequences other than resenting immigration (Rippl and Baier 2005). Strong national-level dependencies aside, the analytical model largely fails to reveal relevant sources of individual-level variance in sociotropic economic anxiety.

Worrying about one's very livelihood is one of the weaker predictor of resentment. This is not a new inside, a study comparing income anxiety to relative deprivation, status anxiety, sociotropic economic concerns and socioeconomic status indicators comes to the conclusion, that status indicators explain least of all, followed by income anxiety (Rippl et al. 2005). But to conclude that economic anxieties only matter as far as they refer to a collective (Hainmueller et al. 2014) dismisses the equally strong connection between relative deprivation and status anxiety to immigration attitudes (Rippl et al. 2005). Furthermore, the pattern predictably changes if dependent variables are items asking about consequences of immigration for oneself, not with respect to society at large (Sniderman et al. 2004).

Income inequality and redistribution. Lower household income strengthens resentment towards immigration especially in societies characterized by high income inequality, indicated by a significant and negative interaction effect between household income and the Gini-Index. Just as the likelihood of nationalist voting, immigrant resentment is driven by income inequality and with Rooduijn et al. (2018) I speculate that relative deprivation mediates the link. Higher social expenditure ease income inequality (Table C4 in Appendix C), but also show a direct negative effect on resentment across countries (e.g. Artiles et al. 2014). Providing a

social safety net might ease status anxiety among the population specifically, but ESS data is insufficient in this regard.

Figure 9. Results grievances



Note. $N_{\text{individual}} = 308430$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 209$, $N_{\text{national}} = 30$. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests). For full model see Table B1, Table B8 and Table B9 in Appendix B.

^aEstimate for perceived local ethnic diversity based on ESS 2002/2014, $N_{\text{individual}} = 70414$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 184$, $N_{\text{national}} = 23$. For full model see Table B4 in Appendix B.

Demographic deprivation. Immigrant resentment is increased in rural areas across Europe as well as in regions with adult native sex ratios skewed towards men, and aging population. While each of these statistical effects is small, they are additive – and most likely underestimated by using data at NUTS level 2 that ignores considerable demographic variance compared to smaller geographical areas (Eurostat 2020, own calculations). Taken together, they corroborate research showing that rural societies have become less liberal than urban communities (Cramer Walsh 2012) and how demographic homogeneity and its consequences translates to immigrant resentment (Salomo 2019b; Dancygier et al. 2019). In contrast to previous research, the current research design fails to fully exclude compositional effects as alternative explanation, this should be addressed by future studies.

Social disintegration


Find main results for the social disintegration approach in Figure 10.

Social mistrust. Social mistrust is a potent predictor of anti-immigration attitudes (e.g. Hereros et al. 2009) surpassed in its direct impact only by friendships with immigrants (compare Figure 7–12). Social trust is lower among more socially isolated individuals with lower socio-economic status. Lacking formal education impedes social trust, too, as expected (Uslaner 2002). Feeling unsafe after dark in the local area, indicating a certain degree of social disorder, and ethnic diversity both undermine social trust (e.g. Dinesen et al. 2015; Laurence 2011) but in line with prior research from the UK (e.g. Letki 2008), local disorder does more to undermine trust among residents than local diversity.

Union density and especially the level of social expenditure explain country-level variations in social trust. Neither the wealth of a country (GDP per capita) nor how equal this wealth is distributed among its citizens (GINI-coefficient) predicts social trust across countries – defying expectations (e.g. Uslaner et al. 2005; Delhey et al. 2005; Elgar 2010). Important at the national-level are measures that reassure societal solidarity – both, the work of unions and social expenditure per capita are salient signals of solidarity between citizens. Social expenditure and union density are higher among wealthier countries and associated with lower income inequality, which explains findings of previous research (Table C4 in Appendix C). Levels of (cultural-distant) immigration do not affect social trust at the country-level, in contrast to prior research (Delhey et al. 2005) – or more specifically, the impact of immigration is mediated by local immigration (Dinesen et al. 2015).

Social isolation. While results support previous findings suggesting that socially less well integrated individuals across Europe are more negatively minded towards immigrants (e.g. Hirs et al. 2017), this effect is almost completely mediated through social mistrust, economic anxiety (Figure 8) and a lower likelihood of having immigrants as friends (Figure 7).

Figure 10. Results social disintegration



Note. $N_{\text{individual}} = 308430$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 209$, $N_{\text{national}} = 30$. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests). For full model see Table B1 and Table B10 in Appendix B.

^aEstimate for perceived local ethnic diversity based on ESS 2002/2014, $N_{\text{individual}} = 70414$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 184$, $N_{\text{national}} = 23$. For full model see Table B4 in Appendix B.

Social disorder. Feeling unsafe within the neighborhood after dark decreases tolerance towards immigrants directly (and on top of various mediated effects), corroborating expectations (Havekes et al. 2014; Lüdemann 2006).


Political persuasion

Main results regarding political persuasion are shown in Figure 11.

Political interest. Lacking interest into politics increases intolerance towards immigration (e.g. Rustenbach 2010). The effect is comparable to that of sociotropic economic anxiety in

statistical strength but has received less attention from researchers. Higher occupational status and household income only slightly increase interest (van Deth et al. 2001) while factors related to socialization contribute most in explaining variance in political interest: Women (Fraile et al. 2017), lower educational achievement of parents (Dostie-Goulet 2009), year of birth (Grasso et al. 2019) and rate of educational attainment.

Figure 11. Results political persuasion



Note. $N_{\text{individual}} = 308430$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 209$, $N_{\text{national}} = 30$. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests). For full model see Table B1 and Table B11 in Appendix B.

^AEstimate shown from model with admission scale as dependent, as predictor has significant effect on the admission scale only (for full model see Table B3 in Appendix B).

^aEstimate for perceived local ethnic diversity based on ESS 2002/2014, $N_{\text{individual}} = 70414$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 184$, $N_{\text{national}} = 23$. For full model see Table B3 in Appendix 3.

^bRead: Tolerance of political left-leaning individuals decreases according to extent of nationalist rhetoric of non-nationalist political parties during the last federal election...

^cRead: ... especially if these individuals are political interested (for full model with all partial interactions see Table B1 in Appendix B).

At the country-level, both higher social expenditure as well as higher income inequality drive political interest among the population (Dawson et al. 2010; Brady 2004). Countries that achieve greater income inequality without raising taxes for higher social expenditure generate the least political interest among their citizens – among the generally high-expenditure countries of Europe, Hungary best fits that description, followed by Czechia, Slovenia, and

Slovakia. Local immigration significantly increases political interest, but the effect seems neglectable – immigrant presence likely raises interest in the politics of immigration specifically (Hangartner et al. 2019), which is unlikely to have a strong impact on an indicator of generally political interest.

Party cueing. Nationalist rhetoric (of non-nationalist) parties during the last national parliamentary election reinforces resentment. Specifically, nationalist rhetoric increases opposition towards the admission of immigrants, not perceived threat – possibly an indication, that parties deploying nationalist rhetoric campaign for stricter immigration systems more rigorously than raising concerns about migrants already residing in the country. The effect furthermore only materializes among respondents that are political left-leaning (Bohman 2011), i.e. not already partial to nationalist viewpoints, and further is stronger among those that are also interested in politics, i.e. highly responsive towards political messaging.

Political alignment itself predicts immigration attitudes: Right-leaning respondents are less tolerant, which might say more about long-term configurations of political discourse across Europe – anti-immigrant sentiments, to different degrees, are part of the ideology of right-wing parties across Europe (Volkens et al. 2018) – than about any causal mechanisms. At least in the context of a survey among predominantly adult respondents, given that political orientations form early in life (Rico and Jennings 2016).

Policy signaling. On top of increasing the likelihood with which natives establish friendships to immigrants (see above), more permissive integration policies (MIPEX-Index) are associated with decreased threat perceptions, suggesting signaling effects (e.g. Schlueter et al. 2013). Alternatively, lenient policies towards migrants are the consequence of greater tolerance

among natives caused by other factors. Top-down signaling effects and bottom-up inspired policy change are not mutual exclusive processes.

Socialization contexts

Figure 12 gives the main results regarding socialization contexts.

Social background. Parents with higher educational attainment strengthen tolerance towards immigrants among their children. although the analysis offers no decisive clue as to how. Individual and parental rate of educational attainment have independent effects on immigration attitudes – which is not to be expected if the effect of individual educational attainment mostly reflects selection effects based on parents' education. Assuming some form of liberalizing effect of educational attainment (e.g. Hello et al. 2002), both among respondents and through their parents, is at least not counter-indicated by results.


Generational replacement. Following precedent (Persell et al. 2001), the statistical model includes a main effect of birth cohorts and an interaction term between birth cohort and age, holding year of survey constant throughout. The interaction is weak but statistically significant regarding the admission scale, suggesting that a given cohort becomes slightly more opposed to admitting migrants with increasing age. Since birth cohort and age are strongly correlated to the point that they are interchangeable, this interpretation follows the dominant view prevailing within the literature (e.g. Persell et al. 2001).

The tolerance-furthering impact of higher educational attainment is weaker among younger birth cohorts, defying expectations (Quillian 1996). Given that the liberalizing effect of education at least partly is explainable by pre-selection (Lancee et al. 2015), the strength of this selection effect may have gradually decreased with the increasing permissiveness of educational systems across Europe.

Given the overall impact of educational attainment, the educational system still drives generational replacement by raising shares of higher educated individuals across younger birth cohorts and with it shares of formally better educated parents. Besides greater opportunities for higher education, younger cohorts furthermore have more opportunities for contact to migrants (see Figure 7 above).

National traumata and democratic tradition. Respondents of countries that experience(d) higher levels of geopolitical threat more strongly oppose admitting immigrants, consolidating expectations (Hiers et al. 2017). The impact of geopolitical threat might be larger still. As Hiers et al. (2017) point out, political parties are more disposed to employ nationalist rhetoric in countries that experienced geopolitical threat since their national identities are anchored in shared ethnicity not citizenship. By the same token, integration policies should be less permissive with increasing levels of geopolitical threat across countries.

Figure 12. Results socialization contexts



Note. $N_{\text{individual}} = 308430$, $N_{\text{regional}} = 209$, $N_{\text{national}} = 30$. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests). For full model see Table B1 in Appendix B.

^AEstimate shown is from a model with the admission scale as dependent, as predictor has a significant effect on the admission scale only, for full model see Table B4 in Appendix B.

To at least *explore* these assumptions, additional analysis at the country (by wave) level are deployed, revealing that indeed geopolitical threat levels are positively connected to nationalist rhetoric and less permissive integration policies across the current sample (Table C6 in

Appendix C). Both links are weakened if post-Soviet past is controlled, which is to be expected since the pertaining countries experienced higher levels of national traumata on average, partly owing to the soviet past itself. Furthermore, the liberating effect of higher education is less pronounced in post-Soviet countries (Figure 12), which is not explainable by the higher geopolitical threat level across post-Soviet countries (Table C5 in Appendix C). Owing to their shorter democratic traditions, these countries had considerably less time to gradually ingrain democratic principles within institutions and policies.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

One reason research is preoccupied with the threat and contact theses is the notion that immigration attitudes are intrinsically connected to, sufficed to say, immigration. The grievance, social disintegration, socialization and, in part, political persuasion approaches remain somewhat disconnected from this dominant string of literature – reviews exploring causes of anti-immigrant resentment frequently fail to mention them (e.g. Ceobanu et al. 2010; Fussell 2014; Hainmueller et al. 2014). These different approaches, however, are the context in which contact and threatened responses play out. This becomes clear if we start the inquiry into causes of resentment by asking why people emigrate from certain locales in certain countries and settle in specific locations of certain other countries.

Immigration attitudes and migration streams: common causes

Economically well performing countries tend to be high immigration countries within Europe. Besides attracting immigrants, wealthy countries with generally lower unemployment can afford more generous welfare states, have a higher union density, a formally better educated workforce. Owing to these differences, their resident experience less income anxiety, less sociotropic economic anxiety about the state of the national economy, less local social disorder

and local deprivation, are more trustful of others and tentatively more interest in politics. As much as the distribution of wealth across European countries reflects historic divides – post-Soviet countries and those suffering high levels of geopolitical threat (in the past) tend to be less economically advanced, with Austria, (West) Germany and the UK the only exceptions – history is an independent factor, too: The unmediated link between geopolitical threat levels and increased resentment across the countries in the current sample signifies a cultural dimension that shapes institutions and national identities (Hiers et al. 2017). The shorter democratic tradition of post-Soviet countries, too, echoes through educational institutions and decreases the effectiveness with which higher education shields against prejudice (Hello et al. 2002).

These socioeconomic and historic factors render affluent countries more attractive to immigrants (Coleman 2009; Brandmüller and Önnersfors 2020) and simultaneously, as results show, more tolerant towards them. As far as push-factors that contribute to emigration decisions mirror pull-factors, they largely leave residents in poorer countries less tolerant but also lead to less immigration (and higher emigration). Out of relevant factors at the country-level, income inequality alone does not fit into this pattern: Neither is it a decisive push-/or pull-factor, it furthermore is responsible for opposing effects on immigrant resentment: While high income inequality increases relative deprivation that contributes to resentment, income inequality also appears to raise interest in politics, which helps to challenge prejudice views.

Within countries, the forces of urbanization affect immigration streams and migration behavior of natives alike. As natives leave rural areas to follow jobs, infrastructure, entertainment, and other opportunities into the cities where immigrants tend to settle for similar and other reasons (OECD/European Union 2015), rural areas become less tolerant – through out-selection of younger, better educated, more often female residents (Maxwell 2019) (all found to

be less resentful than average) and the manifold consequences of ensuing demographic homogeneity that shape rural regions over decades (Salomo 2019b; Dancygier et al. 2019), for which the current analysis provides tentative evidence, too. These demographic dynamics come together in rural areas within high-emigration countries/regions, e.g., East Germany, regions in Spain, Greece, Bulgaria as well as countries with stark urban–rural divides owing to settlement history (e.g. Sweden, Finland). Aging societies specifically are increasingly noticeable within regions in France, Italy, Portugal and the UK and male excess among the mating population in regions within Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia (Eurostat 2020, own calculations, please note that these trends are manifest across NUTS 3 but not always across NUTS 2 regions as used in the analysis).

Within urban areas, the pattern is reversed, as favorable socioeconomic conditions become push- not pull-factors for immigrants. Owing to a mix of economic factors, housing discrimination and path dependency (migrants following clusters of other migrants from their country) high-immigration neighborhoods are more often than not the less and least affluent neighborhoods (OECD/European Union 2015).

Contact and threatened responses within context

Countries and regions that attract immigrants are more liberal minded towards migrants for the same reason they attract them. Within urban areas the reverse is true as migrants are concentrated in more disadvantaged neighborhoods where resentment is higher owing to this disadvantage. It is within these contexts that more immediate reactions to immigration – (1) contact and (2) threatened responses – play out.

(1) Contact – meaningful social relationships with, habituation, and cultural exposure to migrants – depends on opportunity. Higher immigration levels mean more average contact at

the national, regional, and local level but everything that excludes migrants from social, institutional or geographical spaces renders contact less likely – less permissive integration policies, as results show, and greater residential segregation (e.g. Semyonov et al. 2009) alike. As much as residents in disadvantaged urban regions have the most opportunities to challenge prejudice through contact, social disintegration, likewise high in these contexts, impedes the likelihood of relationships between natives and migrants. At the same time, immigrant presence feeds into economic anxiety and social mistrust, which amplifies the psychological consequences of disadvantage. However, these feedback loops, as far as results indicate, are not overwhelmingly strong, residents in disadvantaged urban areas are likely more tolerant because of high local immigration than they otherwise would be (this might not be true for all European countries, see specifics of the Swedish case (Strömblad and Malmberg 2016)).

For urban residents outside disadvantaged areas immigrant presence translates to contact more directly and has fewer drawbacks, but the residential segregation of migrants affects them adversely, too: Living close to high-immigration urban neighborhoods increases concerns about immigration through halo effects (e.g. Rydgren et al. 2013), especially among residents in affluent neighborhoods (Martig and Bernauer 2018). Then again, while certain individual characteristics – results especially point to the rate of educational attainment, less so working experiences abroad – further contact wherever one lives, they are likely overrepresented in these neighborhoods. The concentration of highly educated residents specifically furthers tolerance through genuine (but not yet well understood) contextually effects (van Wijk, Bolt and Johnston 2019; Strömblad et al. 2016). This dynamic actually constitutes another feedback loop with immigration – increasing population pressures within certain urban areas lead to the outmigration of high-educated, high-status native residents especially (Coleman 2009) –

Rural residents not only have the fewest opportunities for contact they are also most susceptible to perceived mating competition (Dancygier et al. 2019). Speculatively, encountering immigrants within low-status/high-disorder contexts outside one's own residential area may have especially lasting impacts (Havekes et al. 2013) if overall experiences with migrants are lacking, which is most likely among rural residents. Even if rural areas could attract more migrants, their short history and lacking experience with immigration would likely override the positive effects of contact, increasing resentment in the short term while residents only gradually acculturate to immigrant presence (Newman 2013).

But history moderates how immigration translates to contact in other ways, too: Since less permissive immigration policies are echoes of geopolitical threat and the Soviet past, both historic realities impede chances for contact between natives and migrants today.

(2) Contact serves as remedy against threatened responses (Savelkoul, Laméris and Tolsma 2017). We should be careful with the narrative of contact being "local" and threat being "national" (Kaufmann et al. 2018): Local immigration spurs alienation fears, situational framing and halo effects are threatened responses that play out locally, contact requires a certain level of acculturation, national level immigration indicates more contact, etc. The effects of immigration at different scales does not boil down to an either (positive) or (negative) question, and without controlling different social mechanisms, the various effects of immigration at any given geographical scale might cancel each other out (van Wijk et al. 2019: 235). But threatened responses as abstract beliefs (e.g. Pettigrew et al. 2010) are informational effects that to a larger part depend on national communication systems (Weber 2015) and, insofar, are more universal than contact.

Sudden influxes of immigrants, higher proportions of (male) cultural-distant or low-skilled migrants, and greater numbers of refugees indicate higher immigrant resentment at the country-level across the sample. One explanation is, that, indeed, these migrant groups provoke the most (and most negatively biased) media coverage (Eberl et al. 2018), especially without public media providing balance (European Broadcasting Union 2016). That dynamic is national as much as individuals are tuned in on national news, local immigration increases alienation fears, results show, and local media that highlights local immigration flows exasperate threatened responses (Hopkins 2010). Media discourse can be completely detached from actual characteristics of immigration, of course, and this aspect is woefully unaccounted for by the statistical analysis presented in this paper.

While the role of media remains somewhat speculative without direct measures of media's representations of immigration, results show that political parties are purveyors of information about immigration, with limited reach to persuade: They cue left-leaning, especially political interested left-leaning individuals. Immigration not only increases the likelihood of nationalist rhetoric among mainstream parties (while the general observation holds true (see Table C6 in Appendix C) the intensity of national rhetoric of, e.g., Polish and Hungarian political parties appears detached from the reality of very low levels of immigration into these countries). Immigration simultaneously leads to greater responsiveness towards these kind of political cueing messages since local immigration stimulates political interest (slightly). Given how these cueing messages are further moderated by political orientation, this explains why local immigration has been found to reduce the distance between political left- and right-leaning residents regarding immigration attitudes (Schaub, Gereke and Baldassarri 2020).

Besides party cues, policies, too, mediate the impact of immigration on resentment. While post-Soviet countries consistently have both lower levels of immigration than their western

counterparts and less permissive integration policies, with the post-Soviet past statistically controlled, higher immigration levels coincide with less not more permissive integration policies (Table C6 in Appendix C). The UK is a case in point: Potentially as reaction to higher influxes of immigration compared to countries with similar MIPEX-scores, it is the only country that significantly tightened its immigration policies since 2012.

What moderates threatened responses are, firstly, characteristics of the migrant population itself that either increase salience, such as sudden influxes of migrants, local proximity, (male) migrants that belong to visible minority groups, and/or lay the ground for intersectionality. Existing prejudice towards native groups – educationist attitudes, anti-elitism, stereotypical views of “the poor” (poor younger men especially) – are aggravated against migrants, results indicate. Secondly, threatened responses to immigration depend on the historic background of a country. (Past) geopolitical threat and the shorter democratic tradition of post-Soviet countries are connected to less permissive integration policies and greater readiness of political parties to deploy nationalist rhetoric, i.e. history shapes immigration attitudes today by affecting how political actors will react to immigration, leading to more or less tolerant political cueing and signaling effects.

Wealthier countries not only attract higher levels of immigration, but the characteristics of their migrant populations differ meaningfully from other countries, as they host more cultural-distant and low-skilled migrants, more refugees, have higher influxes of immigration – characteristics, result demonstrate, connected to higher resentment. Owing to the same underlying socioeconomic factors, countries otherwise best situated to prevent resentment among their population attract migrant populations that will provoke the strongest backlash. The threat of highly skilled migrant populations alone is an exception, this form of perceived threat is overrepresented in less affluent European countries (the UK being an exception).

Most susceptible to immigrant resentment

In conclusion, who are most susceptible to resentment – at the individual, local/regional and country level?

Individuals

Across individuals, it is those (a) lacking opportunities and (b) easy to persuade. (a) In the way socioeconomic status, place of residency, grievances, social disintegration, immigrant presence interact, it becomes clear that tolerance depends on the distribution of opportunities for social, economic, and institutional participation in society for both natives and migrants. Be it residential segregation of migrants, less social welfare spending, demographic deprivation, feeling unsafe in the neighborhood, fewer opportunities for educational attainment and intergroup contact for older generations, and so on – inequality begets resentment. Importantly, however, the different dimension of this dynamic can be self-mitigating, as far as the poorest individuals live in disadvantaged urban areas, for example, they may have the most opportunities for local contact. Socioeconomic status in general does not signify any singular social mechanism, its impact varies with context, one of its most important role is to affect where individuals live. Consequently, it is not surprising if the most deprived are not per se the most resentful (Lengfeld 2017).

(b) Threatened responses are predominantly concerns about what might be the consequences of (a certain kind of) immigration, not actual experiences (Pettigrew et al. 2010). Those most susceptible and most exposed to resentful party cues, policy signals, and media bias are most likely to show threatened responses. Accordingly, both political disinterest and outsized beliefs about the extent of national immigration share all relevant predictors

among them: younger birth cohorts, women, those with lower rates of educational attainment, and lower parental rate of educational attainment. These factors indicate dynamics of socialization that influence how individuals seek and process socio-political information as well as early exposure to information about issues such as immigration (Prior 2010). Political left-right identification, too, appears to be a product of socialization more than anything (Rico et al. 2016) – that we know of. Again, similar characteristics can have different outcomes depending on context: Political interest may shield against misinformation but increase the effectiveness of nationalist cueing messages from political parties. Mechanisms of socialization are likely not the only contributing factors, but so far, we have missed the opportunity to diligently inquire who (else) is easy to persuade and therefore most likely to show threatened responses. These insight could anchor the threatened response approach at the individual level, a connection increasingly lost as the pertaining theses mostly explain country-level variation.

The distributional conflict theses of course aim to identify social groups most likely to show threatened responses. But fearing higher taxation/lower welfare disbursements (in the context of high-expenditure countries with increased low-skill immigration) or higher competition for jobs (depending on personal skill and relative skill levels between migrants and natives) might mirror increased economic anxiety owing to the presence of immigrants more closely than threatened responses based on informational effects. It depends on the question initially raised by Bonacich (1972): Is the pressure felt by specific skill groups or employees in certain sectors (Dancygier et al. 2013) based on experience or perceptual only? Although the outcome stays the same, the precise mechanism involved differs. In light of how little distributional conflict contributes statistically to our understanding of anti-immigrant attitudes, the field might be happy to call it a “zombie” theory and move on (Hainmueller et al.

2014: 241). But the theory identifies scenarios under which high-skilled/highly educated and high-income individuals against the general trend are *more* resentful towards immigration. This matters as far as elites are (still) multipliers of opinion – the other scenario under which individuals of higher social status are more susceptible to resentment is related to increased responsiveness towards cues from political elites.

Locales and regions

Within countries, the interplay of threatened responses, contact, grievances, and social disintegration leaves rural areas, especially within high immigration countries, most susceptible to resentment. Rural Europe not only disproportionately was left out of the steady increase of post-war immigration and the acculturation processes it set in motion, urbanization also advances the out-selection of residents more tolerant towards immigration, demographic grievances and even mating competition, while economic performance remains subpar to urban regions. This lack of opportunity does not prevent exposure to information, however mediated, about country-level immigration prone to strengthen resentment. (Although, the lack of high-speed internet in rural areas might have this effect (Schaub and Morisi 2020).) Rural east Germany is an example par excellence (Figure 13): A relatively large region that, outside of Berlin, has very low immigration levels compared to high-immigration regions in West Germany that surely color the national discourse about immigration. East Germany furthermore suffers from levels of demographic deprivation that lack comparison even in a worldwide perspective (Salomo 2019a).


Countries

Countries *least* susceptible to immigrant resentment are those with favorable socioeconomic conditions (higher GDP per capita, less unemployment, more generous welfare states, higher

union density, a formally better educated workforce), immigrant populations with characteristics least likely to provoke threatened responses (generally lower immigration, slow growing immigrant populations, lower shares of cultural-distant migrants and less men among them, less refugees, lower shares of low-skilled migrants, a native population not “outskilled” by migrants) and a favorable historic background (non-Soviet past, low geopolitical threat). This combination assures that mechanisms like grievances and social disintegration do little to undermine liberal views on immigration, that threatened responses will be minimal and that immigration translates to positive contact with the highest likelihood. Within Europe, the only country that comes close to this description is Iceland (which indeed is the most tolerant country across the sample, Figure 13).

Furthermore, countries where the self-mitigating dynamic between more/less favorable socioeconomic and historic conditions and immigration with characteristics that are more/less likely to provoke threatened response works should show lower levels of resentment. These are high-immigration countries like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK on the one hand, and low-immigration countries like Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia on the other hand. Table 1 gives an overview over which of these countries (categories 2 and 3 in Table 1) indeed show below-average levels of immigrant resentment in cross-country comparison (also see Figure 13) – they mostly follow expectations. Most exceptions offer further insight into how economic crises, consistently fast-growing immigrant populations, deliberate social policy, and the shadows of history can disrupt the self-mitigating dynamic found in similar countries (see Table 2).

Figure 13. Immigrant resentment across Europe



Source. ESS 2002–2016, own calculations. Immigrant resentment (see Table A2a in Appendix A) is z-standardized across all respondents (as used in statistical modeling), aggregated for each country (across all years available) and, for readability, projected to a scale of ± 2 standard deviations from the across country mean.

Most susceptible to immigrant resentment are countries that, untypically, combine unfavorable socioeconomic contexts and stronger immigration with characteristics more likely to provoke backlash – Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Portugal, and Slovenia fit that description. Out of those, only Croatia does not show the expected elevated levels of immigrant resentment (Table 1 and Table 2). The cases of Greece and Cyprus especially demonstrate, that resentment abounds, if the self-mitigating dynamic of push-, pull-factors and immigration streams is disturbed.

Greece and Cyprus – southern Italy could be mentioned here, too – have been turned into heavy immigration countries by virtue of geographic location and European policies like the Dublin I–III regulations, i.e. they are countries where many refugees and asylum seeker first

arrive within Europe. They are simultaneously losing natives to emigration pushed out by economic disadvantage (a declining economy between 2008–2014), high unemployment (rising between 2008–2014), and faltering welfare states, meaning economic as well as demographic grievances and social disintegration already lead to increased resentment among the population.

Table 1. Countries by socioeconomic factors, immigration characteristics, immigrant resentment

		Immigration characteristics	
		Low backlash	High backlash
Socioeconomic context	favorable	(1) <i>Very low</i> resentment expected: Iceland	(3) <i>Low</i> resentment expected: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK
	unfavorable	(2) <i>Low</i> resentment expected: Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania ^a , Slovakia	(4) <i>High</i> resentment expected: Croatia ^b , Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia

Note. Sources see Table A2a and Table A4 in Appendix A. All data publicly available, own calculations available from author(s).

^aESS data available in 2008 only. ^bESS data available in 2008 and 2010 only.

High immigration – refugees/asylum seekers from cultural-distant countries, tentatively lower skilled, more male than female, prone to sudden influxes – amplifies this resentment through the full force of threatened responses. Sociotropic economic concerns, too, are strongest if higher national immigration levels coincide with unfavorable economic conditions, as results demonstrate. Furthermore, migrants held up in camps will, even locally, lead to increased resentment through halo effects and situational framing, not to meaningful positive contact (Hangartner et al. 2019). Greece and Cyprus specifically are, moreover, the only European countries for whom higher geopolitical threat is not just part of history, but ongoing (Aegean dispute). In face of this – of all we know about how social mechanisms drive anti-

immigration attitudes – levels of resentment in Greece, Cyprus and partly southern Italy (Figure 13) fail to surprise.

Table 2. Countries defying expectations regarding immigrant resentment given socioeconomic context and immigration characteristics – and why

Country	
France (resentment higher than expected)	Unemployment closer to countries with considerably lower GDP per capita – steadily increasing since the economic crisis in 2008. Also has low union density.
Italy (resentment higher than expected)	Unemployment similar to France, also GDP per capita lower than in North-Western countries and as of 2016 still considerably below its level in 2008. Both is true for Spain as well, but Spain host far fewer refugees than Italy.
UK (England, Wales) (resentment higher than expected)	Consistently faster growing immigrant population at high levels than comparable countries, only country that significantly restricted integration policies starting in 2012. Potentially connected, non-nationalist British political parties employ more nationalist messages than in any other North-Western country (geopolitical threat, too, is comparable high). The country showed below average level of resentment prior to 2012 and elevated resentment thereafter.
Austria (resentment higher than expected)	Comparably fast-growing migrant population, similar to Sweden or Norway. Yet while the latter have among the most permissive integration policies in Europe, Austria – sharing high levels of historic geopolitical threat with the UK – has one of the most restrictive integration policies among North-Western European countries, both amplifying threat and impeding contact. Nationalist rhetoric among Austrian parties is surpassed by British parties across North-Western countries.
Hungary (resentment higher than expected)	Intense national traumata and, accordingly, high levels of nationalist rhetoric among mainstream parties. Further stands out with a combination of country-level factors inclined to leave residents less interested in politics (i.e. low income inequality, low social expenditures).
Czech Republic (resentment higher than expected)	Also shows characteristics that impede political interest and experienced elevated levels of geopolitical threat – that does <i>not</i> translate to high nationalist rhetoric. The analysis offers no further clues to Czechia’s elevated level of resentment.
Croatia (resentment lower than expected)	Data is only available for 2008 and 2010, information on the composition of its migrant composition furthermore is incomplete, i.e. the case is hard to judge.

Note. Sources see Table A2a and Table A4 in Appendix A. All data publicly available, own calculations available from author(s).

Explanatory power and what next

The statistical model explains 41 percent of the inter- and intra-country variation across 30 countries with up to eight data points each between 2002 and 2016 (country-level $R^2_{\text{adjusted}} = .410$, see *Analytical strategy*, statistical models not shown). At the individual level, that number sinks to 25 percent (individual $R^2_{\text{adjusted}} = .254$, see *Analytical strategy*). Suffice to say, the explanatory power is relative to explanations not included in the model. These range from media discourse detached from immigration characteristics, social media and other discussion networks (e.g. Berg 2009) as well as many individual-level explanations brought forward by psychological research – ideological attitudes (Duckitt and Sibley 2007) to behavioral genetics (Verhulst, Eaves and Hatemi 2012).

Interpretations of the explanatory power at the individual level especially may differ and there are no comparable studies providing precedent. Taking it at face value – it seems too low, at least in relation to the effort involved. While it is reassuring in the context of a replication crisis engulfing social science research that the current study was able to replicate almost all statistical findings of previous studies on causes of immigrant resentment, this overall result does not make it easier to cut to the chase. Needed are serious, comprehensive canonization efforts aimed at reconciling and slimming down the different arguments that have been brought forward, regarding each study as a piece in the puzzle no matter its origin in a specific “school of thought”. This work needs to be published alongside articles presenting original research. Failing this challenge leaves us with incoherent answers to questions the broader public deems increasingly more pressing, unable to communicate our insights. Most approaches presented in the last three decades, as this article makes clear, do not contradict each other theoretically nor empirically, they are additive, deeply intertwined empirically and provide context to each other.

Research into the causes of immigrant resentment further can profit from a broader view on the explanandum. Approaches as the grievance, social disintegration, political persuasion, socialization theses and generalized intergroup contact thesis are developed and applied to explain a broader spectrum of the attitudinal space immigrant resentment is embedded within – intolerance towards social minorities, nationalism, political authoritarianism, etc. Acknowledging these overlaps is adamant for evaluating the contribution of any one theoretical approach and would allow to consolidate our understanding of social resentment and anti-democratic attitudes.

APPENDIX

Appendix A: Sample and Measurements

Table A1. Unweighted total sample size European Social Survey per country by wave

Country/ ESS Round	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	Total
Austria	2257	2256	2405				1795	2010	10723
Belgium	1899	1778	1798	1760	1704	1869	1769	1766	14343
Bulgaria			1400	2230	2434	2260			8324
Croatia				1484	1649				3133
Cyprus			995	1215	1083	1116			4409
Czechia	1360	3026		2018	2386	2009	2148	2269	15216
Denmark	1506	1487	1505	1610	1576	1650	1502		10836
Estonia		1989	1517	1661	1793	2380	2051	2019	13410
Finland	2000	2022	1896	2195	1878	2197	2087	1925	16200
France	1503	1806	1986	2073	1728	1968	1917	2070	15051
Germany	2919	2870	2916	2751	3031	2958	3045	2852	23342
Greece	2566	2406		2072	2715				9759
Hungary	1685	1498	1518	1544	1561	2014	1698	1614	13132
Iceland		579				752		880	2211
Ireland	2046	2286	1800	1764	2576	2628	2390	2757	18247
Italy	1207	1529				960		2626	6322
Latvia				1980					1980
Lithuania					1677	2109	2250	2122	8158
Luxemburg	1552	1635							3187
Netherlands	2364	1881	1889	1778	1829	1845	1919	1681	15186
Norway	2036	1760	1750	1549	1548	1624	1436	1545	13248
Poland	2110	1716	1721	1619	1751	1898	1615	1694	14124
Portugal	1511	2052	2222	2367	2150	2151	1265	1270	14988
Romania				2146					2146
Slovakia		1512	1766	1810	1856	1847			8791
Slovenia	1519	1442	1476	1286	1403	1257	1224	1307	10914
Spain	1729	1663	1876	2576	1885	1889	1925	1958	15501
Sweden	1999	1948	1927	1830	1497	1847	1791	1551	14390
Switzerland	2040	2141	1804	1819	1506	1493	1532	1525	13860
UK	2052	1897	2394	2352	2422	2286	2264	1959	17626
Total	39860	45179	38561	47489	45638	45007	37623	39400	338757

Table A2a. Individual-level variables

Measurement	Source/availability	Comment and literature reference
<i>Attitudes towards immigration: threat scale</i>		
3 items about concerns over impact of immigration on the country's economy (good–bad), culture (enriched–undermined), as place to live (better–worse)	ESS 2002–2016	For analysis of cross-cultural validity see Meuleman and Billiet 2012. A confirmatory factor analysis (Table A2b) confirms the threat and opposition scale to be two dimensions of a factor higher order. Threat and opposition scales are computed by combining items as mean averages, cases with at least one valid answer across items receive an index score. The attitudes towards immigration scale are the two scales combined as mean averages, only cases with valid values for both scales receive an index score.
<i>Attitudes towards immigration: opposition scale</i>		
3 items about preferences regarding admission of migrants from same ethnic group, different ethnic group as majority of [country], poorer countries outside EU: allow many–allow none	ESS 2002–2016	
<i>Attitudes towards immigration (combined)</i>		
Threat and opposition scale combined	ESS 2002–2016	
<i>Immigrant friends:</i>		
Any immigrant friends? Non–several	ESS 2002	e.g. Schlueter and Wagner 2008
<i>Perceived extent national immigrant population:</i>		
Out of every 100 people in country how many born outside country?	ESS 2002, 2014 ^a	Semyonov, Rajjman and Gorodzeisky 2008
<i>Individual economic anxiety:</i>		
Living on current household income? Comfortable–very difficult	ESS 2002–2016 ^b	Status anxiety, relative deprivation are further important dimensions of economic anxiety (Scheepers et al. 2002; Salomo 2019b) but not included in the ESS.
<i>Sociotropic economic anxiety:</i>		
Satisfied with state of [country's] economy? Extremely dissatisfied–extremely satisfied	ESS 2002–2016	Sides et al. 2007
<i>Political interest:</i>		
How interested in politics? Not at all–very	ESS 2002–2016	e.g. Bohman 2011

(to be continued)

Table A2a. (continued)

Measurement	Source/availability	Comment and literature reference
<i>Political alignment:</i>		
Self-placement on 11-point right-left scale	ESS 2002–2016 ^c	e.g. Bohman 2011
<i>Social mistrust:</i>		
Generalized social trust scale (see Reeskens and Hooghe 2007)	ESS 2002–2016	e.g. Hooghe et al. 2008 For a confirmatory factor analysis see Table A2b; index computed by combining items as mean averages, cases with at least one valid answer across items receive an index score.
<i>Educational attainment:</i>		
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) (Unesco 2012)	ESS 2002–2016	Categories harmonized across ESS waves: levels 1 or below, level 2, level 3, level 4, level 5 or higher
<i>Highest educational attainment parents:</i>		
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)	ESS 2002–2016 ^d	See educational attainment; information provided for father and mother of respondent are combined to indicate highest level of educational attainment of either of them.
<i>Occupational status:</i>		
Respondents with occupations classified as ISCO08 5000 or higher ^e , that are either temporary employed, work less than 30 hours a week or were unemployed the last seven days prior to questioning are considered of low occupational status.	ESS 2002–2016	Follows the concept of labor market “outsiders” proposed by Rueda (2005) as applied by Jaime-Castillo, Marqués-Perales and Álvarez-Gálvez 2015. Occupations are classified according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) (ILO 2012). The ESS provides ISCO88 codes up until 2010 ISCO08 codes from 2012 onwards. To convert ISCO88 into ISCO08 classifications, I used the conversion tool provided by Ganzeboom and Treiman (last revised 2010).
<i>Household income:</i>		
Total net income, all sources, deciles	ESS 2002–2016 ^f	ESS uses different brackets before and as of 2008. Both variables are divided by the square root of household size (OECD 2011) and z-standardized within each country by wave (Han 2016) before being combined into a single variable.
<i>Union member:</i>		
Currently member of a trade union? No–yes	ESS 2002–2016 ^g	Mayda 2006
<i>Meeting socially:</i>		
How often socially meet with others? Daily–never	ESS 2002–2016	Hiers et al. 2017

(to be continued)

Table A2a. (continued)

Measurement	Source/availability	Comment and literature reference
<i>Working abroad:</i>		
Paid work in another country more than 6 months in last 10 years? No/not applicable–yes	ESS 2004–2016 ^h	
<i>Born abroad:</i>		
Born outside of country of residence? No–yes	ESS 2002–2016	
<i>Year of birth</i>	ESS 2002–2016	Left-censored at the 1 percentile mark; answers 2001 and 2002 combined
<i>Single:</i>		
Live with husband/wife/partner at household? No–yes	ESS 2002–2016	Only needed for robustness checks shown in Table C1b, Table C1c in Appendix C
<i>Age</i>	ESS 2002–2016	Right-censored at the 1 percentile mark; ESS round <i>minus</i> year of birth if missing even though year of birth available
<i>Gender: Male–female</i>	ESS 2002–2016	

Notes. ^aOwing to an unusual high degree of item non-response, missing information was substituted using regression imputation, the predictors are: Occupational status, educational attainment, born abroad, age, gender. Method: single imputation (it is currently impossible to implement multiple imputations with Stata’s GLM routine).

^bUnavailable for France in 2002 and 2004, these respondents (0.98 percent of total sample) receive the weighted mean average across France 2006.

^cOwing to an unusual high degree of item non-response (13.2 percent of total sample), missing information was substituted with mean averages of country by wave. (Regression-based imputations are contraindicated since the perceived extent national immigrant population acts as dependent variable).

^dAfter substituting missing information for one parent with available information from the other parent, cases with missing information still amount to 14 percent, owing to many cases with educational degrees incompatible with ISCED, missing information therefore was substituted with mean averages of country by wave. On top of that, some countries did not include the question during certain ESS rounds: Sweden 2002, 2004 and 2008, Hungary 2014, Bulgaria as well as Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, the UK, Greece, and Ireland in 2008. These cases received the mean averages of their country from the closest or the two closest points of measurement available.

^eISCO08 5000 or higher denotes services and sales workers, skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers, plant/machine operators and assemblers, elementary occupations.

^fBesides a larger number of respondents who denied indicating their household income, the question is unavailable for Ireland 2002, Portugal 2010, Slovakia 2008, Estonia 2004, 2006 and 2014. That leaves circa 25 percent of the total sample for which missing information had to be substituted using regression imputation, the predictors are: regional GDP per capita, regional unemployment rate, occupational status, educational attainment, born abroad, age, gender (single imputation).

^gNot asked in Spain 2012 (0.56 percent of total sample), substituted with the weighted mean across Spain 2010 and 2014.

^hNot included in the first ESS round, substituted with mean averages of countries 2004.

Table A2b. Confirmatory factor analysis for attitudinal scales

<i>Attitudes towards immigration</i>	Threat scale	Opposition scale
Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? ^a	.839***	
Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?	.813***	
Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?	.784***	
To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? ^a		.939***
... How about people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?		.805***
... How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?		.851***
Factor correlation <i>Threat scale</i> with <i>Opposition scale</i>	.705***	
<i>N</i>	285.209	
<i>Generalized social trust</i>		
Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? ^a	.749***	
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?	.656***	
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	.702***	
<i>N</i>	306.120	

Note: Standardized factor loadings, * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests).

^aUnstandardized factor loading restrained to 1.

Table A3. Local-/regional-level variables

Measurement	Source/availability	Reference/comment
<i>Perceived ethnic diversity:</i>		
Describe area where you currently live: Almost nobody of minority race/ethnic group—many people are	ESS 2002, 2014	Objective measures of local diversity are unavailable. <i>Perceived</i> local diversity captures exposure to diversity more directly than objective diversity (Stolle, Soroka and Johnston 2008), because it indirectly measure the local concentration of migrants (not only the local percentage) (Iglesias-Pascual, Paloma and García-Ramírez 2019). In addition, I use regional NUTS Level 2 data to contrast effects of perceived local diversity with a more objective measure that, at least, captures sub-national variation. Unfortunately, regional immigration data is only available for 2011. I will include regional immigration levels in all relevant models as control variable for perceived local diversity, but only report if both measures diverge in meaningful ways.
<i>Immigrant population (%) (regional):</i>		
Percentage of residents born abroad, includes refugees if usual residents for at least 12 months	EU Census 2011 ^a	
<i>Native adult sex ratio (regional):</i>		
Ratio of men to women aged 15–44 years (higher values indicate more men)	Eurostat ^a	Dancygier et al. 2019 rely on more fine-grained data than NUTS level 2, somewhat limiting comparability.
<i>Aging population (regional):</i>		
Old dependency ratio: population 65 and over to population 15–64 years	Eurostat ^a	Simplified version of Salomo 2019b, who uses mor fine-grained data limiting comparability.
<i>GDP per capita (regional):</i>		
Purchasing power standard (PPS) per inhabitant	Eurostat ^a	Since indicators for local economic deprivation are unavailable, regional GDP per capita and unemployment indicate at least some within country variation, (Hoxhaj and Zuccotti 2020), for example economic differences between larger urban and rural areas.
<i>Unemployment rate (regional):</i>		
Percentage of unemployed available for and seeking employment out of the total labor force (ILOSTAT-Definition)	Eurostat ^a	
<i>Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood:</i>		
How safe do you/would you feel walking alone in this area after dark? very safe–very unsafe	ESS 2002–2016	Chandler and Tsai 2001; Rustenbach 2010
<i>Rural residency:</i>		
Which best describes the area where you live? Other–Country village, farm, countryside home	ESS 2002–2016	

Notes. ^aAny regional data unavailable for specific years is replaced with data from the closest year available or, if that rule proves inconclusive, with the mean average of the two closest data points available.

Table A4. National-level variables

Measurement	Source/availability ^a	Reference/comment
<i>Immigrant population:</i>		
Percentage of residents born abroad, includes refugees if usual residents for at least 12 months	Eurostat, World Bank, own calculations	Half of the countries do not count asylum seekers towards their immigrant population (Eurostat 2018)
<i>Refugees per 1000 capita</i>		
Recognized refugees per 1000 capita	Eurostat, World Bank, own calculations	
<i>Average growth immigrant population:</i>		
I calculated the growth of the immigrant population compared to two, three and four years prior and used the average growth across these three reference points.	Eurostat, World Bank, own calculations	
<i>Cultural-distant immigrant population:</i>		
Percentage of usual residents born abroad and outside of the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and non-Muslim majority European countries	OECD, Eurostat, own calculations ^b	Definition based on Schneider 2008; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Hainmueller et al. 2015
<i>Sex ratio among cultural-distant immigrants:</i>		
Ratio of men to women among cultural-distant immigrants (see above) (higher values indicate more men)	OECD, own calculations	
<i>Relative skill composition:</i>		
Among the working age population (15–64 years) the <i>low-skilled</i> have achieved less than completed first stage of secondary level education (ISCED 00, 01, 02) <i>high-skilled</i> ISCED 03 and above; the ratio of high- to low-skilled within natives is divided by the ratio within immigrants (higher values indicate migrants are relatively less skilled)	Eurostat (EU Labour Force Survey); (EU Census 2011 for Romania, Bulgaria)	Facchini et al. 2009

(to be continued)

Table A4. (continued)

Measurement	Source/availability ^a	Reference/comment
<i>Immigrant skill composition:</i>		
Low-skilled relative to high-skilled immigrants within working age (15–64 years), skill-level defined as above (higher values indicate more low-skilled immigrants)	Eurostat (EU Labour Force Survey) (EU Census 2011 for Romania, Bulgaria)	Based on Schneider 2008 who uses percentages of low-skilled migrants among the population conditioned on total number of migrants, which is unsuited here.
<i>GDP per capita:</i>		
PPP-adjusted, in constant 2011 international \$	World Bank	
<i>Unemployment rate:</i>		
Percentage of unemployed available for and seeking employment out of the total labor force (ILOSTAT-Definition)	World Bank	
<i>Union density:</i>		
Percentage of union members among respondents within working age (15–64 years)	ESS 2002–2016	
<i>Social expenditure:</i>		
Total expenditure on social protection per capita, PPS-adjusted	Eurostat	Facchini et al. 2009
<i>Income inequality:</i>		
GINI coefficient, post-taxes, post-transfer	SWIID: Solt 2016	(Rooduijn et al. 2018)
<i>Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX):</i>		
Provides a combined measure of integration of immigrants in labor market, education, health care, political realm; ease of access to permanent residence, citizenship, family reunions; anti-discrimination policies; calculated as average across years available.	2010–2014, Huddleston, Bilgili and Joki 2015	Schlueter et al. 2013
<i>Nationalist rhetoric of political parties:</i>		
Relative share of party manifesto content aimed at “defining and consolidating the national identity” (positive references to national way of life, patriotism, nationalism, notion of protecting the country from subversion within) averaged across non-nationalist parties (Volkens et al. 2017) for most recent federal parliamentary election.	Party manifesto project, see Volkens et al. 2018	Bohman 2011 calculates averages of nationalist rhetoric across all years available, somewhat inflating cueing messages with political culture at large.

(to be continued)

Table A4. (continued)

Measurement	Source/availability^a	Reference/comment
<i>Post-soviet country</i>		
Countries that were part of the Soviet Union or affiliated with it, i.e. Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia (East Germany is not treated as separate country).		

Notes. ^aAny country-level data unavailable for specific years is replaced with data from the closest year available or, if that rule proves inconclusive, with the mean average of the two closest data points available.

^bRegarding Cyprus, cultural-distant immigrant population is the percentage of non-European immigrants, regarding Croatia it is approximated by the mean average of all other eastern European countries.

Appendix B: Results

Table B1. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	.035	.005	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.123	.011	.000
Social mistrust	.154	.010	.000
Political interest	-.112	.009	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.131	.019	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.024	.007	.000
Union member	-.010	.003	.003
Occupational status	-.013	.004	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.002	.005	.675
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.099	.006	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.015	.003	.000
Born abroad	-.088	.013	.000
Female	-.032	.006	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.057	.005	.000
Year of birth	-.085	.011	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.087	.004	.000
Rural residency	.038	.005	.000
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.029	.009	.002
GDP per capita (regional)	.003	.015	.832
Unemployment rate (regional)	.015	.009	.076
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.031	.011	.005
Aging population (regional)	.033	.019	.083
Immigrant population %	.035	.071	.620
Refugees per 1000 capita	.070	.028	.011
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	.033	.019	.081
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.035	.038	.367
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.126	.046	.007
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.061	.043	.162
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.025	.023	.282
GDP per capita	-.048	.105	.648
Unemployment rate	.001	.016	.947
Union density	-.030	.014	.030
Social expenditure per capita	-.121	.077	.117
Income inequality (GINI)	-.026	.075	.726
Nationalist party rhetoric	-.063	.041	.128
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.089	.072	.214
Geopolitical threat level	.114	.066	.085
Post-Soviet country	-.170	.143	.235

(to be continued)

Table B1. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Perceived local ethnic diversity # feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood			
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.006	.003	.024
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.012	.007	.064
Household income # relative skill composition	-.007	.003	.043
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.012	.005	.014
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.010	.004	.005
Household income # skill composition migrants	.003	.003	.370
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.015	.007	.034
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.014	.005	.007
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.013	.011	.243
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.065
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.058
Year of birth # age	.010	.007	.110
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.010	.005	.074
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	.016	.005	.001
ESS 2002	-.036	.027	.188
ESS 2004	-.009	.019	.639
ESS 2006	.019	.012	.127
ESS 2010	.018	.010	.069
ESS 2012	.022	.015	.145
ESS 2014	.054	.018	.003
ESS 2016	.057	.030	.056
Constant	-.002	.059	.968
R ² _{adjusted}			.212
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table B2. Predictors threat scale, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	.029	.005	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.172	.011	.000
Social mistrust	.183	.013	.000
Political interest	-.116	.009	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.132	.022	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.024	.007	.001
Union member	-.011	.003	.000
Occupational status	-.016	.004	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.009	.006	.152
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.103	.008	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.017	.004	.000
Born abroad	-.113	.015	.000
Female	-.028	.009	.001
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.050	.005	.000
Year of birth	-.065	.011	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.101	.007	.000
Rural residency	.044	.005	.000
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.038	.011	.001
GDP per capita (regional)	-.006	.014	.685
Unemployment rate (regional)	.007	.009	.444
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.021	.009	.024
Aging population (regional)	.038	.017	.026
Immigrant population %	-.037	.065	.564
Refugees per 1000 capita	.066	.027	.013
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	.038	.019	.038
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.050	.042	.238
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.096	.027	.000
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.010	.039	.787
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.017	.016	.282
GDP per capita	-.034	.080	.674
Unemployment rate	.001	.013	.956
Union density	-.019	.011	.072
Social expenditure per capita	-.045	.073	.536
Income inequality (GINI)	.064	.074	.386
Nationalist party rhetoric	-.069	.039	.078
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.148	.072	.038
Geopolitical threat level	.084	.065	.198
Post-Soviet country	-.219	.124	.076

(to be continued)

Table B2. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Perceived local ethnic diversity # feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood			
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.005	.003	.100
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.018	.009	.045
Household income # relative skill composition	-.008	.005	.096
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.017	.007	.023
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.019	.005	.000
Household income # skill composition migrants	.009	.004	.050
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.019	.010	.056
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.018	.007	.015
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.010	.011	.331
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.021	.014	.121
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.021	.014	.125
Year of birth # age	.007	.008	.333
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.002	.006	.722
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	.021	.009	.017
ESS 2002	-.026	.024	.266
ESS 2004	.011	.014	.450
ESS 2006	.024	.011	.028
ESS 2010	.020	.009	.028
ESS 2012	.011	.017	.510
ESS 2014	.052	.018	.004
ESS 2016	.058	.024	.016
Constant	.004	.061	.945
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table B3. Predictors admission scale, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	.041	.008	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.075	.014	.000
Social mistrust	.125	.008	.000
Political interest	-.109	.009	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.129	.016	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.024	.007	.000
Union member	-.009	.004	.038
Occupational status	-.011	.004	.002
Household income (deciles)	.005	.005	.350
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.094	.005	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.014	.002	.000
Born abroad	-.062	.011	.000
Female	-.036	.005	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.063	.005	.000
Year of birth	-.105	.011	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.072	.003	.000
Rural residency	.033	.006	.000
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.022	.010	.027
GDP per capita (regional)	.011	.017	.528
Unemployment rate (regional)	.023	.009	.011
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.040	.015	.006
Aging population (regional)	.026	.022	.241
Immigrant population %	.123	.073	.093
Refugees per 1000 capita	.075	.034	.025
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	.026	.021	.229
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.021	.041	.604
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.152	.070	.029
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.104	.053	.047
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.029	.034	.392
GDP per capita	-.039	.113	.728
Unemployment rate	.001	.024	.952
Union density	-.040	.018	.025
Social expenditure per capita	-.187	.087	.032
Income inequality (GINI)	-.125	.078	.108
Nationalist party rhetoric	-.055	.046	.230
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.029	.086	.736
Geopolitical threat level	.152	.068	.025
Post-Soviet country	-.092	.144	.522

(to be continued)

Table B3. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Perceived local ethnic diversity # feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood			
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.007	.003	.029
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.007	.005	.170
Household income # relative skill composition	-.005	.003	.081
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.007	.003	.030
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.002	.003	.629
Household income # skill composition migrants	-.003	.002	.139
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.011	.004	.013
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.010	.004	.010
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.016	.012	.197
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.026	.013	.041
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.028	.012	.023
Year of birth # age	.013	.007	.040
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.017	.005	.001
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	.012	.005	.012
ESS 2002	-.040	.027	.135
ESS 2004	-.025	.021	.229
ESS 2006	.016	.014	.261
ESS 2010	.017	.011	.137
ESS 2012	.031	.015	.047
ESS 2014	.054	.019	.005
ESS 2016	.052	.036	.148
Constant	-.006	.062	.926
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table B4a. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	.038	.005	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.125	.018	.000
Social mistrust	.159	.015	.000
Political interest	-.113	.004	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.146	.021	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.022	.006	.000
Union member	-.008	.009	.371
Occupational status	-.022	.006	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.004	.007	.625
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.105	.008	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.012	.004	.001
Born abroad	-.080	.016	.000
Female	-.029	.009	.001
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.059	.008	.000
Year of birth	-.082	.015	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.075	.014	.000
Rural residency	.032	.010	.001
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.037	.021	.087
GDP per capita (regional)	-.005	.023	.838
Unemployment rate (regional)	.005	.022	.822
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.044	.013	.001
Aging population (regional)	.015	.016	.346
Immigrant population %	-.018	.035	.609
Refugees per 1000 capita	.005	.027	.853
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	-.036	.017	.037
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	.029	.048	.555
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	-.013	.059	.822
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.071	.041	.081
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.037	.071	.600
GDP per capita	.055	.090	.542
Unemployment rate	-.001	.037	.983
Union density	-.131	.127	.300
Social expenditure per capita	.067	.135	.621
Income inequality (GINI)	-.072	.047	.127
Nationalist party rhetoric	.035	.051	.488
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.025	.082	.758
Geopolitical threat level	.116	.052	.026
Post-Soviet country	-.092	.106	.385

(to be continued)

Table B4a. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Perceived local ethnic diversity # feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood			
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.007	.003	.033
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.023	.010	.025
Household income # relative skill composition	-.015	.005	.002
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.006	.006	.308
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.004	.007	.545
Household income # skill composition migrants	.008	.004	.061
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	.003	.007	.735
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.022	.008	.011
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.018	.005	.001
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.025	.014	.066
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.025	.013	.055
Year of birth # age	.011	.009	.207
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.007	.007	.331
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	.003	.008	.742
ESS 2002	.025	.089	.778
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	.023	.046	.624
R ² _{adjusted}			.256
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B4b. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	.085	.015	.000
Individual economic anxiety	.037	.006	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.121	.018	.000
Social mistrust	.154	.014	.000
Political interest	-.108	.003	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.145	.022	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.020	.005	.000
Union member	-.007	.009	.408
Occupational status	-.020	.006	.001
Household income (deciles)	-.004	.007	.561
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.096	.007	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.012	.003	.000
Born abroad	-.079	.016	.000
Female	-.038	.009	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.057	.008	.000
Year of birth	-.084	.014	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	-.047	.008	.000
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.070	.013	.000
Rural residency	.024	.009	.008
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.039	.020	.050
GDP per capita (regional)	.003	.023	.913
Unemployment rate (regional)	.005	.023	.826
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.046	.012	.000
Aging population (regional)	.012	.016	.444
Immigrant population %	-.014	.038	.708
Refugees per 1000 capita	.008	.029	.770
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	-.032	.019	.089
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	.026	.050	.601
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.002	.062	.976
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.078	.041	.058
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.000	.072	.998
GDP per capita	.077	.093	.405
Unemployment rate	.007	.039	.852
Union density	-.145	.137	.287
Social expenditure per capita	.052	.143	.714
Income inequality (GINI)	-.091	.050	.069
Nationalist party rhetoric	.052	.053	.330
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.035	.086	.685
Geopolitical threat level	.123	.055	.024
Post-Soviet country	-.099	.110	.371

(to be continued)

Table B4b. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Perceived local ethnic diversity # feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.020	.004	.000
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.004	.004	.342
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.021	.009	.022
Household income # relative skill composition	-.014	.005	.002
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.004	.007	.574
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.003	.007	.679
Household income # skill composition migrants	.007	.005	.216
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	.007	.009	.449
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.018	.009	.045
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.018	.005	.001
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.071
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.025	.013	.050
Year of birth # age	.013	.009	.157
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.008	.007	.237
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	-.001	.007	.862
ESS 2002	.011	.094	.906
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	.022	.047	.633
R ² _{adjusted}			.267
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B5a. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	.089	.016	.000
Individual economic anxiety	.034	.008	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.116	.019	.000
Social mistrust	.147	.015	.000
Political interest	-.108	.004	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.128	.015	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.025	.006	.000
Union member	-.013	.013	.302
Occupational status	-.018	.009	.057
Household income (deciles)	-.014	.006	.015
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.094	.006	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	-.096	.010	.000
Female	-.038	.008	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.058	.009	.000
Year of birth	-.096	.020	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	-.050	.010	.000
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.052	.012	.000
Rural residency	.025	.011	.025
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.034	.031	.284
GDP per capita (regional)	-.025	.030	.409
Unemployment rate (regional)	-.004	.011	.691
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.010	.011	.358
Aging population (regional)	-.006	.015	.692
Immigrant population %	-.044	.121	.718
Refugees per 1000 capita	.181	.082	.026
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	-.196	.056	.001
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.244	.113	.031
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.053	.051	.295
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	.000	.059	.994
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	.222	.087	.011
Unemployment rate	-.194	.040	.000
Union density	-.179	.089	.043
Social expenditure per capita	-.292	.164	.075
Income inequality (GINI)	-.095	.071	.180
Nationalist party rhetoric	.075	.059	.203
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.151	.040	.000
Geopolitical threat level	.157	.042	.000
Post-Soviet country	-.410	.134	.002

(to be continued)

Table B5a. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Perceived local ethnic diversity # feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.019	.007	.011
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.010	.004	.007
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.017	.008	.036
Household income # relative skill composition	.001	.004	.825
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.001	.005	.849
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	-.001	.005	.841
Household income # skill composition migrants	.005	.005	.280
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.004	.005	.507
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	.004	.006	.463
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.009	.005	.079
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.041	.014	.004
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.014	.018	.433
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.004	.008	.605
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	-.024	.007	.000
ESS 2002	/		
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	.016	.022	.486
R ² _{adjusted}			.265
N _{individual}			35466
N _{regional}			156
N _{national}			21

Table B5b. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	-.176	.011	.000
Perceived immigration level	.087	.014	.000
Individual economic anxiety	.039	.007	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.114	.018	.000
Social mistrust	.144	.015	.000
Political interest	-.093	.004	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.120	.013	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.009	.003	.001
Union member	-.012	.011	.311
Occupational status	-.017	.009	.054
Household income (deciles)	-.011	.006	.052
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.083	.005	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	-.058	.009	.000
Female	-.039	.008	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.047	.009	.000
Year of birth	-.073	.019	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	-.031	.010	.003
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.045	.012	.000
Rural residency	.020	.010	.050
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.015	.030	.616
GDP per capita (regional)	-.021	.029	.472
Unemployment rate (regional)	-.012	.012	.328
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.004	.011	.695
Aging population (regional)	-.004	.016	.810
Immigrant population %	-.005	.116	.967
Refugees per 1000 capita	.189	.079	.016
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	-.216	.057	.000
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.282	.108	.009
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.036	.048	.458
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	.011	.055	.839
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	.174	.084	.037
Unemployment rate	-.207	.039	.000
Union density	-.195	.085	.022
Social expenditure per capita	-.280	.160	.080
Income inequality (GINI)	-.090	.069	.190
Nationalist party rhetoric	.059	.056	.296
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.140	.037	.000
Geopolitical threat level	.149	.041	.000
Post-Soviet country	-.430	.130	.001

(to be continued)

Table B5b. (continued)

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Perceived local ethnic diversity # feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.018	.009	.031
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.010	.003	.001
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.015	.007	.029
Household income # relative skill composition	-.003	.005	.539
Household income # social expenditure per capita	.003	.006	.598
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.002	.007	.791
Household income # skill composition migrants	.003	.006	.610
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	.003	.008	.726
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	.006	.006	.305
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.014	.005	.010
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.038	.013	.002
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.017	.017	.320
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.002	.007	.760
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	-.024	.006	.000
ESS 2002	/		
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	.007	.021	.723
R ² _{adjusted}			.296
N _{individual}			35466
N _{regional}			156
N _{national}			21

Table B6. Predictors immigrant friends, ESS 2002

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	.098	.021	.000
Union member	/		
Occupational status	.009	.010	.336
Household income (deciles)	.039	.010	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	.109	.011	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	.215	.024	.000
Female	-.020	.009	.034
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	.140	.024	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	.116	.014	.000
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	-.043	.006	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.085	.023	.000
GDP per capita (regional)	.058	.015	.000
Unemployment rate (regional)	-.026	.034	.453
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.187	.083	.025
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.056	.043	.198
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.114	.059	.052
Unemployment rate	-.033	.040	.407
Union density	/		
Social expenditure per capita	/		
Income inequality (GINI)	/		
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	.087	.038	.021
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B6. (continued)

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	/		
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	-.042	.038	.269
R ² _{adjusted}			.231
N _{individual}			35466
N _{regional}			156
N _{national}			21

Table B7. Predictors alienation fears, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	/		
Union member	/		
Occupational status	-.042	.006	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.035	.016	.035
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.149	.019	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	.024	.005	.000
Female	.135	.017	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.040	.008	.000
Year of birth	.080	.016	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	.085	.011	.000
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	/		
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.085	.025	.001
GDP per capita (regional)	-.033	.024	.168
Unemployment rate (regional)	.010	.014	.477
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	-.075	.073	.307
Refugees per 1000 capita	-.039	.035	.269
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.004	.045	.933
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.409	.085	.000
GDP per capita	-.045	.072	.535
Unemployment rate	-.031	.047	.509
Union density	/		
Social expenditure per capita	/		
Income inequality (GINI)	/		
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B7. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	.007	.037	.844
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	-.022	.051	.664
R ² _{adjusted}			.157
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B8a. Predictors individual economic anxiety, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.069	.007	.000
Union member	.010	.004	.007
Occupational status	-.070	.011	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.316	.009	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.066	.017	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	.040	.008	.000
Female	-.011	.005	.023
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	/		
Age	.023	.020	.253
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.067	.007	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.028	.015	.064
GDP per capita (regional)	-.007	.013	.604
Unemployment rate (regional)	.078	.017	.000
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.073	.047	.118
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	/		
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.307	.073	.000
Unemployment rate	-.004	.021	.863
Union density	-.020	.012	.088
Social expenditure per capita	-.076	.042	.073
Income inequality (GINI)	/		
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B8a. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	-.050	.010	.000
ESS 2004	-.033	.008	.000
ESS 2006	-.016	.004	.000
ESS 2010	-.005	.005	.283
ESS 2012	.009	.007	.203
ESS 2014	-.008	.008	.277
ESS 2016	-.012	.010	.224
Constant	.017	.047	.716
R ² _{adjusted}			.265
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table B8b. Predictors individual economic anxiety, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.065	.007	.000
Union member	-.002	.007	.830
Occupational status	-.061	.010	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.313	.014	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.059	.019	.002
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	.034	.010	.001
Female	-.021	.008	.009
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	/		
Age	.015	.022	.487
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.075	.008	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.035	.021	.094
GDP per capita (regional)	-.018	.020	.356
Unemployment rate (regional)	.079	.011	.000
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.005	.024	.823
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	/		
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.243	.072	.001
Unemployment rate	.000	.019	.983
Union density	-.180	.069	.010
Social expenditure per capita	.027	.076	.719
Income inequality (GINI)	/		
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B8b. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	.002	.044	.968
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	-.005	.051	.920
R ² _{adjusted}			.226
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B8c. Predictors individual economic anxiety, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.066	.007	.000
Union member	-.003	.007	.714
Occupational status	-.059	.011	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.309	.014	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.059	.019	.002
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	.028	.009	.002
Female	-.018	.008	.026
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	/		
Age	.021	.021	.308
Perceived local ethnic diversity	.054	.011	.000
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.065	.008	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.024	.021	.251
GDP per capita (regional)	-.025	.020	.224
Unemployment rate (regional)	.077	.011	.000
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.003	.023	.912
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	/		
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.246	.077	.001
Unemployment rate	.001	.020	.955
Union density	-.170	.067	.011
Social expenditure per capita	.034	.075	.652
Income inequality (GINI)	/		
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B8c. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	-.016	.003	.000
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	.006	.043	.895
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	-.002	.051	.971
R ² _{adjusted}			.228
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B9a. Predictors sociotropic economic anxiety, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.037	.006	.000
Union member	.021	.006	.000
Occupational status	-.045	.005	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.058	.008	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.015	.007	.032
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	-.063	.008	.000
Female	.012	.008	.141
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	/		
Age	.014	.012	.221
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.073	.011	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.059	.041	.155
GDP per capita (regional)	-.107	.059	.070
Unemployment rate (regional)	-.017	.019	.387
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.598	.234	.011
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	/		
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.241	.207	.245
Unemployment rate	.259	.045	.000
Union density	-.042	.033	.197
Social expenditure per capita	.304	.184	.099
Income inequality (GINI)	/		
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B9a. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	-.429	.154	.005
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	.009	.043	.843
ESS 2004	-.074	.025	.004
ESS 2006	-.123	.018	.000
ESS 2010	-.127	.028	.000
ESS 2012	-.145	.038	.000
ESS 2014	-.185	.040	.000
ESS 2016	-.241	.048	.000
Constant	.421	.253	.096
R ² _{adjusted}			.059
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table B9b. Predictors sociotropic economic anxiety, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.041	.008	.000
Union member	.022	.007	.002
Occupational status	-.040	.004	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.053	.007	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.021	.005	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	-.069	.006	.000
Female	.016	.013	.224
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	/		
Age	.006	.012	.621
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.076	.007	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.035	.029	.231
GDP per capita (regional)	-.069	.041	.092
Unemployment rate (regional)	-.016	.026	.538
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.397	.167	.017
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	/		
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.648	.348	.063
Unemployment rate	.151	.075	.044
Union density	/		
Social expenditure per capita	/		
Income inequality (GINI)	/		
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B9b. (continued)

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	-.274	.107	.010
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	.105	.120	.383
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	.131	.133	.322
R ² _{adjusted}			.117
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B9c. Predictors sociotropic economic anxiety, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.042	.008	.000
Union member	.022	.007	.002
Occupational status	-.039	.004	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.052	.007	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.021	.005	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	-.072	.006	.000
Female	.017	.014	.210
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	/		
Age	.010	.012	.444
Perceived local ethnic diversity	.032	.011	.005
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.071	.007	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.028	.029	.332
GDP per capita (regional)	-.072	.042	.082
Unemployment rate (regional)	-.017	.026	.509
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.396	.165	.016
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	/		
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.659	.365	.071
Unemployment rate	.150	.076	.048
Union density	/		
Social expenditure per capita	/		
Income inequality (GINI)	/		
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B9c. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	-.275	.105	.009
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	.104	.122	.390
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	.134	.134	.315
R ² _{adjusted}			.119
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B10a. Predictors Social mistrust, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.082	.009	.000
Union member	.000	.003	.962
Occupational status	-.035	.005	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.050	.006	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.080	.008	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	.001	.004	.765
Female	-.050	.007	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	/		
Age	-.037	.015	.016
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.125	.009	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.027	.012	.032
GDP per capita (regional)	-.021	.015	.148
Unemployment rate (regional)	.041	.017	.017
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.001	.023	.969
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	.018	.017	.275
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.028	.041	.501
Unemployment rate	-.013	.016	.436
Union density	-.032	.007	.000
Social expenditure per capita	-.137	.030	.000
Income inequality (GINI)	.017	.025	.492
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B10a. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	-.005	.006	.440
ESS 2004	.001	.009	.911
ESS 2006	-.011	.003	.000
ESS 2010	-.003	.010	.750
ESS 2012	.000	.008	.972
ESS 2014	.010	.007	.158
ESS 2016	-.002	.006	.726
Constant	.053	.052	.312
R ² _{adjusted}			.125
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table B10b. Predictors Social mistrust, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.089	.012	.000
Union member	.005	.007	.497
Occupational status	-.034	.006	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.047	.012	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.091	.009	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	.003	.007	.705
Female	-.050	.006	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	/		
Age	-.048	.017	.006
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.128	.006	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.031	.025	.209
GDP per capita (regional)	-.047	.020	.017
Unemployment rate (regional)	.039	.030	.195
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.001	.021	.945
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	.031	.024	.195
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.033	.063	.604
Unemployment rate	.009	.029	.758
Union density	-.165	.049	.001
Social expenditure per capita	-.080	.074	.281
Income inequality (GINI)	.013	.031	.670
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B10b. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	.001	.029	.965
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	.036	.046	.431
R ² _{adjusted}			.139
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B10c. Predictors Social mistrust, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.090	.012	.000
Union member	.004	.007	.530
Occupational status	-.033	.006	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.046	.012	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.091	.009	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	.001	.007	.912
Female	-.049	.006	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	/		
Year of birth	/		
Age	-.046	.017	.008
Perceived local ethnic diversity	.021	.005	.000
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.125	.006	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.027	.025	.274
GDP per capita (regional)	-.050	.020	.012
Unemployment rate (regional)	.038	.029	.195
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.001	.021	.968
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	.031	.024	.200
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.033	.064	.607
Unemployment rate	.009	.028	.764
Union density	-.161	.049	.001
Social expenditure per capita	-.078	.073	.286
Income inequality (GINI)	.017	.032	.596
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B10c. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	.003	.029	.922
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	.037	.046	.420
R ² _{adjusted}			.139
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B11a. Predictors political interest, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	/		
Union member	.043	.012	.000
Occupational status	.022	.005	.000
Household income (deciles)	.066	.008	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	.232	.010	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	-.016	.007	.019
Female	-.125	.005	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	.087	.009	.000
Year of birth	-.184	.013	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	-.046	.005	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.038	.011	.001
GDP per capita (regional)	.004	.012	.751
Unemployment rate (regional)	-.025	.020	.196
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.012	.039	.754
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	/		
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.055	.065	.400
Unemployment rate	-.001	.029	.975
Union density	.042	.028	.139
Social expenditure per capita	.163	.063	.009
Income inequality (GINI)	.083	.031	.008
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B11a. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	.008	.016	.623
ESS 2004	-.007	.017	.660
ESS 2006	-.015	.008	.049
ESS 2010	-.014	.009	.116
ESS 2012	.000	.020	.989
ESS 2014	-.002	.016	.880
ESS 2016	-.007	.025	.782
Constant	-.020	.031	.518
R ² _{adjusted}			.174
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table B11b. Predictors political interest, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	/		
Union member	.036	.009	.000
Occupational status	.026	.008	.002
Household income (deciles)	.074	.010	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	.217	.015	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	-.012	.005	.027
Female	-.134	.010	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	.103	.013	.000
Year of birth	-.184	.012	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	-.041	.007	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.020	.016	.220
GDP per capita (regional)	.039	.018	.031
Unemployment rate (regional)	-.022	.031	.471
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.129	.039	.001
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	/		
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.037	.076	.628
Unemployment rate	.012	.032	.709
Union density	.337	.127	.008
Social expenditure per capita	-.037	.082	.648
Income inequality (GINI)	.190	.082	.020
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B11b. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	-.040	.036	.271
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	-.057	.055	.301
R ² _{adjusted}			.145
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Table B11c. Predictors political interest, ESS 2002/2014

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	/		
Sociotropic economic anxiety	/		
Social mistrust	/		
Political interest	/		
Political alignment (right-leaning)	/		
Meeting socially (frequency)	/		
Union member	.036	.009	.000
Occupational status	.026	.009	.002
Household income (deciles)	.075	.010	.000
Educational attainment (ISCED)	.217	.015	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	/		
Born abroad	-.014	.005	.008
Female	-.133	.010	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	.103	.013	.000
Year of birth	-.186	.012	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	.019	.007	.007
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	-.044	.007	.000
Rural residency	/		
Immigrant population % (regional)	.016	.016	.335
GDP per capita (regional)	.036	.018	.040
Unemployment rate (regional)	-.023	.031	.462
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	/		
Aging population (regional)	/		
Immigrant population %	.128	.039	.001
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	/		
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	/		
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	/		
GDP per capita	-.036	.075	.635
Unemployment rate	.012	.032	.715
Union density	.344	.126	.006
Social expenditure per capita	-.038	.081	.633
Income inequality (GINI)	.194	.081	.016
Nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	/		
Geopolitical threat level	/		
Post-Soviet country	/		

(to be continued)

Table B11c. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	/		
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	/		
Household income # relative skill composition	/		
Household income # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # skill composition migrants	/		
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	/		
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	/		
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	/		
Year of birth # age	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	/		
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	/		
ESS 2002	-.040	.036	.261
ESS 2004	/		
ESS 2006	/		
ESS 2010	/		
ESS 2012	/		
ESS 2014	/		
ESS 2016	/		
Constant	-.056	.056	.317
R ² _{adjusted}			.144
N _{individual}			70414
N _{regional} (by wave)			184 (317)
N _{national} (by wave)			23 (41)

Appendix C: Robustness checks

Table C1a. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	.035	.005	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.123	.011	.000
Social mistrust	-.155	.010	.000
Political interest	-.110	.009	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.130	.019	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.024	.007	.000
Union member	-.008	.003	.009
Occupational status	-.013	.004	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.002	.005	.712
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.099	.006	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.015	.003	.000
Born abroad	-.088	.013	.000
Male 15–44 years	.035	.006	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.057	.005	.000
Year of birth	-.102	.009	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.084	.004	.000
Rural residency	.039	.005	.000
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.029	.009	.002
GDP per capita (regional)	.003	.014	.834
Unemployment rate (regional)	.015	.009	.074
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.031	.011	.005
Aging population (regional)	.033	.019	.084
Immigrant population %	.035	.071	.617
Refugees per 1000 capita	.070	.028	.011
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	.033	.019	.081
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.035	.038	.356
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.127	.046	.006
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.061	.043	.160
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.025	.023	.280
GDP per capita	-.048	.104	.646
Unemployment rate	.001	.016	.935
Union density	-.030	.014	.030
Social expenditure per capita	-.120	.077	.118
Income inequality (GINI)	-.026	.075	.730
Nationalist party rhetoric	-.063	.041	.126
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.090	.072	.209
Geopolitical threat level	.115	.066	.082
Post-Soviet country	-.169	.143	.235

(to be continued)

Table C1a. (continued)

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Male 15–44 years # adult native male excess (regional)	.005	.006	.396
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.012	.007	.091
Household income # relative skill composition	-.007	.003	.040
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.012	.005	.010
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.010	.004	.003
Household income # skill composition migrants	.003	.003	.350
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.015	.007	.028
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.014	.005	.004
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.013	.011	.256
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.066
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.057
Year of birth # age	.013	.006	.040
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.006	.005	.182
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	.017	.005	.001
ESS 2002	-.037	.027	.169
ESS 2004	-.010	.019	.596
ESS 2006	.018	.012	.141
ESS 2010	.019	.010	.060
ESS 2012	.023	.015	.125
ESS 2014	.055	.018	.002
ESS 2016	.059	.030	.049
Constant	.001	.059	.984
R ² _{adjusted}			
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table C1b. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	.034	.005	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.123	.011	.000
Social mistrust	-.155	.010	.000
Political interest	-.109	.009	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.131	.019	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.025	.007	.000
Union member	-.008	.003	.016
Occupational status	-.012	.003	.001
Household income (deciles)	-.002	.005	.608
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.099	.006	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.014	.003	.000
Born abroad	-.087	.013	.000
Male and single	.026	.004	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.058	.005	.000
Year of birth	-.089	.010	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.083	.004	.000
Rural residency	.038	.005	.000
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.029	.009	.002
GDP per capita (regional)	.003	.015	.838
Unemployment rate (regional)	.015	.009	.071
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.031	.011	.004
Aging population (regional)	.033	.019	.088
Immigrant population %	.036	.071	.609
Refugees per 1000 capita	.071	.028	.011
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	.033	.019	.083
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.036	.038	.347
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.126	.046	.007
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.060	.043	.163
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.025	.023	.282
GDP per capita	-.049	.105	.642
Unemployment rate	.001	.016	.939
Union density	-.030	.014	.031
Social expenditure per capita	-.121	.076	.115
Income inequality (GINI)	-.027	.074	.714
Nationalist party rhetoric	-.063	.041	.127
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.089	.072	.215
Geopolitical threat level	.114	.066	.083
Post-Soviet country	-.169	.143	.236

(to be continued)

Table C1b. (continued)

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Male and single # adult native male excess (regional)	.003	.004	.469
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.012	.007	.094
Household income # relative skill composition	-.007	.003	.032
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.012	.005	.010
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.011	.004	.003
Household income # skill composition migrants	.003	.003	.346
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.014	.007	.037
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.015	.005	.005
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.013	.011	.264
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.062
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.055
Year of birth # age	.014	.006	.030
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.009	.005	.085
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	.017	.005	.001
ESS 2002	-.036	.027	.180
ESS 2004	-.009	.019	.628
ESS 2006	.019	.012	.127
ESS 2010	.018	.010	.067
ESS 2012	.022	.015	.140
ESS 2014	.054	.018	.003
ESS 2016	.051	.029	.080
Constant	.002	.059	.971
R ² _{adjusted}			
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table C1c. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	.035	.005	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.122	.011	.000
Social mistrust	-.156	.010	.000
Political interest	-.109	.009	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.131	.019	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.025	.007	.000
Union member	-.008	.003	.017
Occupational status	-.011	.003	.001
Household income (deciles)	-.002	.005	.653
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.099	.006	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.014	.003	.000
Born abroad	-.087	.013	.000
Male, single and 15–44 years	.079	.012	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.058	.005	.000
Year of birth	-.096	.010	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.082	.004	.000
Rural residency	.038	.005	.000
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.029	.009	.002
GDP per capita (regional)	.003	.015	.831
Unemployment rate (regional)	.016	.009	.071
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.031	.012	.009
Aging population (regional)	.033	.019	.087
Immigrant population %	.036	.071	.616
Refugees per 1000 capita	.071	.028	.010
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	.033	.019	.081
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.036	.038	.346
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.127	.046	.006
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.060	.043	.161
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.025	.023	.274
GDP per capita	-.051	.106	.633
Unemployment rate	.001	.016	.944
Union density	-.030	.014	.031
Social expenditure per capita	-.119	.077	.121
Income inequality (GINI)	-.026	.075	.731
Nationalist party rhetoric	-.063	.041	.126
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.090	.072	.214
Geopolitical threat level	.114	.066	.086
Post-Soviet country	-.170	.144	.238

(to be continued)

Table C1c. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Male, single and 15–44 years # adult native male excess (regional)	.005	.014	.696
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.011	.007	.099
Household income # relative skill composition	-.007	.003	.034
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.012	.005	.010
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.010	.004	.003
Household income # skill composition migrants	.003	.003	.281
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.015	.007	.031
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.014	.005	.005
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.013	.011	.256
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.066
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.056
Year of birth # age	.015	.006	.009
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.008	.005	.113
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	.017	.005	.001
ESS 2002	-.037	.027	.174
ESS 2004	-.010	.019	.605
ESS 2006	.019	.012	.136
ESS 2010	.018	.010	.065
ESS 2012	.022	.015	.135
ESS 2014	.054	.018	.003
ESS 2016	.056	.030	.062
Constant	-.006	.059	.919
R ² _{adjusted}			
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table C2. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	.035	.005	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.125	.011	.000
Social mistrust	-.154	.010	.000
Political interest	-.113	.009	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.131	.019	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.024	.007	.000
Union member	-.010	.003	.004
Occupational status	-.014	.004	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.002	.005	.725
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.099	.006	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.015	.003	.000
Born abroad	-.088	.013	.000
Female	-.032	.006	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.056	.005	.000
Year of birth	-.085	.011	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.087	.004	.000
Rural residency	.039	.005	.000
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.027	.010	.007
GDP per capita (regional)	-.002	.015	.882
Unemployment rate (regional)	.011	.009	.252
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.034	.012	.004
Aging population (regional)	.028	.019	.143
Immigrant population %	.059	.074	.424
Refugees per 1000 capita	/		
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	.034	.020	.094
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.005	.041	.908
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.086	.055	.119
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.036	.042	.390
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.031	.027	.236
GDP per capita	-.107	.146	.463
Unemployment rate	.002	.016	.886
Union density	-.031	.015	.039
Social expenditure per capita	-.109	.084	.197
Income inequality (GINI)	-.027	.094	.771
Nationalist party rhetoric	-.084	.048	.078
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.055	.081	.497
Geopolitical threat level	.106	.079	.181
Post-Soviet country	-.179	.161	.266

(to be continued)

Table C2. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.006	.003	.025
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.012	.007	.067
Household income # relative skill composition	-.007	.003	.043
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.012	.005	.014
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.010	.004	.005
Household income # skill composition migrants	.003	.003	.397
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.015	.007	.036
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.014	.005	.007
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.012	.011	.274
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.059
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.059
Year of birth # age	.010	.007	.114
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.010	.006	.077
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	.017	.005	.001
ESS 2002	-.024	.029	.397
ESS 2004	-.002	.021	.919
ESS 2006	.021	.013	.103
ESS 2010	.014	.009	.124
ESS 2012	.015	.013	.238
ESS 2014	.043	.016	.009
ESS 2016	.059	.033	.077
Constant	-.008	.062	.896
R ² _{adjusted}			
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table C3. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002–2016

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends	/		
Perceived immigration level	/		
Individual economic anxiety	.035	.005	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.123	.012	.000
Social mistrust	-.154	.010	.000
Political interest	-.112	.009	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.131	.019	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.024	.007	.000
Union member	-.010	.003	.003
Occupational status	-.013	.004	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.002	.005	.687
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.099	.006	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.015	.003	.000
Born abroad	-.088	.013	.000
Female	-.032	.006	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.057	.005	.000
Year of birth	-.085	.011	.000
Age	/		
Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.087	.004	.000
Rural residency	.039	.005	.000
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.026	.010	.008
GDP per capita (regional)	.001	.014	.954
Unemployment rate (regional)	.015	.009	.082
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.030	.011	.007
Aging population (regional)	.035	.020	.084
Immigrant population %	.086	.090	.340
Refugees per 1000 capita	.071	.027	.009
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	.031	.020	.126
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.046	.044	.303
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.121	.043	.005
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.049	.040	.222
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.015	.028	.586
GDP per capita	.005	.131	.970
Unemployment rate	.003	.017	.835
Union density	-.034	.015	.028
Social expenditure per capita	-.069	.087	.428
Income inequality (GINI)	-.025	.071	.722
Nationalist party rhetoric	-.057	.043	.187
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.096	.062	.123
Geopolitical threat level	.088	.052	.089
Post-Soviet country	-.054	.174	.756

(to be continued)

Table C3. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.006	.003	.023
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.012	.007	.064
Household income # relative skill composition	-.007	.003	.043
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.012	.005	.014
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.010	.004	.005
Household income # skill composition migrants	.003	.003	.374
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.015	.007	.034
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.014	.005	.007
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	-.059	.040	.143
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.013	.011	.252
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.064
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.057
Year of birth # age	.010	.007	.110
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.010	.005	.074
Educational attainment (ISCED) # post-Soviet country	.017	.005	.001
ESS 2002	-.018	.035	.613
ESS 2004	.003	.023	.900
ESS 2006	.024	.013	.053
ESS 2010	.014	.011	.190
ESS 2012	.013	.018	.478
ESS 2014	.042	.022	.049
ESS 2016	.042	.031	.177
Constant	.058	.064	.366
R ² _{adjusted}			
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table C4. Historic context, political party cues and policy signaling, countries pertaining in the ESS 2002–2016

	Social expenditure per capita			Union density			Income inequality (GINI)		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
GDP per capita	.750	.119	.000	.366	.126	.004	.073	.090	.414
Social expenditure per capita	/			/			-.359	.159	.024
Union density	/			/			-.459	.085	.000
ESS 2002	-.027	.036	.454	.017	.034	.609	-.080	.084	.338
ESS 2004	-.003	.033	.938	.067	.073	.360	-.062	.083	.453
ESS 2006	.052	.040	.193	.022	.032	.487	-.081	.075	.279
ESS 2010	.123	.034	.000	-.014	.023	.531	-.068	.071	.339
ESS 2012	.171	.042	.000	.101	.088	.247	.027	.089	.763
ESS 2014	.223	.055	.000	-.019	.039	.633	.039	.085	.645
ESS 2016	.214	.060	.000	.014	.101	.891	.051	.084	.541
Constant	-.090	.093	.332	-.002	.162	.991	.044	.135	.747
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)			30 (180)			30 (180)

Table C5. Predictors anti-immigration attitudes, ESS 2002–2016 (the interaction between educational attainment and post-Soviet dummy not replicable with geopolitical threat level)

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Immigrant friends			
Perceived immigration level			
Individual economic anxiety	.035	.005	.000
Sociotropic economic anxiety	.123	.011	.000
Social mistrust	-.154	.010	.000
Political interest	-.112	.009	.000
Political alignment (right-leaning)	.131	.019	.000
Meeting socially (frequency)	-.024	.007	.000
Union member	-.010	.003	.003
Occupational status	-.014	.004	.000
Household income (deciles)	-.002	.005	.661
Educational attainment (ISCED)	-.105	.007	.000
Working experience abroad (>6 months)	-.015	.003	.000
Born abroad	-.088	.013	.000
Female	-.032	.006	.000
Educational attainment parents (ISCED)	-.057	.005	.000
Year of birth	-.085	.011	.000
Age			
Perceived local ethnic diversity			
Feeling unsafe after dark in neighborhood	.087	.004	.000
Rural residency	.038	.005	.000
Immigrant population % (regional)	-.029	.010	.002
GDP per capita (regional)	.004	.015	.805
Unemployment rate (regional)	.015	.009	.078
Adult native sex ratio (male excess) (regional)	.031	.011	.005
Aging population (regional)	.034	.019	.082
Immigrant population %	.034	.072	.636
Refugees per 1000 capita	.071	.028	.011
Immigrant population growth (average 2-4 years prior)	.033	.019	.081
Cultural-distant immigrant population %	-.035	.038	.365
Skill composition migrants (less skilled)	.126	.047	.007
Relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.062	.044	.158
Cultural-distant immigrant sex ratio (male excess)	.025	.024	.289
GDP per capita	-.049	.106	.645
Unemployment rate	.001	.016	.964
Union density	-.030	.014	.031
Social expenditure per capita	-.122	.078	.116
Income inequality (GINI)	-.025	.075	.740
Nationalist party rhetoric	-.063	.041	.130
Migrant integration index (MIPEX)	-.090	.072	.212
Geopolitical threat level	.113	.067	.089
Post-Soviet country	-.172	.144	.232

(to be continued)

Table C5. *(continued)*

	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
Female # adult native male excess (regional)	-.006	.003	.023
Educational attainment # relative skill composition natives/migrants (migrants less skilled)	-.015	.006	.011
Household income # relative skill composition	-.008	.003	.004
Household income # social expenditure per capita	-.014	.004	.001
Household income # relative skill comp. # social expenditure per capita	.012	.003	.001
Household income # skill composition migrants	.003	.004	.524
Household income # skill comp. migrants # social expenditure per capita	-.012	.007	.120
Household income # Perceived local ethnic diversity	/		
Household income # inequality (Gini)	-.016	.005	.001
GDP per capita # immigrant population %	/		
Political interest # nationalist party rhetoric	.014	.011	.217
Political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.067
Political interest # political alignment # nationalist party rhetoric	-.024	.013	.059
Year of birth # age	.011	.007	.102
Educational attainment (ISCED) # year of birth	.011	.005	.050
Educational attainment (ISCED) # geopolitical threat level	.005	.009	.564
ESS 2002	-.036	.027	.190
ESS 2004	-.009	.019	.643
ESS 2006	.019	.012	.130
ESS 2010	.018	.010	.065
ESS 2012	.022	.015	.146
ESS 2014	.054	.018	.003
ESS 2016	.057	.030	.057
Constant	-.002	.060	.977
R ² _{adjusted}			
N _{individual}			308430
N _{regional} (by wave)			209 (1294)
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)

Table C6. Historic context, political party cues and policy signaling, countries pertaining in the ESS 2002–2016

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z	Coef.	Std. Err.	P>z
<i>Nationalist party rhetoric</i>									
Immigrant population %				.595	.145	.000	.661	.146	.000
GDP per capita				-.585	.155	.000	-.512	.153	.001
Geopolitical threat level	.565	.178	.001	.373	.155	.016	.294	.195	.132
Post-Soviet country							.309	.165	.061
ESS 2002	-.152	.106	.150	-.044	.066	.499	-.006	.074	.935
ESS 2004	-.079	.117	.501	-.006	.072	.932	.018	.068	.791
ESS 2006	-.059	.107	.580	.021	.058	.720	.055	.061	.371
ESS 2010	-.069	.098	.483	-.077	.045	.083	-.046	.038	.225
ESS 2012	-.125	.108	.249	-.084	.061	.170	-.064	.062	.303
ESS 2014	-.118	.109	.281	-.060	.073	.415	-.043	.068	.524
ESS 2016	-.097	.108	.371	-.034	.074	.644	-.018	.070	.804
Constant	.137	.146	.348	.081	.122	.507	.087	.112	.438
<i>Migrant integration index (MIPEX)</i>									
Immigrant population %				-.272	.133	.040	-.387	.139	.005
GDP per capita				.439	.166	.008	.313	.165	.057
Geopolitical threat level	-.417	.137	.002	-.241	.181	.182	-.105	.171	.541
Post-Soviet country							-.530	.155	.001
ESS 2002	.170	.064	.008	.079	.040	.046	.013	.039	.740
ESS 2004	.114	.066	.084	.043	.041	.294	.001	.048	.981
ESS 2006	.129	.063	.042	.072	.043	.098	.013	.046	.773
ESS 2010	.060	.062	.334	.060	.041	.143	.006	.025	.800
ESS 2012	.073	.070	.295	.041	.048	.392	.006	.042	.879
ESS 2014	.147	.072	.042	.094	.059	.109	.066	.045	.146
ESS 2016	.114	.075	.128	.054	.063	.394	.025	.054	.639
Constant	.022	.159	.891	.055	.148	.710	.045	.125	.721
N _{national} (by wave)			30 (180)			30 (180)			30 (180)

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Von der Schulform zur schulischen Organisationsform

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