WZB

Fenella Fleischmann and Karen Phalet*

Identity multiplicity among the Muslim second generation in European cities: where are religious and ethnic identities compatible or conflicting with civic identities?

* University of Leuven
e-mail: karen.phalet@psy.kuleuven.be

discussion paper

November 2010

Order no.: SP IV 2010-705

Abstract

Drawing on recent cross-nationally comparative survey data of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in five European cities, this study examines the patterns of identification with ethnic, religious, national and city identities. We take a comparative perspective and analyse data from five cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Brussels and Stockholm) that differ markedly in their policy approach to the integration of immigrants, the socio-economic position of the second generation and the political climate confronting ethnic and religious minorities. The analysis focuses on the question of how the Turkish and Moroccan second generation combines their ethnic and religious minority identities with identification with the country and city of residence. As European national identities are – to a greater extent than is the case for US American national identity – implicitly tied to and appropriated by the national majority group, we hypothesise that national identities will be non-inclusive of ethnic and religious identification, thus resulting in a negative correlation between Dutch/Belgian/Swedish identity on the one hand and Turkish/Moroccan and Muslim identities on the other. In contrast, we expect a positive correlation with identification with the city of residence, as Europe's cities are more diverse in terms of their population composition, have a more cosmopolitan outlook and are to a lesser extent dominated by one group of the population than the nation-states in which they are located. Secondly, we hypothesise that distinct identification patterns will be related to the modes of incorporation of the second generation, such that identity compatibility (i.e., positive associations between ethnic and religious identities on the one hand and national and city identities on the other) instead of identity conflict (i.e., negative associations) will be more often found in more favourable contexts of reception.

Key words: identification; identity multiplicity; second generation; Muslims; Europe

Zusammenfassung

Das Paper analysiert die Identifikationsmuster der türkischen und marokkanischen zweiten Einwanderergeneration in vergleichender Perspektive auf Basis von neuen ländervergleichenden Umfragedaten in fünf europäischen Städten in drei Ländern (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerpen, Brüssel und Stockholm). Diese unterscheiden sich deutlich in ihrer Einwanderungs- und Integrationspolitik, aber auch in der sozioökonomischen Position der zweiten Generation und in dem Maß der politischen Polarisierung rundum die Themen Immigration und Integration. Daraus ergeben sich länder- und städtespezifische „modes of incorporation", die hier in Bezug zu den Identifikationsmustern der zweiten Generation gesetzt werden. Dabei richten wir uns vor allem auf die Zusammenhänge zwischen ethnischer und religiöser Identifikation auf der einen Seite – als Identitäten die die türkische und marokkanische zweite Generation von der Mehrheitsgesellschaft unterscheiden – und nationaler (d.h., niederländischer, belgischer und schwedischer) und Städte- Identifikation (z.B. Amsterdamer) – als Identitäten die mit der Mehrheitsgesellschaft geteilt werden. Da europäische nationale Identitäten stärker als dies in den USA der Fall ist von den ethnischen und religiösen Merkmalen der Mehrheitsgesellschaft bestimmt werden und daher ethnische und religiöse Minderheiten eher ausschließen, erwarten wir einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen nationaler Identifikation auf der einen, und ethnischer und religiöser Identifikation auf der anderen Seite. Im Gegensatz dazu erwarten wir positive Zusammenhänge mit der Identifikation mit der Stadt, da europäische Städte im Vergleich zu den sie umringenden Ländern Zentren ethnischer und kultureller Vielfalt sind und ihre Identität daher weniger von einer einzelnen Gruppe dominiert wird. Aus vergleichender Perspektive erwarten wir, dass die Identifikationsmuster der zweiten Generation die „modes of incorporation" in den jeweiligen Kontexten widerspiegeln, so dass in für Einwanderer der zweiten Generation günstigeren Kontexten Identitäten eher kompatibel sind (d.h., positiv korrelieren) und sich seltener in Konflikt miteinander befinden (d.h. negativ korrelieren).

Schlüsselbegriffe: Identifikation, Identität, Multiplizität, zweite Generation, Muslime, Europa

Table of Contents

Multiple identities among the second generation

Against the background of different modes of incorporation of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in five European cities (Antwerp, Brussels, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Stockholm), this paper raises the question of how these youngsters combine their multiple social identities. As children of immigrants from majority Muslim countries, the Turkish and Moroccan second generation is distinguished from European majority populations by both their ethnic and their religious identity. Being born and raised in major cities of Western European countries, however, the second generation will also develop a sense of belonging to the nation and the city that is shared with the majority population. These multiple social identities may be compatible (i.e., mutually reinforcing or positively associated), conflicting (i.e., mutually exclusive or negatively associated) or unrelated. In this paper, we analyse where ethnic (Turkish or Moroccan), religious (Muslim), national (Belgian, Dutch or Swedish) and city identities ("Amsterdammer", "Stockholmare" etc.) are compatible or conflicting.

In the following, we first derive hypotheses about cross-national variation in the compatibility of minority identities with European national and city identities. Subsequently, we describe the modes of incorporation of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden in terms of their migration history, integration policies and socio-economic disadvantage, taking into account differences between cities within the same country. We then briefly explain our data and methods, before presenting and discussing the results of the empirical analysis.

National identities and minority identities

When coming of age, the local-born children of immigrants, the so-called second generation, are confronted with the question: "What shall I call myself?" (Portes and MacLeod 1996). US studies among the new second generation resulting from the highly diverse post-1965 immigration show that many children of immigrants have adopted hyphenated identities, such as Dominican-American or Vietnamese-American (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Such hyphenated or hybrid identities express simultaneous feelings of belonging to the culture of their parents' origin country and to the country of socialisation of the second generation, as well as the distinct experience of growing up in America with a particular cultural background. However, comparisons across different migrant groups in the US also reveal diversity in integration trajectories, reflecting differential modes of incorporation due to differential resources and investments within local ethnic communities. This diversity of migrant groups' trajectories in the US has been summarised in the theory of segmented assimilation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). This theory describes the factors leading to either of three forms of assimilation: (i) classical upward assimilation in terms of economic upward mobility and cultural assimilation into the American mainstream, (ii) downward assimilation into the mainly African-

American urban underclass, or (iii) economic assimilation with maintenance of cultural distinctiveness. Portes and MacLeod (1996) document that different modes of incorporation are not only associated with school attainment or intergenerational mobility, but also affect the choice of labels and the expression of social identities among the second generation. For instance, using multivariate regression among children of immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries sampled from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, they showed that more acculturated members of the second generation were more likely to adopt a hyphenated American identity, whereas the label 'Hispanic' was adopted more often by persons with low socio-economic status and more frequent experiences of discrimination.

So far, there is little evidence on how these theories and findings resonate in European contexts. Although Europe has experienced large-scale immigration coinciding with the 'new immigration' in the United States, cross-country comparative research on the integration trajectories of the second generation is still limited (cf. Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008), which is mainly due to the lack of cross-nationally comparable data (but see Crul and Schneider 2010; Ersanilli 2010). European researchers closely follow US theories and debates on immigrant integration and try to implement them in Europe (Thomson and Crul 2007). Applying the theory of segmented assimilation has proven useful for the study of economic integration (Phalet and Heath 2010) and of educational attainment (Fleischmann, Phalet, Neels, and Deboosere forthcoming) of different second-generation groups in Belgium. Regarding patterns of identification among the second generation, American findings raise the question of whether and under what conditions the children of immigrants in Europe will also develop hyphenated identities, e.g., as Turkish-German or Moroccan-Dutch. However, in contrast to the US and other classical immigration countries, European national identities have strong ethnic connotations and this has been pointed out as an obstacle to the construction and maintenance of hyphenated identities – although the extent to which national identities and, by implication, access to citizenship are tied to ethnic ancestry varies between European countries (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy 2005). Because the populations of most European nations have been relatively homogeneous in terms of their ethnic and religious composition as compared to the US, national identities in Europe are dominated by the majority populations and are thus less inclusive of minority groups.

This is particularly true for Muslims, who are widely perceived as 'the ultimate other' in public opinion and the media in Europe because ethnic, religious and socio-economic aspects of 'otherness' overlap in this group (Casanova 2009). Moreover, in the wake of events such as the Rushdie affair in Britain and the *affaire du foulard* in France (Modood 2003; Parekh 2008), and more prominently since '9/11', Muslims are considered a security threat. Surveys in the Netherlands also indicate perceived cultural conflict with and considerable levels of outright political suspicion against Muslims even before '9/11' (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). After this fateful event, Muslims all over Europe became targets of hostility and violence (Allen and Nielsen 2002). Thus it has been argued that Islam in Europe functions as a 'bright boundary' between the majority

2

group and minorities in a similar way as race functions in the US (Alba 2005). The fact that religion takes on the function of boundary marker and is heavily disputed in debates about immigrant integration in Europe, but less so in the US, has been attributed, among others, to the histories of church-state relations in European nations where the Christian churches had a strong grip on politics and society over centuries (Foner and Alba 2008). While church-state relations have been more intimate in all European countries as compared to the United States, there are also large differences between European countries in the extent to which particular religious groups have been privileged. Concretely, in the countries under study in this paper, historical patterns of church-state relations vary from a state church in Sweden via a heavily privileged position of the Catholic Church in Belgium to institutionalised religious pluralism in the Netherlands. Religion as a boundary marker between immigrants and the majority society can thus be expected to be of differential importance in the contexts under study. Nevertheless, due to the ethnic connotations of European national identities and the role of Islam as a bright boundary marker, we expect that among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, identification with the nation of residence will be generally in conflict with both their ethnic and in particular with their religious Muslim identity.

City identities and minority identities

While identification with European nations might be problematic for the Turkish and Moroccan second generation, cities as sites of enhanced ethnic and cultural diversity can be an alternative for the children of immigrants to develop a sense of belonging that is shared with members of the majority population (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2002). Europe's cities are characterised by a higher level of diversity than their rural hinterland and often have a cosmopolitan outlook. As sites of minority concentration, they offer economic opportunities within ethnic enclaves to immigrants and their children (Phalet and Heath, 2010). Due to the concentration of diversity in cities, dominant groups cannot claim exclusive 'ownership' of the city identity (Sassen 1999). Thus, we hypothesise that identification with the city might be more easily combined with the ethnic and religious minority identities of the second generation as compared to the national identity of their country of residence. Before we examine the identification patterns of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Antwerp, Brussels, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Stockholm, we describe the different modes of incorporation that these migrant groups face in the different contexts.

Migration histories and modes of incorporation: the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden

Migration history

The migration history of Turks and Moroccans to Belgium and the Netherlands is quite similar. Both Western European countries recruited labourers through bilateral agreements with Turkey and Morocco from the 1960s onwards to compensate for shortages on their national labour markets during the post-WWII economic boom. Since these so-called 'guest workers' were employed mainly in unskilled or semiskilled manual work, most immigrants had rather low levels of education and most of them originated from rural areas in their home country. After the restriction of labour migration following the 1973 oil crisis and subsequent economic decline, large-scale labour migration came to an end, but the annual intake of immigrants from Turkey and Morocco did not decrease substantially due to family reunification migration. In both countries, the Turkish and Moroccan communities are the most important immigrant groups from majority Muslim countries and as such figure prominently in public debates on immigration and integration particularly after '9/11' (Lesthaeghe 2000; Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Turks and Moroccans are the two largest non-Western minorities in the Netherlands; including naturalised immigrants and the second generation, they numbered 0.38 and 0.34 million respectively, thus accounting for 2.3 % and 2.1 % of the total population of the Netherlands in 2009 (Statline 2010). In Belgium, Moroccans and Turks are outnumbered by Italians as the largest immigrant group (discounting immigrants from neighbouring countries); including naturalised immigrants and the second generation, they make up respectively 2.6 % and 1.5 % of the Belgian population according to the latest Census of 2001 (Phalet, Deboosere, and Bastiaenssen 2007).

In the Swedish context, labour migration has been a less important part of the total immigration after WWII. Instead, Sweden has known a higher rate of refugee migration (Corman 2008). Nevertheless, Sweden also recruited Turkish labourers in the 1960s and until the early 1980s these Turkish immigrants and their families made up the largest Muslim immigrant group in Sweden. However, the ethnic composition of the immigrant population has become much more diverse due to the onset of large-scale refugee migration from, among others, Iran, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Afghanistan since the 1980s. As a consequence, the Muslim population in Sweden today is highly diverse in ethnic, linguistic and religious terms (Sander 1990). Moreover, due to the different Swedish immigration history, the immigrant group of Turkish origin, i.e. immigrants who are born in Turkey and their Swedish-born children, is more internally diverse than the Turkish population in most other European countries as it includes substantial shares of Kurds and Assyrians who arrived as political refugees. While the Kurds are mostly Sunni or Alevi Muslims, the Assyrians are predominantly Orthodox Christians (Sander 1993; Westin 2003).[1] In terms of

4

numbers, the Turkish minority population in Sweden is relatively small and amounted to approximately 60,000 persons in 2000 including the Swedish-born second generation, which is about 0.7 % of the Swedish population (Westin, 2003).

Integration policy and political climate

Both Sweden and the Netherlands have been pioneers in developing and implementing their own variants of multiculturalism when formulating policies of immigrant integration. Already in 1975, the Swedish government implemented an integration policy which declared as its three main aims (i) equality between native Swedes and immigrants, (ii) freedom of choice for immigrants to maintain their culture and/or adopt Swedish culture, and (iii) co-operation between native Swedes and immigrant communities (Johansson 2008). In order to realise equality between the traditionally privileged Swedish state church and new immigrant religions, the system of state funding of religious communities was reformed such that every community received funding proportionately to its membership (Sander 1993). In addition, the Swedish state funds Islamic Free schools, like those of other minority religions and philosophies (Johansson 1999). While the question whether these policies have been successful or rather generated so-called 'parallel societies' is widely discussed in public debate (ibid.), the Swedish policy approach to immigrant integration is described as one of the most inclusive in Europe, comparable to those of the classic immigration countries (Kymlicka 2000). Moreover, with the exception of the Southern Swedish region of Skåne, right-wing and openly anti-immigrant parties have not gained any noticeable support in elections (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002) until the latest national elections in September 2010. Despite this relatively favourable policy context, there is widespread prejudice against Muslims among the Swedish population and in Swedish media reporting (Otterbeck 2002); moreover, Muslims turn out to be the most rejected group in survey studies among Swedish youth (Bevelander and Otterbeck 2010; Otterbeck and Bevelander 2006).

In the Netherlands, integration policies targeting ethnic minority groups reflected the tradition of 'pillarisation' – despite the fact that the traditional 'pillars' were already dissolving when the minority policies were developed (Entzinger 2001). 'Pillarisation' refers to the provision of social services and maintenance of organisations within separate and parallel segments of society differentiated by religion or philosophy, with all pillars enjoying equal representation at the national level (Lijphart 1968). Dutch integration policies aimed to help immigrants and ethnic minorities to maintain their culture, language and religion and facilitated the establishment of ethnic and religious minority organisations. This has allowed Muslims to set up organisations and religiously based institutions such as schools and broadcasting networks, which are funded by the state like comparable institutions of other religious denominations or philosophies of life – although the Dutch state does not provide funds for strictly religious activities (Doomernik 1995; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, and Meijer 1996). In the

5

aftermath of the murders of politician Pim Fortyun and film-maker Theo van Gogh, the Netherlands has experienced a shift in policy and public discourse towards a greater emphasis on cultural assimilation (Vasta 2007; Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005). However, survey data reveal that the Dutch majority population experienced considerable levels of cultural conflict with Muslim minorities already before these major national crises and even before '9/11' (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). The increasing emphasis on assimilation has resulted in a more restrictive policy approach to immigration and integration, for instance with regard to higher hurdles for family formation migration (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2010). Nevertheless, despite shifts in public climate and policies, institutions have been slower to change such that the opportunities for Muslims to organise around their religion and receive funding for their organisational activities have not been greatly affected.

Compared to the Netherlands and Sweden, Belgium has been late to formulate and implement integration policies. Moreover, the complex federal structure of the state which includes a national government (that is responsible for issues regarding immigration), regional governments (Flemish and Walloon; they are responsible for political matters bound to their territory, such as housing, economy and welfare state) and linguistic communities (Dutch-speaking, French-speaking and German-speaking; they are responsible for education, among other things) implies that ethnic minorities encounter different policy regimes in different parts of the country (Jacobs 2000). Although immigrant integration policies are therefore shaped by multiple layers of government, the most striking policy cleavage occurs between Flanders in the North of the country, where policies were modelled on the Dutch approach, and Wallonia, where policies put more emphasis on cultural assimilation and the attenuation of social inequality, following the French approach (Jacobs 2000; Martiniello 2003). As the different layers of government intersect in the capital region of Brussels, ethnic minorities have encountered a comparatively favourable opportunity structure in the Belgian capital that gives a voice to persons and groups of different cultural backgrounds (Favell and Martiniello 1999). Due to the electoral influence of the extreme-right and openly anti-immigrant Vlaams Blok/Belang in Flanders generally, but particularly in Antwerp, the public climate with regard to ethnic and religious diversity is comparatively more hostile in Antwerp than in Brussels and Wallonia. Furthermore, the integration of Islam as a minority religion has encountered more obstacles in Belgium than in Sweden and the Netherlands. While Islam was recognised as a national religion by the national government, thus granting Muslims a legal status on an equal footing with catholics, already in 1974, the implementation of this formal status was precluded until recently. The reason for the delayed implementation of state recognition is that the Belgian state required a centralised organisation representative of the Belgian Muslim population and thus imposed upon this group an internal structure modelled after the Christian churches. In addition to this state intervention and attempts to control the organisational process and outcomes, internal divisions within the Belgian Islamic community have contributed to delaying the implementation of the legal equality of Islam (Foblets and Overbeeke 2002; Kanmaz 2002; Manço 2000).

6

Socio-economic disadvantage

It remains an open question to what extent cross-national differences in policy approaches towards immigrant integration and the accommodation of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity have resulted in different patterns of ethnic stratification in education and on the labour market across European immigrant receiving societies; or whether country differences in ethnic stratification are due to other country differences such as the state of the national economy, the stratification of the school system, the regulation of the labour market, intergenerational class mobility or the level of anti-immigrant prejudice (cf. Heath 2007). Regardless of the precise (configurations of) reasons for cross-national variation in ethnic stratification, comparative research has exposed distinct patterns of ethnic penalties and premiums in educational attainment and on the labour market for different ethnic minority groups across European countries, in line with different selectivity of the first generation of immigrants (Heath and Cheung 2007). Regarding the three comparison countries considered in this paper, ethnic penalties in education and labour market attainment appear least severe in Sweden, which therefore resembles the classic immigrant receiving countries Australia, Canada and the US as well as the UK in terms of relatively low levels of ethnic stratification (Heath 2007). Belgium, and the Netherlands, together with the German-speaking countries, on the other hand are characterised by a stronger degree of ethnic stratification in light of larger ethnic penalties in educational achievement and attainment, unemployment, and access to professional jobs (Heath and Cheung 2007). These cross-country comparative trends however need to be nuanced by group-specific patterns in each country and must therefore not be overly generalised.

As an illustration of country and city differences in socio-economic disadvantage, Figure 1 presents inactivity and unemployment rates as well as the share of persons with less than full secondary education per group and city based on weighted samples from the TIES-surveys (cf. infra).[2] Across all five cities, we observe that both Turkish and Moroccan children of immigrants have lower levels of education and higher rates of economic inactivity and unemployment than the comparison group of native descent. While the share of lowly educated persons is higher among Turks than Moroccans in all cities where both groups were sampled, differences in labour market exclusion between the two minority groups are more limited. The group least affected by the three outcomes analysed is the comparison group in Stockholm. Though disadvantaged in comparison to this reference group, the Turks in Stockholm have more favourable outcomes than the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in the other four cities, particularly in terms of education. Regarding labour market participation and access to jobs, we observe that group differences are smallest in Brussels, whereas most exclusion from the labour market occurs in the Dutch cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam.

Figure 1   *Economic inactivity, unemployment and low education (%) per group and city*

Source: TIES 06 – 07 Netherlands, TIES 07 – 08 Belgium, TIES 07 – 08 Sweden, weighted data.

Though far from being complete, this short overview of migration histories, integration policies, political climates and socio-economic disadvantage has highlighted some important differences in modes of incorporation of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in the five cities under study. In terms of policies to include immigrants and Islam as a minority religion as well as real socio-economic disadvantage, Stockholm comes out as the most favourable context of reception for the Turkish second generation. The Netherlands recently shifted from a similar multiculturalist model to an assimilationist agenda, and this is coupled with substantial levels of labour market exclusion among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in the two largest cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The two Belgian cities under study expose large disadvantages in education, more so among Turkish than Moroccan youngsters, against the backdrop of a protracted process of recognition of Islam as a minority religion, and with more hostility in Antwerp and a more open political opportunity structure in Brussels. Our empirical analysis focuses on the question of how these different contexts of reception relate to the identification patterns among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in these five cities.

A first expectation is that in all contexts under study national identification will be negatively related with religious and ethnic identifications while city identification will be more positively related to religious and ethnic identifications, due to the different prototypes of national and city identities, particularly in terms of their

openness to religious and ethnic minorities. The second hypothesis regards contextual variation in identification patterns and predicts that there will be less identity compatibility (i.e., positive associations between ethnic and religious identities on the one hand and national and city identities on the other) and more identity conflict (i.e., negative associations between ethnic and religious identities and city identities) in less favourable contexts of reception. Instead of examining the mean levels of identification with particular categories, our analysis focuses on the correlations between four categories of identification. Specifically, we will look at identification with religious (Muslims), ethnic (Turkish or Moroccan), national (Belgian, Dutch, Swedish) and city („Amsterdammer" etc.) identities.

Data and method

The TIES-surveys

The acronym TIES stands for 'The Integration of the European Second generation'. The TIES-project gathered cross-nationally comparative survey data among the children of Turkish, Moroccan and/or ex-Yugoslavian guest workers in 15 cities in 8 European countries. The surveys target children of immigrants from these countries who are born in the survey country and who are between 18 and 35 years old. In addition, in all cities a comparison group is interviewed consisting of persons of native descent (i.e., born in the survey country with both parents born in the survey country) within the same age range. In some countries (including Belgium and the Netherlands) the sampling of the comparison group was matched to that of the second generation, such that participants in the comparison group live in the same neighbourhoods as second generation participants. In other countries (including Stockholm) such a matching of the comparison group to the second generation was not possible (in the Swedish case, a random sample of persons of Swedish descent in the relevant age range was drawn). For the analysis presented in this paper, we make use of the TIES-survey data from Belgium (Antwerp and Brussels; CESO-CSCP, 2008, TIES07-08-Belgium), the Netherlands (Amsterdam and Rotterdam; NIDI-IMES, 2007, TIES06-07-Netherlands, 2007) and Sweden (Stockholm; CEIFO, 2008, TIES08-Sweden). For information about sampling, fieldwork and response rates, readers are referred to the technical reports (for the Netherlands Groenewold 2008; for Sweden Renstrand and Lundström 2008; for Belgium Swyngedouw, Phalet, Baysu, Vandezande, and Fleischmann 2008).

By sampling the same ethnic groups in different cities and countries and different ethnic groups in the same cities and countries, the surveys can reveal differences between ethnic groups and receiving contexts in integration processes and outcomes. An international questionnaire was elaborated by the participating research institutions and translated into national languages. Data collection was based on face-to-face interviews at participants' homes. Overall, response rates

to the TIES-surveys were rather low in most cities (around 30 % in Amsterdam, Brussels, Rotterdam and Stockholm, but reasonably high at 60 % in Antwerp). Although these values may be considered problematically low in surveys of the general population, they are not surprisingly low given the fact that the target population combines three characteristics associated with lower survey response: young age, inner city residence, and ethnic minority background (Stoop, Billiet, Koch, and Fitzgerald 2010). The low response rates warrant caution in interpreting mean differences across contexts as differences in means are most prone to sampling bias; correlations between variables, however, appear to be more robust to sampling bias and therefore better comparable despite low response rates (Stoop, Billiet, Koch, and Fitzgerald 2010; Van de Vijver and Leung 1997).

In light of the low response rates and in order to investigate the cross-national comparability of the TIES-surveys, we compared the characteristics of parents of the second-generation participants across cities in order to exclude differential selectivity of the first generation as an alternative explanation for contextual differences. This comparison (not shown, available upon request) showed that the parents of the participants, i.e., the Turkish and Moroccan first generation, have similar characteristics. Indeed few differences across cities were found and the comparison revealed the typical profile of Turkish and Moroccan labour migration to Western Europe in terms of the age and timing of migration, rural origin, educational qualifications and labour market attainment of the first generation. Notable deviations were found in Brussels (among both Turks and Moroccans) and Stockholm, where parental levels of education were higher as was labour market participation among mothers. These groups thus appear to be somewhat more positively selected in terms of their human capital than the comparison groups in the other cities.

Measures

The four categories of identification were measured with the same questionnaire item that was repeated for every category. The question wording was "How strongly do you feel you belong to the following groups? To what extent do you feel (1) [national], i.e. Belgian, Dutch, Swedish, (2) [city inhabitant] e.g. „Amsterdammer", Stor-Stockholmare, (3) Turkish/Moroccan, (4) Muslim?" Respondents could indicate their degree of identification on a 5-point scale ranging (after recoding) from (1) very weakly to (5) very strongly. Respondents who indicated that the relevant category of identification did not apply to them or who rejected the respective label were coded as 0 on the pertaining category of identification.[3]

Control variables include participants' gender (female dummy), age (two categories, 18 - 25, 26 - 35, the former being the reference) and highest level of education completed or currently attended if the participant was still following full-time education (three categories: less than full secondary, full secondary, any tertiary, the lowest level being the reference category).

10

Method

Multi-group structural equation modelling is used to estimate parallel models for nine groups: the Turkish second generation in all five cities and the Moroccan second generation in all cities except Stockholm. The advantage of this method is that we can test whether correlations and regression coefficients are the same or differ statistically across groups by including equality constraints.[4] Our research interest concerns the correlations between four categories of identification and how these differ across contexts. These correlations are computed in structural equation models by correlating the errors of these four identification variables. Control variables are included by drawing direct paths from gender, age and education to all four categories of identification.

A disadvantage of this method is that it can only expose contextual differences, in this case in the correlation between categories of identification, rather than explaining these differences in terms of contextual characteristics as one could do with a multilevel design. However, the number of groups, cities and countries included here is too limited for a multilevel approach. In investigating contextual differences in identification patterns, we therefore draw on a comparative case study design and develop hypotheses on how the contexts under study, in terms of their different modes of incorporation, may affect the identification patterns of the second generation (cf. supra). Subsequently, we observe whether the pattern of findings is in line with this reasoning.

Results

Figure 2 shows the mean levels of the four categories of identification per city and ethnic minority group.[5] We observe that religious and ethnic belonging are very strong among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in all five cities under study. Religious identity tends to be stronger than ethnic identity among Moroccans, while the reverse is true for Turks. In contrast to these strong identities, the feeling of belonging to the Belgian, Dutch and Swedish nation is much weaker and, in the Belgian case, even below the neutral midpoint of the scale, indicating prevalent disidentification. In all cases, identification with the city of residence is higher than with the country and the mean level of city identification is comparable to the strong levels of ethnic and religious identification in the Netherlands and Sweden, but lower in Antwerp and Brussels and among Turks in Rotterdam. These findings already suggest that the city is a more accessible category of identification than the nation for the second generation in the contexts under study. However, the mean levels do not provide an answer to the question of how the four categories of identification are related.

Figure 2   Mean levels of ethnic, religious, national and city identification per group and city

Source: TIES 06 – 07 Netherlands, TIES 07 – 08 Belgium, TIES 07 – 08 Sweden, weighted data.

Table 1 therefore displays the six partial correlations (controlling for gender, age and education) between categories of identification for the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in the five cities.[6] Despite minor variations in magnitude and significance levels, these correlations can be summarised into three distinct patterns of identification. In one pattern, we observe negative correlations

12

between national identification and religious (and sometimes ethnic) identification, with non-significant correlations between city and ethnic or religious identities. This conflict pattern occurs among the Turks and Moroccans in Amsterdam and the Turks in Stockholm. Thus for these groups there is tension between their religious and ethnic identities and the national identity of their country of residence: the more they feel Muslim (and Turkish/Moroccan), the less they identify as Dutch or Swedish. A second pattern displaying compatibility of ethnic and religious with national and city identities is found among Moroccans in Antwerp and Brussels as well as Turks in Brussels. Here we find positive correlations between city, and less frequently national, identity on the one hand and religious and ethnic identities on the other. For members of these groups, Turkish/Moroccan and Muslim identities and city and national identities thus mutually reinforce one another: the more they feel Muslim and Turkish/Moroccan, the more they feel a sense of belonging to the city and country where they live. The last identification pattern can be described as compartmentalisation and it is found among the Turks in Antwerp as well as the Turks and Moroccans in Rotterdam. Here we find no significant correlations connecting ethnic and religious with national and city identities such that variations in ethnic or religious identity are dissociated from variations in national or city identity. In other words, whether the Turkish and Moroccan second generation has a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic and religious identity is not related to their identification with the city and country of residence.

Table 1   *Correlations between four categories of identification per group and city*

	National-city	National-ethnic	National-Muslim	City-Ethnic	City-Muslim	Ethnic-Muslim
Turks in Antwerp	0.307 ***	0	0	0	0	0.550 ***
Moroccans in Antwerp	0.348 ***	0.105 ***	0	0.199 ***	0.199 ***	0.497 ***
Turks in Brussels	0.302 ***	0.114 ***	0	0.181 ***	0.131 ***	0.452 ***
Moroccans in Brussels	0.385 ***	0.115 ***	0	0.216 ***	0.187 ***	0.527 ***
Turks in Amsterdam	0.323 ***	-0.185 ***	-0.210 ***	0	0	0.533 ***
Moroccans in Amsterdam	0.521 ***	-0.217 ***	-0.219 ***	0	0	0.549 ***
Turks in Rotterdam	0.317 ***	0	0	0	0	0.645 ***
Moroccans in Rotterdam	0.440 ***	0	0	0	0	0.441 ***
Turks in Stockholm	0.304 ***	-0.186 ***	-0.154 ***	0	0	0.383 ***

Note: Correlations are estimated while controlling for gender, age and education.

Source: TIES 06 – 07 Netherlands, TIES 07 – 08 Belgium, TIES 07 – 08 Sweden, weighted data.

Since the description in terms of three distinct patterns glosses over minor differences across groups within one pattern, we formally tested the distinction between the three patterns and the uniformity within patterns by constraining the correlations between the four categories of identification to be equal within each pattern. Compared to an unconstrained model where the correlations are estimated uniquely for each group, the model with three patterns fits the data equally well ($\Delta \chi^2$ (24) = 28.856, p = .226). In contrast, a model that imposes one common pattern (i.e., all correlations are constrained to be equal across all groups) has a significantly worse fit ($\Delta \chi^2$ (48) = 142.027, p < .001).

Regarding our first hypothesis about differential associations of ethnic and religious identities with national and city identities, it is striking to observe that negative correlations of ethnic and religious identities are always related to national identity, while positive correlations are always tied to the city identity. This supports the notion that European national identities are less compatible with Muslim religious and Turkish and Moroccan ethnic identities in contrast to more compatible city identities. However, we never find negative correlations with national identity and positive correlations with city identity in the same group and in three cases, neither correlation is significant. Thus our results at best indicate a trend towards more compatibility of ethnic and religious minority identities with city rather than with national identities.

Regarding our second hypothesis about cross-national differences in identification patterns we note that, interestingly, compatibility of ethnic and religious identities with national and city identities is found only in Belgium where the mode of incorporation was least favourable of all the contexts in our sample (cf. supra). Importantly, however, these positive correlations between ethnic and religious identities on the one hand and city identity on the other are observed at relatively low levels of identification with the city and even lower levels of identification with the Belgian nation. In contrast, negative correlations between national identity and ethnic and religious minority identities occur in contexts where identification with the nation is highest in our sample, i.e., in Sweden and the Netherlands. These contexts are those that came out as most favourable modes of incorporation in our previous comparison. However, the variation in identification patterns across groups within the same context and across contexts within the same group makes clear that there is no general 'Turkish' or 'Moroccan' pattern of identification and neither a 'Belgian' or 'Dutch' one.[7] This means that we cannot interpret our findings in terms of the inclusive character of European national and city identities per se, because these identities differentially include and exclude specific ethnic and religious groups in specific cities.

14

Discussion and conclusion

In light of the identity multiplicity of the children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Europe, this paper studied second-generation identification patterns. Instead of focusing on mean levels of identification with certain categories, we focused on the associations between ethnic and religious identities on the one hand – as identities that distinguish Turkish and Moroccan minorities from the European mainstream – and national and city identities – as identities shared with the majority population. Applying a comparative approach across five major cities in three European countries, we hypothesised that identity compatibility (i.e., positive associations between ethnic and religious identity and national and city identity) rather than identity conflict (i.e., negative associations) would be found more often in more favourable contexts of reception. Moreover, due to the ethnic (white) and religious (Christian) connotations of European national identities, we expected national identities to be less inclusive of (i.e., more negatively associated with) ethnic and religious identities of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation.

The description of modes of incorporation in terms of migration history, integration policies, political climate and socio-economic disadvantage suggested that Sweden offers the most favourable context of reception to the second generation. The Belgian context was described as least favourable for the inclusion of the second generation due to the delayed formulation and implementation of integration policies and the recognition of Islam as a minority religion. The Netherlands occupied a middle position due to its recent shift from more multicultural pluralist to more assimilationst policies of immigrant integration.

Relating these modes of incorporation to patterns of identification among the second generation, we found that identity compatibility is observed in less favourable contexts of reception, whereas identity conflict occurs more often in more favourable contexts. This unexpected finding can possibly be explained in terms of an 'integration paradox' (Buijs, Demant, and Hamdy 2006; Gijsberts and Vervoort 2009). This would imply that in contexts where the second generation has a strong feeling of belonging to the nation and city where they live, they might be more aware of prejudices and discrimination against their ethnic and religious in-group and/or of the socio-economically disadvantaged position of their group. Such experiences of conflict may be less likely or even absent where national and city identifications are lower, indicating that these latter contexts are less important as frames of reference. Additional analyses are needed to test these explanations and to gain more insights into why different identification patterns are found among specific groups in specific contexts.

A number of limitations should be kept in mind when drawing conclusions on modes of incorporation and identification patterns of the second generation. First of all, the comparative case study approach to the analysis of contextual differences in identification patterns does not allow statistical testing of the influence of contextual effects such as modes of incorporation. Such a test would

require a larger number of contextual units (such as cities or countries) than available in the TIES-surveys, and it would require the operationalisation of modes of incorporation in terms of quantitative variables. Recent comparative projects have developed indicators for immigrant integration policies (MIPEX, Niessen, Huddleston, and Citron 2007) or for citizenship regimes (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2010). These indicators need to be put to test in future research using multilevel designs and including a wide range of countries. So far, however, cross-nationally comparable data that include substantial shares of ethnic minorities are still scarce. Secondly, in our study of identification patterns we had to rely on single-item measures of the four categories of identification in terms of a sense of belonging. Multiple items tapping into other aspects of social identity such as perceived importance to the self, interdependence and public regard (cf. Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004) would complement our understanding of identity multiplicity in the Turkish and Moroccan second generation.

This paper has addressed the differences in modes of incorporation and identification patterns that the Turkish and Moroccan second generation encounters in European cities. Comparisons of the integration contexts across the five cities under study described Stockholm as the most favourable context and the Belgian cities, in particular Antwerp with its polarised political climate, as the least favourable context of reception of the children of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. However, the finding that identification patterns vary within national contexts suggests that other factors than modes of incorporation at the national level (e.g., integration policies) play a role in shaping the way that ethnic and religious identity on the one hand and national and city identity on the other are related. Still, we found that identification with the city and nation of residence was higher in the contexts where modes of incorporation were more favourable. However, in these contexts identification with the nation and the city were also found to be negatively correlated with ethnic and religious identity, such that among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation in these cities, the ethnic and religious identities are in conflict with national and city identities. Concretely, this implies that the second generation feels they have to choose between a sense of belonging to their ethnic and religious in-groups and a sense of belonging to the wider society at the city and national level. On the other hand, compatibility of the identities in the form of positive correlations was only observed in cities where identification with the city and particularly the nation was low. This suggests that favourable modes of incorporation go together with high levels of identification with the host society among ethnic minorities, but at the same time this enhanced sense of belonging may imply that the second generation is also more aware of the prejudice and socio-economic disadvantage faced by their ethnic and religious in-groups. This integration paradox shows that even in the most favourable contexts for the incorporation of immigrants in Europe, tensions between European national and Muslim religious identity remain, while conflict between these categories of identification appears more limited in contexts that are less conducive to the incorporation of ethnic minorities in general and Muslims in particular – although it must be noted that the avoidance of conflict comes at the cost of particularly low levels of identification

16

with the wider society. It thus seems that the importance of Islam as a bright boundary marker interacts with modes of incorporation in Europe such that tensions between Muslim identity and European national identities increase where the second generation identifies more strongly with the country they live in.

Notes

[1] Since in our data source (cf. infra) sampling of the Turkish second generation is based on the country of birth of the parents, members of the Assyrian minority were also included in the sample. We excluded these cases for the present analysis with the aim to maximise the comparability of the Turkish second generation across countries and due to our focus on Muslim religious identities as important boundary marker in European migration contexts.

[2] Economically inactive persons are defined as those who do not have a paid job or who are unemployed, but not looking for a job. Respondents who were still in full-time education are excluded. Only persons active on the labour market are counted when calculating unemployment rates. Low education refers to the highest level of education completed or currently attended if the respondent is still in full-time education. Due to different sampling frames and generally low response rates, the data may not be optimally representative of the contexts under study, yet they are optimally comparative across contexts, at least with regard to the second generation (cf. infra). Cross-national comparisons of differences between the second generation and the comparison groups of native descent must be interpreted with great caution because the sampling of the comparison group differed across countries.

[3] In Belgium, 30.6 % of the Turkish and 25.0 % of the Moroccan second generation did not self-categorise as Belgian, 25.3 % of the Turks and 18.3 % of the Moroccans indicated that the city identity did not apply to them, while only 7.2 % of the Turkish and 8.6 % of the Moroccan respondents did not self-categorise as Turkish or Moroccan respectively and 14.1 % of the Turks and 7.4 % of the Moroccans did not self-categorise as Muslims. In the Netherlands, the percentages of respondents indicating that a category of identification was not applicable/ they did not identify at all with the respective category are as follows: Dutch identity: 6.3 % of the Turkish and 3.4 % of the Moroccan respondents, city identity: 3.7 % of the Turkish and 1.4 % of the Moroccan respondents, ethnic identity: 2.1 % of the Turkish and 1.0 % of the Moroccans, religious identity: 2.7 % of the Turkish and 1.0 % of the Moroccan respondents. In Sweden, 9.3 % of the ethnically Turkish respondents said that they do not identify at all as Swedish, 6.6 % did not identify as Stockholm resident, 2.0 % did not identify as Turkish and 7.3 % did not identify as Muslim. The higher percentages of non-identification with the nation and city in Belgium reflects the divergent structure of the questionnaire in this country as in this case the question on identification was preceded by a question of self-categorisation instead of non-categorisation being an answer category in the identification question.

[4] For instance, to test whether two correlations are equal or significantly different across groups, two models are estimated: one in which the two correlations are constrained to be equal and one in which they are unconstrained and thus estimated uniquely for each group. Subsequently, the model fit of the two models is compared using a χ^2-test. If the fit of the model with constrained correlations and the unconstrained model do not differ significantly, it can be concluded that the two correlations do not differ statistically. While χ^2 is problematic as an indicator of model fit because of its sensitivity to large N's, χ^2-tests can be used to formally test differences in model fit between nested models.

[5] Means are calculated controlling for gender, age (18-25 vs. 26-35), education (less than tertiary vs. tertiary) and economic activity (working vs. unemployed, student, other inactive).

[6] These correlations were estimated in multiple group models in structural equation modelling (with AMOS 17) in order to test the equivalence of correlations across groups and cities. Non-significant correlations were constrained to be zero if this did not result in significantly worse model fit according to χ^2-tests of constrained and unconstrained model.

[7] In the case of Sweden where we have data on only one group in one single city, we cannot examine variation across contexts or groups. However, the results from Belgium and the Netherlands, where we have data on two groups in two cities, would suggest that drawing conclusions on a general 'Swedish' pattern is not realistic.

18

References

Alba, Richard. 2005. "Bright vs. blurred boundaries: Second-generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States." Ethnic and Racial Studies 28:20-49.

Allen, Christopher and Jorgen S. Nielsen. 2002. "Summary report on Islamophobia in the EU after September 11 2001." European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Vienna.

Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An organizing framework for collective identity: articulation and significance of multidimensionality." Psychological Bulletin 130:80-114.

Bevelander, Pieter and Jonas Otterbeck. 2010. "Young people's attitudes towards Muslims in Sweden." Ethnic and Racial Studies 33:404-425.

Buijs, Frank J., Froukje Demant, and Atef Hamdy. 2006. Strijders van eigen bodem. Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Casanova, José. 2009. Europas Angst vor dem Islam. Berlin: Berlin University Press.

Corman, Diana. 2008. "Sveriges invandring och utvandring." Pp. 175-192 in Migration och etnicitet. Perspektiv på ett mångkulturellt Sverige., edited by M. Darvishpour and C. Westin. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Crul, Maurice and Jens Schneider. 2010. "Comparative integration context theory: participation and belonging in new diverse European cities." Ethnic and Racial Studies 33:1249-1268.

Doomernik, Jeroen. 1995. "The institutionalization of Turkish Islam in Germany and the Netherlands: a comparison." Ethnic and Racial Studies 18:46-63.

Entzinger, Han. 2001. "Towards a model of incorporation: the case of the Netherlands." Pp. 321-347 in Ethnic minorities and inter-ethnic relations in context. A Dutch Hungarian comparison., edited by K. Phalet and A. Örkény. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Ersanilli, Evelyn. 2010. "Comparing integration. Host culture adoption and ethnic retention among Turkish immigrants and their descendants in France, Germany and the Netherlands." Dissertation Thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences, Free University, Amsterdam.

Favell, Adrian and Marco Martiniello. 1999. "Multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-levelled Brussels: national and ethnic politics in the "Capital of Europe"."

Fleischmann, Fenella, Karen Phalet, Karel Neels, and Patrick Deboosere. forthcoming. "Contextualising ethnic educational inequality: the role of structural neighbourhood characteristics and ethnic density in second-generation attainment." International Migration Review.

Foblets, Marie-Claire and Adriaan Overbeeke. 2002. "State intervention in the institutionalisation of Islam in Belgium." Pp. 113-128 in Religious freedom and the neutrality of the state: The position of Islam in the European Union, edited by W. A. R. Shadid and S. Van Koningsveld. Leuven: Peeters.

Foner, Nancy and Richard Alba. 2008. "Immigrant religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or barrier to inclusion?" International Migration Review 42:360-392.

Gijsberts, Merove and Miranda Vervoort. 2009. "Beeldvorming onder hoger opgeleide allochtonen. Waarom is er sprake van een integratieparadox?" Sociologie 5:406-429.

Groenewold, George. 2008. "Appendix: Sample design, TIES survey implementation and evaluation." Pp. 169-179 in The Position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The TIES study in the Netherlands., edited by M. Crul and L. Heering. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Heath, Anthony. 2007. "Crossnational patterns and processes of ethnic disadvantage." Pp. 639-695 in Unequal chances: Ethnic minorities in Western labour markets, edited by A. Heath and Cheung. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heath, Anthony and Sin-Yi Cheung. 2007. "Unequal chances: Ethnic minorities in Western labour markets." in Proceedings of the British Academy, edited by T. B. Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heath, Anthony, Catherine Rothon, and Elina Kilpi. 2008. "The Second Generation in Western Europe: Education, unemployment and occupational attainment." Annual Review of Sociology 34:211-235.

Jacobs, Dirk. 2000. "Multinational and polyethnic politics entwined: minority representation in the region of Brussels-Capital." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 26:289-304.

Johansson, Bo. 1999. "Islamiska friskolor - lyckad integration eller hot mot mångfalden?" Pp. 175-194 in Blågul islam? Muslimer i Sverige, edited by I. Svanberg and D. Westerlund. Nora: Nya Doxa.

Johansson, Christina. 2008. "Svensk invandrings- och flyktingpolitik." Pp. 193-218 in Migration och etnicitet. Perspektiv på ett mångkulturellt Sverige., edited by M. Darvishpour and C. Westin. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Kanmaz, Meryem. 2002. "The recognition and institutionalisation of Islam in Belgium." Muslim world 92:99-114.

Kasinitz, Philip, John Mollenkopf, and Mary Waters. 2002. "Becoming American/ becoming New Yorkers: Immigrant integration in a majority minority city." International Migration Review 36:1020-1036.

Koopmans, Ruud, Ines Michalowski, and Stine Waibel. 2010. "Citizenship rights for immigrants. National paths and cross-national convergence in Western Europe, 1980-2008." WZB, Berlin.

Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy. 2005. Contested citizenship. Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe. Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press.

Kymlicka, Will. 2000. "Nation-building and minority rights: comparing West and East." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 26:183-212.

Lesthaeghe, Ron. 2000. "Communities and generations. Turkish and Moroccan populations in Belgium.". Brussels: VUB University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1968. The politics of accommodation: pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lubbers, Marcel, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. "Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe." European Journal of Political Research 41:345-378.

Manço, Ural. 2000. "Voix et voies musulmanes de Belgique." Brussels: FUSL.

Martiniello, Marco. 2003. "Belgium's immigration policy." International Migration Review 37:225-232.

Modood, Tariq. 2003. "Muslims and the politics of difference." Political Quarterly 74:100-115.

Niessen, Jan, Thomas Huddleston, and Laura Citron. 2007, "Migrant Integration Policy Index", Retrieved February, 2008 (http://www.britishcouncil.org/netherlands-networks-mipex-report.pdf).

Otterbeck, Jonas. 2002. "The depiction of Islam in Sweden." The Muslim world 92:143-156.

Otterbeck, Jonas and Pieter Bevelander. 2006. "Islamofobi: en studie av begreppet, ungdomars attityder och unga muslimers utsatthet." Forum för levande historia, Stockholm.

Parekh, Bhikhu. 2008. "European liberalism and 'the Muslim question'." ISIM / Leiden: ISIM Paper.

Phalet, Karen, Patrick Deboosere, and Vicky Bastiaenssen. 2007. "Old and new inequalities in educational attainment. Ethnic minorities in the Belgian Census 1991-2001." Ethnicities 7:390-415.

Phalet, Karen and Anthony Heath. 2010. "From Ethnic Boundaries to Ethnic Penalties: Urban Economies and the Turkish Second Generation." American Behavioral Scientiest 53:1824-1850.

Portes, Alejandro and Dag MacLeod. 1996. "What shall I call myself? Hispanic identity formation in the second generation." Ethnic and Racial Studies 19:521-547.

Portes, Alejandro and Ruben G. Rumbaut. 2001. Legacies. The story of the immigrant second generation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhou. 1993. "The new second generation: segmented assimilation and its variants." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530:74-96.

Rath, Jan, Rinus Penninx, Kees Groenendijk, and Astrid Meijer. 1996. Nederland en zijn islam. Een ontzuilende samenleving reageert op het ontstaan van een geloofsgemeenschap. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.

Renstrand, Nils and Sixten Lundström. 2008. "Personliga ervarenheter av integration i Stockholms län. En undersökning på uppdrag av Centrum för forskning om internationell migration och etniska relationer (CEIFO) vid Stockholms universitet. Teknisk rapport." SCB/DIH, Stockholm.

Sander, Åke. 1990. "Islam and Muslims in Sweden." Migration 8:87-134.

—. 1993. I vilken usträckning är den svenske muslimen religiös? Några överväganden kring problematiken med att ta reda på hur många muslimer som deltar i verksamheten vid de muslimska "församlingarna" i Sverige Göteborg: KIM.

Sassen, Saskia. 1999. "Whose city is it? Globalisation and the formation of new claims." Pp. 145-162 in Sustainable cities in the 21st century, edited by A. F. Foo and B. Yuen. Singapore: NUS Press.

Sniderman, Paul M. and Louk Hagendoorn. 2007. When ways of life collide. Multiculturalism and its discontents in the Netherlands. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Statline. 2010. "Bevolking; generatie, geslacht, leeftijd en herkomstgroepering, 1 januari." Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.

Stoop, Ineke, Jaak Billiet, Achim Koch, and Rory Fitzgerald. 2010. Improving survey response. Lessons learned from the European Social Survey. Chichester: Wiley.

Swyngedouw, Marc, Karen Phalet, Gülseli Baysu, Véronique Vandezande, and Fenella Fleischmann. 2008. "Technical Report TIES 2007-2008 Belgium – Extended.

Trajectories and Experiences of Turkish, Moroccan and Native Belgians in Antwerp and Brussels." CeSo/CSCP, Leuven.

Thomson, Mark and Maurice Crul. 2007. "The Second Generation in Europe and the United States: How is the transatlantic debate relevant for further research on the European Second Generation?" Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33:1025-1041.

Van de Vijver, Fons J.R. and Kwok Leung. 1997. Methods and data analysis for cross-cultural research. London: Sage.

Vasta, Ellie. 2007. "From ethnic minorities to ethnic majority policy: multiculturalism and the shift to assimilationism in the Netherlands." Ethnic and Racial Studies 30:713-740.

Verkuyten, Maykel and Katarzyna Zaremba. 2005. "Interethnic relations in a changing political context." Social Psychology Quarterly 68: 375-386.

Vermeulen, Hans and Rinus Penninx. 2000. Immigrant integration: the Dutch case. Amsterdam: Spinhuis.

Westin, Charles. 2003. "Young people of migrant origin in Sweden." International Migration Review 37:987-1010.

Zhou, Min. 1997. "Segmented assimilation: Issues, controversies, and recent research on the new second generation." International Migration Review 31: 975-1008.

22

Discussion Papers 2008

SP IV 2008-701
Tradeoffs between Equality and Difference. Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective
Ruud Koopmans

SP IV 2008-702
The Diffusion of Ethnic Violence in Germany: The Role of Social Similarity Tradeoffs between Equality and Difference
Robert Braun, Ruud Koopmans

SP IV 2008-703
The Rise of Right-Wing Populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands. A Discursive Opportunity Approach
Ruud Koopmans, Jasper Muis

SP IV 2008-704
Transnationale Familien. Zur Entstehung, zum Ausmaß und zu den Konsequenzen der migrationsbedingten Eltern-Kind-Trennung in Familien aus den klassischen Gastarbeiterländern in Deutschland
Rahim Hajji

SP IV 2008-705
Transnationale Familienverhältnisse, Verlusterfahrung und Bindungsverhalten
Rahim Hajji

Discussion Papers 2009

SP IV 2009-701
Ethnic Retention and Host Culture Adoption among Turkish Immigrants in Germany, France and the Netherlands: A Controlled Comparison
Evelyn Ersanilli, Ruud Koopmans

SP IV 2009-702
Citizenship Tests in Five Countries – An Expression of Political Liberalism?
Ines Michalowski

Discussion Papers 2010

SP IV 2010-701
Host-country cultural capital and labour market trajectories of migrants in Germany. The impact of host-country orientation and migrant-specific human and social capital on labour market transitions
Jutta Höhne, Ruud Koopmans

SP IV 2010-702
Why Swiss-Germans dislike Germans. On negative attitudes towards a culturally and socially similar group
Marc Helbling

SP IV 2010-703
Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Paths and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980-2008
Ruud Koopmans, Ines Michalowski, Stine Waibel

SP IV 2010-704
Contextual sources of perceived group threat: Immigrant group size, negative immigration-related news reports and their interaction, Spain 1996-2007
Elmar Schlueter, Eldad Davidov

SP IV 2010-705
Identity multiplicity among the Muslim second generation in European cities: where are religious and ethnic identities compatible or conflicting with civic indentities?
Fenella Fleischmann

Bestellschein   *Order Form*

Absender / Return Address:

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
für Sozialforschung
Presse- und Informationsreferat
Reichpietschufer 50

D-10785 Berlin-Tiergarten

Hiermit bestelle ich folgende(s) Discussion paper(s):	**Please send me the following Discussion paper(s):**
Bestell-Nr. / Order no.	**Autor/in, Kurztitel / Author(s) / Title(s) in brief**