

Ariane Berthoin Antal & Victor J. Friedman

Overcoming dangerous learning:

**The role of critical reflection in
cross-cultural interactions**

SP III 2004-106

ZITIERWEISE/CITATION:

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Discussion Paper SP III 2004-106
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (2004)

Forschungsschwerpunkt:

Organisationen und
Wissen

Research Area:

Organizations and
Knowledge

Abteilung:

Innovation und
Organisation

Research Unit:

Innovation and
Organization

**Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB)
Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin
Telefon: +49 30 25491-201, Fax: +49 30 25491-209
www.wz-berlin.de/ow/inno**

Abstract: Rapid globalization has increased the need and opportunity for interactions between people from different cultural backgrounds. Experience is often considered the best teacher and experiences with cross-cultural interactions represent important opportunities to learn to deal with differences. Drawing on a collection of 260 cases, this contribution argues that even when people enter into cross-cultural interactions with the intention of learning new ways of seeing and doing things, they often draw conclusions that make them unreceptive to information that might contradict what they already think. Thus, learning from experience can be dangerous when it inhibits inquiry and closes off new knowledge. This contribution illustrates the kinds of “dangerous learning” we have encountered in our research and presents strategies of critical self-reflection and interaction to generate shared understandings of situations, desired outcomes, and appropriate actions.

Zusammenfassung: Erfahrungen gelten als wichtige Lernressource, dieser Beitrag hingegen stellt anhand ausgewählter Fallstudien über interkulturelle Interaktionen dar, wie Erfahrungen dem Lernen auch im Wege stehen können. Die Untersuchung zeigt auf, dass auch Akteure, die sich bewusst in interkulturelle Situationen begeben, um neue Sichtweisen zu erlernen, auf eingeübte Interpretationsmuster und Lösungsansätzen zurückgreifen, sobald kulturelle Situationen ihren eigenen Erfahrungen und Vorstellungen widersprechen. Somit wird das unreflektierte Lernen aus Erfahrungen zu einer gefährlichen Strategie, da es die Überprüfung der Annahmen verhindert und neue Erkenntnisse ausschließt. Die Konsequenzen sind sowohl auf individueller wie auch auf organisationaler Ebene von Bedeutung, da Schlussfolgerungen aus Erfahrungslernen oft unkritisch als handlungsleitend für zukünftige Interaktionen im Organisationsgedächtnis gespeichert werden. Dieser Beitrag verdeutlicht, wie „dangerous learning“ zu Stande kommt und entwickelt interaktive Lernstrategien, um dieser Gefahr entgegenzuwirken.

Overcoming dangerous learning: The role of critical reflection in cross-cultural interactions

Rapid globalization has increased the need and opportunity for interactions between people from different cultural backgrounds. Experience is often considered the best teacher and experiences with cross-cultural interactions represent important opportunities to learn to deal with differences. But what do people actually learn from such experiences? This contribution¹ argues that even when people enter into cross-cultural interactions with the intention of learning new ways of seeing and doing things, they often draw conclusions that make them unreceptive to information that might contradict what they already think. Thus, learning from experience can be dangerous when it inhibits inquiry and closes off new knowledge.

The goal of this contribution is to illustrate the kinds of “dangerous learning” we have encountered in our research and how to overcome them. We draw on our work with international management students to explore how people learn from their experience in difficult cross-cultural interactions. Our research suggests that dangerous learning is not the result of stupidity or lack of cultural interest. Rather, people have a hard time putting a desire to be open-minded into action when encountering cultural misunderstandings and conflict. Indeed, some of the most dangerous learning occurs when the participants allow their previous knowledge to violate their own values of openness and reason.

We shall also argue that overcoming dangerous learning requires an ability to employ critical self-reflection that engages others in a process of “negotiating reality” (Berthoin Antal & Friedman 2003a and b). Critical self-reflection in cross-cultural situations involves gaining insights into one’s own thinking and emotional responses and understanding how one’s own culture influences expectations and interpretation. Negotiating reality entails combining critical self-reflection with

1 A shorter version of this article will appear in a publication resulting from The SALTA Project of the National Institute of Working Life, Stockholm: Productive Reflection and Learning at Work, Edited by D. Boud, P. Cressey, P. Doherty. Routledge

inquiry into the perspectives and logics that underlie the behavior and expectations of the other participants. It opens up new ways of seeing a situation, expands the range of potential responses and helps people become more effective at generating shared understandings of situations, desired outcomes, and appropriate actions.

Exploring cases to reveal dangerous learning

We have collected 260 cases written by students for a graduate course on cross-cultural management at a German business school. The purpose of our course was to help the participants learn to “recognize and use cultural differences as a resource for learning and for the design of effective action in specific contexts” (Berthoin Antal & Friedman 2003a: 1). Our focus was on stimulating the participants to explore and express how their cultural backgrounds shaped their assumptions and perceptions, rather than teaching them about the attributes of foreign cultures. While not denying that it is useful to learn about other cultures, we are skeptical of cultural adaptation strategies for cultural interactions, in the sense of knowing enough about different cultures to “intentionally shift into a different cultural frame of reference” and modify behavior to fit the norms of another culture (Bennett 1998: 28). The intensive course was designed to lead the students through a process of gaining insights into their past behavior by re-visiting their thought processes and their emotional responses with their peers, followed by the opportunity to redesign and try out new approaches to empower them to become more effective in future interactions (for a more detailed description of the course see Berthoin Antal & Friedman 2003b).

The cases were based on the personal experience of the students and illustrated their attempts to handle difficult cross-cultural situations. Prior to the course, the students received a standard case-writing format that included a brief background to the problem situation, their intended strategy for dealing with it, and a reconstructed dialogue to illustrate how this strategy was put into action. The dialogues were written in a two-column format (Argyris 1982; Argyris & Schön 1974, 1978). In the right hand column the case-writers reconstructed the actual words spoken or

actions taken as closely as possible. In the left hand column they recorded their thoughts and feelings during the dialogue. To close the paper, they noted the outcome and commented on the learning they drew from the experience.

The course participants had worked or studied all around the world, and they reported on difficulties working in cross-cultural teams, relating to superiors and clients, managing subordinates, interacting with peers in shared housing or at social events, and carrying out everyday business transactions. Most of the students expressed a strong interest in learning from their opportunities to work and study abroad. They saw their internships in foreign subsidiaries and semesters in foreign universities as creating experiences from which they would gain insights into different cultures, different ways of seeing and doing things. Yet, when we read the cases to discover what the students had learned from their experiences, we found that, when the students faced the challenge of achieving performance targets, their learning goals often slipped away. We combed through the cases for evidence of moments when the students stopped to reflect on their reasoning, their behavior, and their conclusions about how to improve their cross-cultural skills.

Almost none of the students engaged in a process of critical self-reflection when they encountered conflict and misunderstanding. Instead, they used their existing mindsets to interpret the situation and to define the solution. The power of their knowledge and past experience was so strong that they disregarded or misinterpreted information that could have contradicted their views and provided them with guidance. In almost every case they cast doubt on the logic, ability, or values of the other person or people involved in the situation, rather than questioning their own assumptions, thinking, or behavior.

What the students learned from their experience

In order to illustrate dangerous learning, we shall first take a close look at one case study, including excerpts from the two-column dialogue, written by student called Ralf². While this case study is typical of what many students wrote, it is not intended to be an average or representative case. It reflects some of the features and consequences of dangerous learning, and we use brief summaries of other cases in order to illustrate additional dimensions and fill out our argument.

Ralf was a German member of a small project team analyzing a company in Sydney, Australia. He was particularly happy that the team included Alex, “an intelligent and extremely motivated” Malaysian member who had been in Australia quite a while and could be relied on for local knowledge. Ralf and Johannes had only recently arrived from Germany (the team included another member whose nationality and role were not specified in the case study). Shortly before the report was to be presented, Ralf was horrified to discover that Alex had a totally different conception of how to present the team’s findings and conclusions than the approach Ralf and Johannes had been trained to use in Germany.

The following is a section from the dialogue that Ralf presented to illustrate how he dealt with this situation:

² The names of the participants in the cases have been changed.

My thoughts and feelings	What was said
<p>... actually I think it is the worst report I have ever read....</p> <p>... what is a report good for if you talk much more about the analysis than the recommendations. In which part is your client more interested in?</p> <p>... at least I hope we can reduce some damage, by making the report at least look good and readable.</p>	<p>Ralf: Hi Alex, I read the report and I think all in all you two...did quite a good job. But the report somehow is longer than I expected.</p> <p>Alex: we had to put in some additional contributions about our findings. We thought it necessary to reflect exhaustively what the various workers at Company X we interviewed told us. I talked to our professor and she said it would be advisable to do this way as the whole project is politically sensitive.</p> <p>(...)</p> <p>(...)</p> <p>Ralf: O.k. I see the importance of adapting the report to the liking of our professor. But nevertheless I would like – with the help of Johannes – to look over the finished report and apply some minor changes. You know for “us Germans” the formal style is pretty important. Thus, we would like to use 1.5 line space, rephrase some headlines and so on.</p>

It was too late to change the content, but the two Germans worked intensely to reformat the report to meet their standards. Ralf described the final report as "one big compromise for all participants," with the two Germans not liking the content and Alex not liking the appearance. Ralf concluded from this case that he could not

count on foreign team members to meet his standards. Therefore, he believed that in future he would have to take much more control from the very beginning.

What characterized dangerous learning in this, and other, instances?

1. *The case writers' reasoning and behavior closed off, or severely limited, their understanding of the other stakeholders' expectations.* There was actually plenty of information available that might have helped Ralf break out of his prior ways of thinking and learn something new. As illustrated by the dialogue, Ralf overlooked the explanation provided by Alex. He did not take on board the fact that the professor based her advice on her political understanding of the situation. Neither of these two items of information stimulated him to question his sense of what the standards should be. And he insisted on formatting the paper according to German business school style while emphasizing the importance of attending to the client—who was not German.
2. *The case-writers' reasoning and behavior prevented them from discovering, and bringing to bear, the knowledge resources implicit in the diversity of a multi-cultural team.* Despite the fact that Ralf had a positive impression of Alex and stated that he valued Alex's knowledge of the local culture, he was unable to put those thoughts into action. Ralf treated the alternative set of standards as inferior rather than inquiring into the differences between them.

In another case, Rajiv, an Indian, was assigned by his British superior to lead a small project team that included an American man and a Japanese woman. Anticipating cross-cultural conflict, he consistently applied the concept of *Madhyapantha* (the Middle Path) to force "compromises" whenever a disagreement arose. Thus, he quickly looked for solutions that would keep both sides "happy". Although he wrote that he had achieved "cultural synergy", the case data indicated that he imposed his own perspective ("the Middle Path") rather than allowing any conflict among the different perspectives. He neither questioned his own strategy nor inquired into the

differences among his colleagues as a way of discovering new ways of seeing and doing things.

3. *The case writers confirmed their beliefs that their own way was the best way even when results fell below expectations.* Under pressure, and in the aftermath of the situation, Ralf remained firmly convinced that he knew the best way to do something even though there was evidence to the contrary.

In a different case, Peter faced a big challenge during his internship in the Indonesian subsidiary of the German company: to persuade senior local managers to provide information and introduce new reporting tools. He was aware of the importance assigned to age and experience in the local culture, but took it upon himself to get people to understand the German mode of expertise-based authority. After initial attempts to show respect for the senior manager, Peter could not decode the polite responses he received, so he decided to be more direct. He concluded, “definitely my way to start this was not the best way to do it. At the following meetings I took a more authoritarian role and the results were better.” He did not learn how to communicate effectively with the local management, and he suspects that the reporting tool was discontinued a little while later because it was not well adapted to the management processes.

4. *The case writers employed knowledge about cultural differences to explain away problems rather than to explore, or solve, them.* Paradoxically, prior cultural knowledge may actually contribute to dangerous learning. For example, Michael had prepared for his internship in the Japanese subsidiary of a German bank. He wanted to produce high quality work for his female Japanese boss, who was very busy and had little time for him. He was frustrated by the fact that she criticized what he delivered but he did not feel that it would be culturally appropriate to address his concerns. He “remembered from my Japanese language and culture preparation class that open discussions of conflicts are highly uncommon in Japan and I


certainly did not want to break this rule.” He did not learn how to achieve the necessary clarification and remained frustrated.

5. *The case writers violated their own deeply held values while remaining unaware of these inner contradictions.* Maria, a German, was proud of the way she obtained support for her preferred solution to a team assignment during her semester abroad in the U.S. The group, consisting of four women (a German, a Danish, an American and a Puerto Rican), and an American man, had to develop a strategy to resolve an international policy dilemma. She was sure that the male group member, who had served in the U.S. marines, would seek a strategy based on military intervention, but as a pacifist she could not condone the use of force. By talking with each of the other group members before the team meeting, she ensured they would share her diplomacy-based solution. Not until she discussed the situation half a year later in the cross-cultural competence course we led in Germany did she realize that she had seriously compromised the values she prized. By amassing a coalition for the diplomatic solution, she had used force to achieve her pacifist goals. In addition, she had lost an opportunity to learn from the team member whose views she disagreed with.

Experience and dangerous learning

Experience is often considered the most common and most powerful source of learning to become more effective in dealing with the challenges of daily life. People learn from their own, direct experience and through that of others (Bandura 1977). Kolb (1984) conceptualized learning from experience as a cycle that encompasses experiencing, reflecting, conceptualizing, and planning (see Figure 1). Kolb's model implies that these four stages follow one another in a natural fashion and that each cycle expands upon and improves existing knowledge.

Figure 1: Kolb's Cycle of Experiential Learning



Source: D. Kolb (1984) *Experiential Learning*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Prentice Hall: 21

Dangerous learning occurs when people move between concrete experience and active experimentation, short-circuiting the learning cycle, with little or no time or attention devoted to reflection and abstract conceptualization. The problem is that, because people are rarely aware of not having completed the learning cycle, they do not suspend their learning and wait for an opportunity to collect, interpret and apply sufficient information about the situation and their behavior. They draw conclusions from the experience anyway. Dangerous learning may involve what behaviorists have called “superstitious learning” (March & Olsen 1976; Skinner 1948), in which pigeons, people, and organizations incorrectly attribute environmental responses to their actions. The learning is *dangerous* because it limits individuals’ ability to expand their repertoires while leaving them with the sense that they have learned from experience.

Such short-circuited learning cycles are encountered frequently in management (Honey & Mumford 1986; Honey 1991). The problem lies partially in the kind of automatic thinking and behavior that enables competent action in most situations (Friedman & Lipshitz 1992). Automatic thinking and behavior is possible because

people possess "theories of action" (Argyris & Schön 1974, 1978) or "mental models" (Senge 1990) that guide perception, the interpretation of information, and the selection of appropriate action. Theories of action are largely shaped by a person's cultural repertoires; that is, the cumulative influence of various cultures on a person's learning from experience. Theories of action enable people to quickly read and respond to situations. They represent a kind of tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1967) that enables people to perform everyday tasks – from tying shoes to managing a project – with little or no conscious thought.

The problem is that these same structures lead people to perceive what they already know (Weick 1979), making it difficult to pick up cues suggesting the need for a radical rethinking of interpretations or behavior. Thus, in cross-cultural conflicts, people's reactions are rarely "Maybe I should reflect on how I may be misinterpreting the situation?" or "Maybe I should consider the logic in the other's person's arguments or actions?" The obvious fact of cultural differences is used to explain away the conflict rather than reflect on it. As a consequence, individuals become less receptive to information and feedback from their environments, making it difficult for them to learn new ways of interpreting reality and acting on them.

The costs of the dangerous learning were high for our students. They admitted that their solutions were often not particularly good, and they usually had to bear the largest portion of the work. In many instances, they sacrificed their values, quality standards, potential relationships, and leisure time. Until stimulated to reflect self-critically, the experience seemed to teach them that they had done the only thing possible, so that next time they were likely to do the same, maybe even more intensely.

Two kinds of reflection

The foregoing cases and analysis point to the dangers of processes of experiential learning which short-circuit Kolb's cycle, and to the need for promoting critical self-reflection in cross-cultural interactions. We looked for evidence of two kinds of

reflection in the cases: "reflection on action" and "reflection-in-action." Donald Schön described the distinction between them as follows:

We may reflect *on* (italics in original) action, thinking back on what we have done in order to discover how our knowing-in-action may have contributed to an unexpected outcome. We may do so after the fact ... or we may pause in the midst of an action ... In either case, our reflection has no direct connection to present action. Alternatively, we may reflect in the midst of an action without interrupting it ... during which we can still make a difference to the situation at hand – our thinking serves to reshape what we are doing while we are doing it. I shall say, in cases like this, that we reflect-*in*-action (italics in original). (Schön 1987, p. 26)

Reflection-in-action becomes important when a person's almost automatic repertoires for action fail to produce the intended results.

Skilled reflection-in-action means experiencing these moments of blockage or failure as a puzzle in which there is something unique, unclear, or not fully understood in the situation. It also means turning thought back on itself so that people can reconsider their perceptions of situations, their assumptions, their goals, and/or their action strategies. Reflection-in-action is focused on a specific practice context and never ends with insight alone. It involves action to transform or “make something” of the context (Schön 1987, p. 31). Schön described the potential benefits of the informal interplay of “reflection on” and “reflection in” action:

... our reflection on our past reflection-in-action may indirectly shape our future action ... As I think back on my experience..., I may consolidate my understanding of the problem or invent a better or more general solution to it. If I do, my present reflection on my earlier reflection-in-action begins a dialogue of thinking and doing through which I become ... more skillful ... these several levels and kinds of reflection play important roles in the acquisition of artistry. (Schön 1987, p. 31)

These two kinds of reflection are different and distinguishable, and they are both important for learning.

The two-column dialogues provide insights into the problematic nature of the students' reflection-in-action. They almost never reacted to uncertainty, conflicts, and misunderstandings by questioning their own assumptions and exploring new

ways of interpreting situations and acting upon them. They tended to remain focused on their initial objectives, only changing the tactics used to achieve them.

The retrospective evaluation of the outcome of the situation provided data on their reflection on action. The group work during the course itself also provided an opportunity for reflection on action, as each student's case was analyzed in turn, creating opportunities to see what had happened in fresh ways and to envision different potential responses for the case writer. In reflecting on action, most of the students wrote or said that they had learned from their experience but most of these lessons were simply explanations of the problem. Few of the students went so far as to specify how this learning would help them act more effectively in a similar situation the future. Indeed, most of these "lessons" confirmed pre-existing knowledge, ways of doing things, and closed off options for learning new ways of thinking and acting. In addition, the students generally located the problem in others rather than in themselves. In many cases the students simply concluded that they had had no choice, which is a feature of dangerous learning.

There were exceptions, though surprisingly few, to this lack of critical self-reflection. A very small number of students wrote about two phases in their cases, describing how they had recognized a problem in a situation, given it some thought, and then tried a new approach to dealing with it. For example, a French intern in a Japanese company in Paris had a Chinese team member to work with. Louise expected that the Chinese colleague's foreign perspective would be useful for the latter stage of the project, in which they would be expected to come up with new suggestions. However, she was confident that her approach to the initial stage, analyzing the market, was "a routine task" that "should not raise any cultural problem" because a "Chinese business student from a business school would have learned the same things and done the same work."

Louise later discovered that it had been an error to assume that her team member's "yes" had meant full agreement, leading to an embarrassing situation when a senior manager asked for data that neither of them had collected. Recognizing that she "had done a very bad job during the first meeting" with her

Chinese colleague, she decided to revise her approach to the teamwork. In a subsequent meeting she posed questions designed to discover how her colleague saw the purpose of the study and the procedure for carrying it out. They came up with a new approach, agreed on dividing up the task, and successfully completed the analytical part of the study. This experience stood them in good stead while working through their different perspectives during the creative part of the study and their manager was satisfied with the result.

In the reflection section of their papers some of the students recognized the traps they had fallen into. Revisiting the situation with a certain distance, they were able to reflect self-critically on their assumptions, interpretations, and behavior. They raised questions about their performance and exhibited skill in identifying contradictions, gaps, and puzzles in their own thinking and behavior. They revised their original conclusions and expressed a desire to try different approaches. For example, Michael was full of questions about what he could have done better, how he could have discovered ways of communicating more effectively with his boss, and how to deal with similar situations in the future.

Judging from our analyses of the two-column dialogues, less than a handful of case-writers demonstrated any ability to effectively practice reflection-in-action during their attempts to solve a cross-cultural problem. Maria was surprised, and deeply disturbed, when she was made aware of how she had used force (creating a political coalition) rather than reason in dealing with disagreement. Rajiv admitted that he had failed "in coming out of my shell of possessiveness of my leadership position." He also admitted that he had been doubtful from the beginning about achieving the results he had promised to his superior, but had kept these doubts to himself because he "was more concerned about agreeing to what the boss said rather than being honest and telling him that the target might not be achieved."

For most of the students, the discovery of alternative interpretations of the situation and action strategies came only through active engagement in the course. They needed help from others, as well as a set of conceptual tools, to challenge the

conclusions they had drawn from the experience and to open themselves to exploring different responses.

Overcoming dangerous learning: Negotiating reality

Avoiding the trap of dangerous learning requires the ability to experience uncertainty, or “not knowing”, in order to let new meanings emerge. It also involves an ability to engage others in a process of inquiry, experimentation, and joint reflection – often in the very midst of conflict. We have named these abilities “negotiating reality”, which we define as “the process whereby individuals generate an effective strategy of action in a cross-cultural interaction by making themselves and each other aware of their culturally-shaped interpretations and responses to a given situation and expanding their repertoire appropriately” (Berthoin Antal & Friedman 2003a: 16). Negotiating reality is grounded in three fundamental values or beliefs: (1) as human beings, all people are of equal importance and worthy of equal respect; (2) as cultural beings, people differ because they possess different repertoires of ways of seeing and doing things, and (3) the repertoire of no individual or group merits a priori superiority. Dangerous learning almost always involves a violation, though often unintentional, of one of these values.³

The goal of our course was to help the students learn this cross-cultural competency if they wished to do so. It is beyond the scope of this contribution to describe the various components of negotiating reality and the learning process we designed for acquiring these skills (see Berthoin Antal & Friedman, 2003b for a detailed description of this process). We have found that when people inquire into other people’s logics with real curiosity and appreciation, they are likely to discover valuable insights and alternative interpretations that will expand or correct their own perceptions of a situation. The information they gain may be useful in redefining the goals or strategies.

Equally importantly, by sharing the reasoning behind their thinking with others (which we term ‘advocacy’), people create the possibility that their counterparts will

³ We are indebted to Tanja Busch for drawing our attention to this point.

also gain fresh perspectives with which they may adjust their definition of the situation, goals, and strategies. The dual process of inquiry and advocacy makes it more likely that people will avoid or clarify misunderstandings, create a shared image of reality, and generate collaborative action.

Prior knowledge of a culture is a valuable resource in negotiating reality when it is used for posing questions, but impedes the ability of individuals to engage in negotiating reality when it ends exploration. Instead of imposing generalized knowledge about cultural differences on a situation, people need to use it as a basis for "reflective transfer" (Schön & Rein 1994), guiding inquiry into what is truly unique, different, puzzling, and important in this specific instance. Research on international managers confirms that such a learning stance distinguishes particularly effective managers (Ratiu 1983).

Conclusions

The idea of dangerous learning should lead to a healthy skepticism when people claim to have learned from experience in cross-cultural situations. Furthermore, the paradoxical finding from our work about the high risk of dangerous learning among individuals who had made an effort to inform themselves of a culture in advance signals the need for careful course design in cross-cultural management. It is dangerous when cultural knowledge is used in a way that impedes people's ability to collect more information and respond in a new way to the situation. Unfortunately, in almost all the cases, the students imposed their prior cultural knowledge upon the new situation and used it to explain the actions of others and their own frustrations. These explanations became an end point of analysis rather than an opening for inquiry. The courses the case writers had attended and the culture books they had read had not taught them to test their explanations openly with the other people.

There is no reason to assume that dangerous learning is limited to cross-cultural situations. This contribution has attempted to show that there is a high risk that what people call learning from experience is often actually a confirmation what they

already know. Instead of using their existing knowledge and expertise as a point of departure for inquiry, they tend to impose this information on their interpretations of reality and cling to familiar strategies. In many instances, they react in these ways despite their intention to learn from others.

Our findings about dangerous learning suggest directions for further inquiry. It is particularly important to understand the role organizational conditions play in reinforcing dangerous learning or promoting negotiating reality. For example, structure and power relations may influence the openness of individuals to critical self-reflection. In many of the cases, time pressures appeared to be a factor in the short-circuiting of the learning cycle. Thus, it is possible that the particular ways in which time is perceived and structured in organizations is more, or less, conducive to reflection.

Finally, the problem of dangerous learning at the individual level raises question about organizational learning as well. Given the rhetoric about globalization and diversity, what do organizations actually learn from contact with different ways of thinking and acting? Our findings suggest that programs intended to enhance effectiveness in cross-cultural interactions may unwittingly inhibit exploration and learning. When organizational actors draw conclusions from dangerous learning, they may reinforce shared mental models rather than questioning and adjusting them in light of new environmental demands. In addition, the features of dangerous learning may actually become embedded in organizational routines and standard operating procedures so that they impede experimentation and the discovery of new organizational responses. More attention, therefore, needs to be paid to the connection between dangerous learning at the individual and organizational levels.

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