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The WZB Berlin Social Science Center conducts basic research with a focus on problems of modern societies in a globalized world. The research is theory-based, problem-oriented, often long-term and mostly based on international comparisons.

Key research topics include:
- democracy and civil society
- migration and integration and intercultural conflicts
- markets, competition, and behavior
- education, training, and the labor market
- inequality and social policy
- gender and family
- international relations
- transnationalization and the rule of law
- innovation and science policy

160 German and international researchers work at the WZB, including sociologists, political scientists, economists, legal scholars, and historians.

Research results are published for the scientific community as well as for experts in politics, business, the media, and civic organizations.

As a non-university research institute, the WZB is member of the Leibniz Association. The WZB closely cooperates with Berlin universities. Its directors also hold chairs at universities in Berlin and beyond.

The WZB was founded in 1969 by members of the German parliament from all parties. The WZB is funded by the Federal government and the state of Berlin.
Gender relations are one of society’s perennial issues. As progressive as modern social systems are in many respects, gender equality is still on the agenda—and rightly so. Women continue to receive considerably less pay than men do for the same work. The gender pay gap in Germany is especially wide. The European Commission has been urgently working on the topic since 2017, and EU Commissioner of Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Věra Jourová, has signaled that this aspect of discrimination is not unlike the #MeToo movement. As she stated, “the economic independence of women is their best protection against violence.” The gender debate reaches deep into our lives, encompassing family, work, education, health, care, and retirement benefits. WZB research has something important to say about all these matters, as this report shows. But it is not just in our research that we academics should call attention to discrimination and reveal its causes. Our own profession, science, must also look itself in the mirror. The new WZB director Macartan Humphreys acknowledges in his widely read blog-post—“Gender discrimination in political science and the problem of poor allies”—that he and his colleagues have not spoken up for women scholars in their very real concerns. He described the surprise that he and his colleagues felt at the criticism leveled at them, for they believed they had sound reasons for their behavior—and actually considered themselves allies of their women colleagues. Getting to the heart of the matter requires a good deal of critical self-reflection. The same applies to the WZB, too—even with two women leading it and outstanding scores on its adherence to the Leibniz Association’s standards of gender equality. We will keep at it.

Jutta Allmendinger and Ursula Noack
Dynamics of Social Inequalities
Research Unit Skill Formation and Labor Markets
Director: Professor Heike Solga
Research Professorship Transitions to Adulthood
Professor Ingrid Schoon
Research Group Demography and Inequality
Head: Professor Anette Eva Fasang
Project Group National Educational Panel Study: Vocational Training and Lifelong Learning
Head: Professor Reinhard Pollak
Junior Research Group Work and Care
Head: Professor Lena Hipp
ERC-Project Group Effort and Social Inequality
Head: Professor Jonas Radl

Markets and Choice
Research Unit Market Behavior
Director: Professor Dorothea Kübler
Research Unit Economics of Change
Director: Professor Steffen Huck
Research Professorship Market Design: Theory and Pragmatics
Professor Daniel Friedman
Research Professorship Advice and Decision Making
Professor Andrew Schotter
Junior Research Group Ethics and Behavioral Economics
Head: Dr. Agne Kajackaite
WZB-Free University Junior Research Group Neuroeconomics
Head: Professor N.C. Peter Mohr

International Politics and Law
Research Unit Global Governance
Director: Professor Michael Zürn
Research Professorship Global Public Law
Professor Mattias Kumm
Research Professorship Political Theory
Professor Rainer Forst
WZB-FU Junior Research Group
Governance for Global Health
Head: Professor Anna Holzscheiter
Junior Research Group
Global Humanitarian Medicine
Head: Dr. Tine Hanrieder

Digitalization and Societal Transformation
Research Group Science Policy Studies
Head: Professor Andreas Knie
Project Group Globalization, Work, and Production
Head: PD Dr. Martin Krzywdzinski
Project Group The Internet Policy Field
Head: Professor Jeanette Hofmann

Dynamics of Political Systems
Research Unit Democracy and Democratization
Director: Professor Wolfgang Merkel
Research Professorship Theory, History and Future of Democracy
Professor John Keane

Migration and Diversity
Research Unit Migration, Integration, Transnationalization
Director: Professor Ruud Koopmans
Project Group International Citizenship Law
Head: Professor Liav Orgad

Political Economy of Development
Research Unit Institutions and Political Inequality
Director: Professor Macartan Humphreys

Trans-sectoral Research
Center for Global Constitutionalism
Managing Head: Professor Mattias Kumm
Against Elites, Against Outsiders
Heads: Dr. Heiko Giebler, Professor Ruud Koopmans, Professor Wolfgang Merkel, Dr. Susanne Veit
Doctoral Program: “Good Work”
Head: Professor Jutta Allmendinger
Center for Civil Society Research
Head: Professor Edgar Grande
Experimenting with Causality
Heads: Professor Michael Zürn, Professor Steffen Huck, Professor Macartan Humphreys
School-to-Work Transition of SEN Students
Heads: Professor Heike Solga, Professor Ingrid Schoon, Professor Reinhard Pollak

President’s Project Group
Head: Professor Jutta Allmendinger
It was clear for a long time that 2017 would not be a boring year. The WZB would need to find a new managing director, prepare for the 2018 evaluation by the Leibniz Association, and make progress on planning the building that would extend the WZB. Our substantive agenda was also exciting and demanding: We intended to relaunch the research on civil society and help develop a new German center of migration research; as consortium leader of several institutions in Berlin and Brandenburg, the WZB would also be participating in the national competition for a new institute for the study of digitalization and society. Furthermore, we would be cooperating with the universities to submit a cluster application in the next selection round of the German federal government’s strategy for excellence so that the Berlin-wide network of research in the social sciences could finally take off.

We tackled these challenges and were encouraged by several pieces of good news. Here are two examples. In mid-December, we learned from the Leibniz Association that we had received 66 of 68 possible points on gender equality, the highest score of any Leibniz institution. Given our achievements in 2017, it shows again that both women and men can excel in the sciences while also raising children well as fathers and mothers. We will achieve the remaining two score points, too. Other good news reached us at the end of the year. The Chan family that has endowed the A.SK award conferred by the WZB for practical social science research decided to double the sum and to considerably increase the number of months for the fellowships. We very gratefully acknowledge this sign of recognition, which came as a surprise to us.

A New Leadership Duo

We searched long and hard for a successor to managing director Heinrich Baßler and ultimately found that the best person was in our own ranks, namely, Ursula Noack. Having headed the WZB’s department of finance and general administration for many years as a business economist with a master’s degree in personnel development, she won out impressively against stiff competition. Ursula Noack became the new managing director in July 2017 and was welcomed with a major celebration.

From the Research Units

After it became clear in late 2016 that we had succeeded in attracting Macartan Humphreys from Columbia University to join the WZB, a new research unit, Institutions and Political Inequality, was created as part of an equally new Research Area, the Political Economy of Development. Macartan Humphreys’s team is now nearly complete, with seven dedicated, curious, and astute doctoral and postdoctoral researchers from the United States, Hungary, Portugal, and Columbia.

To strengthen sociological research on inequality, we decided to invite applications for a WZB-funded junior research group in the Research Area on Dynamics of Social Inequalities. This competitive selection process has almost been completed. In addition, the WZB has added a project group headed by Jonas Radl and funded by a starting grant from the European Research Council (ERC). The group, which is based at the WZB and the University of Madrid, is working on the topic of “Effort and Social Inequality: Advancing Measurement and Understanding Parental Origin Effects.”

In the field of economics, the Research Area on Markets and Choice has changed. The junior research group led by Ferdinand Vieider has been succeeded by one on Ethics and Behavioral Economics headed by Agne Kajackaite, formerly a postdoctoral researcher in the department of economics at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. Her research focuses on unethical behavior and lies. Another update from the Research Area on Markets and Choice was Dorothea Köbler’s competitive acquisition of Leibniz Association funding to examine market design in the public sphere (such as the allotment of places at schools and universities, public procedures for awarding contracts). The researchers are studying the effects of market designers’ political motives and of corruption and favoritism.

The Research Area on International Politics and Law was expanded in August 2017 by a new research professorship in political theory, a position for which the WZB recruited Rainer Forst, professor of political theory and philosophy at the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main. This research area also hosts Tine Hannrieder, whose Junior Research Group on Global
Humanitarian Medicine (funded by a Freigeist Fellowship from the Volkswagen Foundation) was publicly introduced at an opening event in July 2017.

The Research Area on Migration and Diversity welcomed Liav Orgad (formerly from Columbia University, Harvard, the Freie Universität Berlin, and other institutions) who brought his ERC starting grant on "International Citizenship Law." Another successful application in the Leibniz Association’s competitive procedures strengthened cooperation with WZB Fellow Marc Helbling and his home institution, the University of Bamberg.

The Research Area on Society and Economic Dynamics also continued developing. It was renamed to address Digitalization and Social Change and now includes The Internet Policy Field Project Group. This research area builds bridges between the WZB and the two Berlin entities studying the consequences that digitalization entails for society: the Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society and the Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society a new cooperative venture funded by the German Federal Ministry of Research (see below).

The WZB Reaches Out

Excellent international researchers are invited to speak in the WZB series Distinguished Lectures in Social Sciences. In 2017, the WZB welcomed the economist Sir Richard Blundell (University College London) and the sociologist Robb Willer (Stanford University). The successful series of public events entitled "Junge Wissenschaft trifft Politik" (Junior Science Meets Politics) addresses broader audiences. Its objective is to present the WZB’s research spanning the scholarship of several areas and to offer junior academics a large forum. The series was launched in 2017 with a discussion about the then-impending G20 summit with Lars-Hendrik Röller – former WZB director and current chief economic and finance advisor to the German federal chancellor. Later in the series, young WZB researchers had a lively discussion with Katja Kipping, leader of the leftist political party Die Linke, about what sabbaticals can contribute to structuring working hours and biographical time. Inclusive growth was the keyword for the exchange with Uwe Beckmeyer, Parliamentary Undersecretary of the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, who stood in on short notice for Federal Minister Brigitte Zypries. The young scholars shared insights from their research on the energy transition, the data economy, and the digitalization of work.

As a result of the discussions in the "Political Challenges" group, which formed spontaneously at the WZB after the dramatic world events especially in connection with the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump in the United States, the Information and Communication Department is coordinating a new series of events entitled "Achtung: Demokratie" (Attention: Democracy). This series encompasses a variety of formats ranging from small, rather internal discussion sessions to major public events at which the political challenges of today are explored. Bernhard Weßels launched the series with an analysis of the election to the Bundestag in September 2017. Another significant event in this series was a lecture by Harvard professor Naomi Oreskes on "Why We Should Trust Science."

The WZB Lunch Talks continue to prove a successful instrument for networking and communication. Jutta Allmendinger discussed the state of educational reforms in Berlin with the members of the Science and Research Committee in the Berlin House of Representatives. Speaking to a group of cultural directors and general managers, Steffen Huck presented the results of his experiments in cultural fundraising.

The WZB actively disseminates the results of its research beyond the scientific community. Public interest was especially strong in research about the work of the right-wing political party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) in the state parliaments, discrimination against women in their search for opportunities in training and education, the socially exclusionary practices of private schools in Germany, international comparison sabbatical arrangements, and the influence that seals of approval have on charitable giving. The research on democracy in the 2017 election year contributed a great deal to public discussion, including strategic cooperation with Zeit Online.

The WZB has increased its presence on Twitter. More than 6,500 readers meanwhile follow the WZB news channel, and the number is growing steadily with up to 160 new subscribers per month. The WZB is linked over Twitter to many organizations across the entire spectrum of topics. The number of profile visits has already doubled, and WZB tweets are read more than 100,000 times a month.

New Cooperative Ventures

The WZB is an active advocate for the social sciences, for which it cooperates closely with universities and other research institutions in Germany and abroad. In many areas these activities have led to new structures, such as the
National Education Panel Study (NEPS), the institutionalized exchange forums in the College for Interdisciplinary Education Research (CIDER), and the Berlin Interdisciplinary Education Research Network (BIEN) in behavioral economics.

Center for Civil Society Research
For years, the WZB has endorsed the establishment of a center on the research of civic involvement. This goal has now been achieved with the creation of The Center for Civil Society Research. Its founding director is Edgar Grande, Professor of Comparative Political Science at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. The Freie Universität Berlin is a cooperation partner. The Stiftung Mercator and the Volkswagen Foundation are major sources of the center’s funding. The initial task is to establish the center in research as a cooperative undertaking between an overarching program area of the WZB and the Freie Universität Berlin. In the medium and long term, we foresee that the new center will leave the WZB and develop into an independent institute.

Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society
A joint application by six institutions in Berlin and Brandenburg to create the Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society was approved in May 2017. This consortium thus won out over four other finalists, from Munich, Bochum, Karlsruhe, and Hanover. The German Federal Ministry of Education and Research is funding the institute with €50 million for the first five years. The WZB is responsible for the administrative coordination of the consortium and hosts the head office. The task of the Weizenbaum Institute will be to study current social changes emerging in the context of digitalization and to outline future political and economic options. Twenty research groups from the social sciences, economics, law, design research, and informatics will be working together on these issues. Jeanette Hofmann and Martin Krzywinski, both from the WZB, head three research projects of the Weizenbaum Institute.

German Center for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM)
The DeZIM was founded in mid-2017, funded with nearly seven million euros from the budget of the German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women, and Youth. The center’s objective is to put the research on integration and migration on a firm footing in Germany, to improve its networks, and to close research gaps. The WZB is a founding member of the center’s managing body, DeZIM e.V. Seven institutions of integration and migration research in Germany have joined the DeZIM community, which is open to additional membership. The WZB’s Research Unit on Migration, Integration, Transnationalization will take part in five projects.

We have launched close cooperation in other areas, too. In August 2017 the project entitled “Places of Democracy,” funded by the Mercator Foundation, marked the start of the WZB’s institutional cooperation with the office of the German federal president, to which the research unit led by Wolfgang Merkel will provide advice on issues of democracy. One of the planned activities is a lecture series. Another cooperative activity that further strengthens the work relating to digitalization is the creation of a special professorship (W 3) as a joint 5-year appointment with the Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg. Lastly, the WZB’s interdisciplinary doctoral program on “Good Work” is now contractually connected with the regional network Brandenburg Bündnis für Gute Arbeit (Alliance for Good Work). We are also planning to hold dialogues between the scientific and the decision-making communities and to offer assistance with approaching Brandenburg businesses and labor-policy actors to conduct case studies or set up transfer projects.

Another new step this year is the program to host fellows from Harvard University’s Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at the WZB. We welcomed Grzegorz Ekiert and Chase Foster as the first fellows to participate in this arrangement. The plan is to intensify the exchange of researchers between our institutions.

The best cooperative ventures are those that run so well that everyone involved would like them to be put on a firm formal footing. That has been the case with the Visual Society Program (ViSoP) that the WZB and the Berlin University of the Arts (UdK) created together. Three years after its inauguration in 2014, a formal cooperation agreement was signed by the President of the UdK Martin Renner and Jutta Allmendinger to provide for the ViSoP.

Friends and Alumni
The Friends of the WZB – an association whose membership has grown to thirty-five very active individuals and three corporate entities – continued their gatherings and funding projects in 2017. At the annual meeting in May, they engaged in discussion with the 2016 winners of the Friends of the WZB Award: Anselm Rink, Maja Adena, and Heiko Giebler. In June, Wolfgang Merkel sparked a fruitful exchange with a keynote lecture on the state of western democratic orders. In July, an exhibition of the photographer Jacobia Dahm was opened at the WZB with financial support from the associa-
tion. In November, the Friends convened in the fireplace room of the Max Liebermann House to meet with Germany’s former Federal President Horst Köhler who discussed with them his vision of how Europe should tackle global responsibilities. Food for thought, debate, networking, consultation – the added value of these encounters is high for all involved, with trust and appreciation growing.

After successfully attracting funds to expand its alumni program in 2016, the WZB acquired additional funds in 2017. A grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation will enable the WZB to hold an alumni conference entitled "Social Sciences in Times of Brexit" at Oxford University’s Nuffield College. The exchange between WZB alumni, other academics, and representatives of academic and administrative institutions and boards about science policy is intended to shed light on possible impacts of Brexit, elucidate strategies for coping with them, and promote networking between researchers and institutions in Germany and the United Kingdom.

Praise and Honors

The €100,000 A.SK Social Science Award was conferred by the WZB for the sixth time in 2017. This year’s recipient was political scientist John Ruggie of Harvard University. As United Nations Special Representative on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Ruggie drafted the United Nations Global Compact, which obligates multinational business organizations to uphold human rights. The tribute to his achievements was delivered by Bärbel Dieckmann, president of Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, one of Germany’s biggest private organizations for development and humanitarian aid. The A.SK Award ceremony also included two A.SK Fellowships, one granted to Philipp Hacker, a postdoctoral legal scholar specializing in behavioral economics and technology. At the WZB he will be researching changes power relations in legally constituted markets driven by self-learning algorithms. The second fellowship was received by Alexander Horn, who lectures and conducts research at the Institute of Political Science at the Aarhus University in Denmark. In his cross-national study he is examining whether and how different concepts and ideas of equality abet the development of economic inequality.

Bestowing these honors is an honor for us as well. Many of our scientists have received awards over the years. There have also been distinctions for work outside the classical academic formats. The WZB’s image film was prominently feted in the summer when it was nominated for one of Germany’s oldest cinematic awards, the Wirtschaftsfilmpreis, sponsored by the German Federal Ministry of Economics. The multimedia website "Double Shift" about Syrian refugee children in the Jordanian school system received the German Design Award. The website (and a book with the same title) was produced in the context of our Visual Society Program (ViSoP) by Steffen Huck with the Berlin University of the Arts and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Personnel and Finances

The average number people working at the WZB in 2017 was 402, which is 27 more than in 2016, including student assistants, interns, and apprentices. At the end of 2017, academics on temporary employment contracts accounted for 88.8 per cent of the research staff (in full-time equivalents). Doctoral candidates constituted 40 per cent of the academic staff. Four apprentices completed their training at the WZB at the end of 2017.

To increase the share of women among the academic personnel, particularly in senior research positions, the WZB actively pursues an equal opportunity policy. At the end of 2017, women held 42.1 per cent of the senior research positions and represented 52 per cent of the academic employees. At the end of the year, women accounted for 60.1 per cent of all WZB staff and 45.5 per cent of the nonacademic senior positions.

Most of the WZB’s funding in 2017 came from the Joint Initiative for Research and Innovation, in which the WZB participates as a member of the Leibniz Gemeinschaft. The revenues received, and thus the total funds spent, at the WZB in 2017 amounted to €23.3 million (2016: €21.2 million). The German federal government, the Land (state) government of Berlin, and the other Länder contributed just over €17 million of institutional funding to the WZB’s budget in 2017 (compared to €16.8 million in 2016). Pending the finalization of the annual balance sheet, external funding for research and development totaled €6.7 million in 2017 (2016: 5.2 million).

In 2017, 55 new proposals were submitted for external funding, and 35 were approved, totaling €14.675 million (€9.074 million in 2016). At the end of 2017, 80 externally funded projects were underway at the WZB.
Writing copy, coding and testing software applications, classifying hundreds of photographs, creating logos, designs and websites, or developing innovative ideas for services and products – today, these tasks and many others no longer require employees or office space. Via internet-based platforms, such activities can be outsourced to individuals who complete them online from wherever they are based around the world. This so-called crowd is not in an employment relationship with the buyer or the platform; it may not even be necessary for crowdworkers to know whom they work for. The crowdwork platforms play a key role in shaping working conditions, because unlike pure job search sites, they organize the distribution of tasks, structure work processes, and assess performance.

Given their social and economic relevance, the opportunities and risks of this new, digital work model have become a matter of broad public discussion. At this point, however, reliable data concerning the distribution of crowdwork and the assessment of working conditions are not available. It is largely unclear, therefore, whether crowdwork is a particularly precarious form of work or whether there are also forms involving good working conditions. These are the questions addressed by a WZB-based research project, funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, in which we study German and US crowdwork platforms. The project is based on interviews with platform representatives and experts, as well as a survey of crowdworkers.

Millions of individuals are active as crowdworkers

The societal relevance of the crowdwork phenomenon becomes evident once we look at the number of active crowdworkers reported by the platforms. American platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, CrowdFlower or Upwork at times have several millions of registered crowdworkers. German platforms such as Crowd Guru, jovoto or Clickworker each have several tens or hundreds of thousands of registrations.

Behind these figures, however, there are very different forms of crowdwork, which may be classified by the type of tasks performed. Two basic models emerge: on the one hand, standardized routine and support tasks broken down into small work packages, such as text production, data classification or surveys (so-called microtasks); on the other hand, creative solutions that – while also relatively standardized in some cases, such as design tasks – are highly specialized and knowledge-intensive, for instance in the fields of coding or innovation (so-called macrotasks). Microtasks do not require any specific prior knowledge and mostly take only a few minutes to complete. The people performing them cannot give any creative input of their own. For tasks requiring a certain degree of creativity and knowledge, by contrast, the work is usually organized in projects. Unlike with microtasks, the idea here is to generate a small number of high-quality products or services. That is why creative and complex tasks are often awarded by means of a competition.

Our knowledge of what motivates people to work in the crowd is only fragmentary at this stage. On the one hand, there are many reports in the media about people completing microtask after microtask at a rapid pace because they de-
pend on even the small amounts this kind of work pays – owing to a lack of labor market opportunities, caretaking responsibilities in their families, and social or geographical exclusion. On the other hand, initial research seems to show that only few people in North America or Europe live off crowdwork alone. This finding leads us to ask about non-material motives that may come into play.

Evaluating working conditions in the crowd requires not only an assessment of crowdworkers’ motivation but also an analysis of the various approaches used by the platforms to regulate the work. Based on our surveys, the following factors to assess working conditions may be identified.

Obviously, the first key criterion for assessing working conditions is payment. One aspect to keep in mind here is that at least some crowdworkers only work part time on the relevant platforms. However, the share of part-time crowdworkers and the degree to which they depend on their income from crowdwork are unknown. Initial studies on Germany suggest that only a minority uses crowdwork as their main source of income.

Furthermore, payment schemes are strongly linked to the type of tasks performed. Crowdworkers performing microtasks are typically paid per task and usually in the lower cent or euro range. Macrotasks, by contrast, are often awarded through competitions in which only one winner (or multiple winners) gets the job. Winners are chosen by the client, the community or a jury and may receive awards in the three to six-digit euro range.

Fair payment for microtasks depends on how piece rates are defined. The well-known case of Amazon Mechanical Turk shows that there is a danger of actual earnings being reduced by inappropriately calculated working hours. Inexperienced workers receive between two and three US dollars per hour, whereas experienced full-time crowdworkers can achieve an hourly wage ranging from seven to nine US dollars. Regarding the German microtask platforms, initial findings suggest that piece rates are based on the minimum wage: After estimating the average time needed to complete a task, the price per task is defined in a way to enable crowdworkers to achieve the minimum wage per hour. Yet whether that estimate is realistic requires further investigation.

The risks are for the workers, not for the companies

Payment schemes for macrotasks vary widely. In some cases, awards can be very high. Yet especially in relatively standardized design competitions involving awards in the lower three-digit range, it is impossible to determine the hourly wage corresponding to the work performed. Moreover, the uncertainty of getting no money at all is the participants’ risk alone.

What is more, working conditions strongly depend on the type of performance assessment. This constitutes a special problem in this work format, because some of the essential elements of a company-based performance regulation regime do not exist: There are no supervisors, no co-workers, and no company that everyone works for.

Microtasks are assessed by software through automated checks, by other crowdworkers, or by platform staff. On so-called marketplace platforms, assessments are performed by clients and requesters themselves. Again, the example of Amazon Mechanical Turk highlights some possible conflicts. Here, requesters may arbitrarily reject work outcomes or refuse to pay for them while still owning the rights to the outcome. There is not much that affected crowdworkers can do to claim payment, as access to further jobs depends on favorable reviews from the requesters. So far, we have not come across such arbitrariness on German platforms. Even if a client is not satisfied and the task needs to be repeated, platforms say they do pay crowdworkers for their work.

Another key element in performance assessment is the way in which access to certain tasks is regulated. Many platforms use systems based on reviews and

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reputation to regulate access to more complex and better paid tasks. Such systems are based on points awarded for tasks completed to the client’s satisfaction or on complicated algorithms that also consider aspects such as experience or activity. Some platforms link reputation to ongoing activity: If users are inactive for several days or weeks, their rating goes down. Such systems force crowdworkers to constantly prove their abilities and availability, undermining the promise of special flexibility and self-determined working hours.

Recognition is a key aspect of “good” working conditions and also plays a major role in digital work. Nearly all platforms we interviewed said that material incentives alone are not sufficient to activate the crowd. Tasks are better received if immaterial incentives such as recognition, learning, fun and community are involved as well. It seems that one key mechanism in that regard are reputation systems, which vary in terms of the extent and the format (stars, status descriptors, rankings) in which they are shown. Depending on how it is used, a crowdworker’s digital reputation may either mean status and recognition or pressure to perform.

Especially in the field of more creative macrotasks, another mechanism is the introduction of gaming elements (so-called gamification), including opportunities to “like” or comment on other crowdworkers’ contributions or to (further) develop ideas together. Some platforms award points, honors or even prizes for strong community involvement. Unlike the mechanical completion of standardized microtasks, creative macrotasks are about developing good ideas, a process in which feedback and interaction within the virtual community add value for the client. From a critical perspective, this leads to a mixing of work and free time, of production and play.

One key aspect of “good” work is the opportunity to engage in continuing education and training. Both are largely neglected in the crowd; it is up to crowdworkers themselves to pursue these kinds of activities. One reason certainly is the fact that crowdworkers are registered as self-employed individuals, meaning that platforms or clients do not have any employer obligations. It seems that for some of the self-employed coders or designers, participating in crowdwork competitions is at least a temporary opportunity to gain experience and to network with clients. In the long term, however, the issue of skill formation seems to be a major problem in crowdwork.

Likewise, the possibility to voice one’s own concerns and interests is among the criteria defining good work. Since crowdwork no longer involves an employee-employer relationship, doing so is more a matter of participation than of formal
co-determination. At this stage, participation only means that crowdworkers ask questions, send feedback or criticism to platform owners, or have the opportunity to discuss problems amongst each other. Here we see major differences: Whereas some platforms allow feedback or complaints only directly, and thus individually, through private messaging, other platforms provide additional chat systems and public discussion forums, some of which resemble social networks such as Facebook. One key reason for these different models seems to be that some platforms have a stronger interest in building a crowd community that may be used for self-help and self-regulation.

Digital work in the crowd is a rapidly growing and changing part of the world of work. Final assessments are not possible at this stage. In particular, more research is needed to study crowdworkers’ motivation and background. Even if crowdwork currently is only an additional source of income for most people (at least in Germany), the societal implications of this new form of work must be taken seriously. Crowdwork may reflect the fact that people increasingly need to take on second and third jobs that give rise to grey areas in terms of labor and social law.

The special quality of crowdwork regarding the new approaches for regulating work and performance is that working conditions are determined by the way the platforms are set up technologically. Technology, however, is never neutral; it defines the possibilities for action and reflects power structures. The extent to which these new ways of organizing and regulating work may also affect other sectors is unclear at this stage. It is quite possible that the approaches of standardizing work, introducing digital reputation systems, and using social networks, after proving successful in the crowd, will also take hold at “normal” companies.

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As a result of the recent economic and financial crisis, the labor market opportunities of youth and young adults in many Southern European countries deteriorated enormously. In 2013, youth unemployment rates in Greece and Spain exceeded 50 percent, and the situation continues to be a serious concern. In Germany, Austria and Switzerland, by contrast, youth unemployment is hardly an issue. Because of their dual apprenticeship systems, these countries are often cited as examples of how to successfully integrate young people into the labor market. For one thing, young people completing an apprenticeship are employed at a company and hence not out of work. Furthermore, from an individual and societal perspective, learning an occupation is a long-term investment in young people’s education, competences, and skills.

To mitigate the situation of youth in the crisis-ridden EU countries at least to some degree, the European Union has developed a number of transnational programs. They are designed to promote the mobility of young people to Germany and their integration into the dual apprenticeship system. At the same time, recruiting prospective apprentices from other EU countries is seen as a way to counteract skills shortages on the German labor market. One well-known program to boost migration from other EU countries to Germany is the MobiPro-EU program, which is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs and the German Federal Employment Agency. MobiPro-EU does not offer any financial incentives for employers, but it does provide financial support to participants to help cover relocation costs, to top up apprenticeship wages, and to take German language courses.

Barriers to training opportunities

But what about German employers? Would they be willing to train young Europeans, or do they consistently prefer apprentices who grew up in Germany and went to school there? From the employer’s point of view, what are the main barriers making it difficult for young people from Southern Europe to access the German vocational training market?

To study these questions, we surveyed company owners, managing directors and human resources officers at more than 650 companies across Germany about the prospects of young Spaniards to be hired as apprentices. In cooperation with the German Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB), the vignette study was integrated into an employer panel survey in 2014 (the BIBB Training Panel).

In vignette studies, respondents are given several randomly selected short descriptions of fictitious situations or persons. In our study, they were shown five tabular descriptions of young adults who submitted written applications for an apprenticeship at the respective firm. The applications referred to the firm’s most important training occupation, that is, the occupation with the highest number of apprentices. The vignettes differed in a number of dimensions regarding the fictitious persons’ characteristics. This approach allows us to study how specific applicant characteristics influence respondents’ assessment. On a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely), the employers were asked to rate...
the likelihood of each applicant to be invited to their firm for the follow-up selection stage, usually a job interview or an employment test.

A number of fictitious applicants had Spanish origins. Some came from Spain and wanted to move to Germany. Others were second- or third-generation immigrants from Spain who were born and raised in Germany. The experiment did aim at detecting ethnic discrimination; hence all applicants were given Spanish origins. Rather, by comparing employers’ assessment of different types of applicants, we wanted to determine the role of migration status – newcomers versus immigrant descendants – and related factors such as language skills and the likelihood of staying in Germany.

The prospective apprentices differed by sex and by educational attainment. In addition, we introduced different levels of German language skills among the group of potential newcomers. Furthermore, we varied whether applicants obtain financial support and their possibilities to become socially integrated through relatives living in town. These factors were varied in order to identify potential concerns among employers regarding these aspects.

Previous studies have often found insufficient proficiency in the local language to be one of the main reasons why migrants face inferior labor market opportunities. That is why we differentiated three different levels of German language skills among the newcomers: (1) basic proficiency obtained through taking German classes in high school, (2) intermediate proficiency obtained through taking German classes in high school plus an intensive language course, and (3) fluency in German resulting from having attended a German school in Spain. The third applicant type just like the applicant who was born and raised in Germany, has excellent German skills and a German school-leaving certificate. Our research design thus allows us to keep migration status (newcomers versus immigrant descendants) distinct from German language skills – an endeavor that would hardly be possible using conventional individual surveys. Furthermore, it allows us to consider research findings showing that a foreign educational certificate can be a barrier on the labor market. We build on that research by examining which proficiency levels are expected by employers and what other barriers aside from foreign educational credentials might emerge on the employer side.

One of our assumptions was that employers’ training strategy might be a crucial factor. In Germany, employers offer apprenticeship schemes for different reasons. Some may pursue the goal of investing in their firm’s future skilled labor force and hiring as many of their successful trainees as possible once they have completed the program (“investment strategy”). For others, it may be more important to use their apprentices as a substitute for qualified workers, involving them in the firm’s daily production and work processes even as they are being trained (“production strategy”). These employers are much less likely to hire their apprentices as regular employees after apprenticeship completion; instead, they tend to replace them with new apprentices. In reality, employers’ actual training strategies fall somewhere between these two poles.

Our analyses show that employers clearly look differently at applicants with Spanish roots who were born and raised in Germany and applicants coming directly from Spain: Applicants who grew up in Germany received higher employer ratings than newcomers. In other words, employers believe that applicants with Spanish roots who were born in Germany are more likely to be invited to the follow-up selection stage. Even when compared to Spanish newcomers with excellent German language skills (resulting from having attended a German school abroad), second- or third-generation immigrants were rated 0.5 points higher on average on the 10-point rating scale. Weaker proficiency in German increases that difference: Newcomers with German skills acquired in high school and through an additional intensive course are rated 1.7 points lower on average than applicants born in Germany; newcomers with only basic German proficiency are even rated 2.2 points lower on average.

Behind these average scores, we find further interesting differences with regard to the vignette persons’ sex and educational attainment and with regard to
employers’ training strategy. Applicants with an intermediate secondary school-leaving certificate are the main target group of German employers offering apprenticeships; these applicants also receive the highest ratings. Foreign (and domestic) prospective apprentices with higher education levels (such as a university entrance diploma or a bachelor’s degree) do not have any advantage because of this. This also means that disadvantages resulting from lower German language skills cannot be compensated by higher educational attainment. Employers pursuing an investment strategy (i.e., those that hire a large share of their apprentices as regular employees once the training is completed) prefer applications from Germany even if newcomers are fluent in German and have obtained a German school-leaving certificate at a German school in Spain. A different picture emerges for employers that hire only a few of their former apprentices: Here, we find no difference in the likelihood of being invited to a follow-up selection stage between immigrant descendants and newcomers with excellent German skills. Employers pursuing an investment strategy seem to fear that young Spaniards might return to their home country after completing their apprenticeship in Germany – a less relevant concern for employers motivated by a production strategy.

Moreover, we find that young women are less likely to be invited to the follow-up selection stage than young men – regardless of migration status and employers’ training strategy. Further research is necessary to investigate what causes this difference. However, employers’ preference for male applicants does not seem to stem from prejudice regarding women’s lower labor market commitment. If that were the case, we should find differences by training strategy. The gender differences should be larger for investment-strategy employers than for production-strategy employers.

What are the implications of our findings? Social and labor market policies to promote transnational mobility attempt to improve the situation of young people in crisis-ridden EU countries by investing in their (vocational) education. These policies are also potential means of addressing skills shortages in Germany. However, what at first glance appears to be a win-win situation (from the employer point of view as well), when examined more closely, turns out to be an endeavor involving many barriers. Aside from employers’ high expectations regarding foreign applicants’ German language skills, a firm’s training strategy may also stand in the way of success. Employers who want to make long-term investments in their own skilled workforce by participating in the dual apprenticeship system tend to have reservations about applications from other European countries.

More generally, our findings suggest that the integration of young EU citizens strongly depends on whether employers assume that these young people plan to stay in Germany long term. Furthermore, employers’ high expectations regarding German language skills are a major barrier – even persons who took German classes in high school and completed an additional intensive course face lower chances to be invited for a job interview or employment test. In this respect, it seems we need a discussion about the level of German that is really necessary to start a vocational training program. Furthermore, policy makers should look more deeply into ways of supporting the acquisition of German language skills during apprenticeships or employment.

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Modern democracies find legitimacy chiefly through two key promises: They guarantee fundamental freedoms, civil and human rights, and they promise to provide security for their citizens. On the one hand, the liberal state thus restrains itself in order to protect individual spheres of freedom, and submits the execution of its monopoly of force to democratic and constitutional control. On the other hand, citizens expect the state to provide sufficient resources to ensure collective security. The legitimacy of the liberal state thus rests on two sometimes conflicting principles: self-restraint by the state and the guarantee of security.

This conflict has been particularly sharp over the past fifteen years. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington were a turning point in the way democratic societies handle threats to their security internally and externally. In many democratic countries, legislation was tightened and basic rights sometimes massively curtailed. However, contrary to the public impression, the curbing of civil liberties after 9/11 was by no means a sweeping phenomenon. Reactions by democratic societies to the new threats differed widely. Whereas people in the United States, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom had to accept massive losses of freedom in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, elsewhere – for instance in the Nordic countries or the Netherlands – little changed.

A renaissance of civil liberties?

Almost no research has yet been done on how civil liberties have developed since. Based on the assumption that liberal democracies are systems particularly capable of learning and, given their rule-of-law component, committed to upholding liberal rights and freedoms, one could expect that a period of restriction on civil liberties should be followed by a renaissance of liberal rights. Recent data covering the period from 1990 to 2012 confirm this hypothesis.

A well-functioning legal system, a lively civil society, and a freedom-minded political culture ought, in principle, make it difficult for democratic lawmakers to impose too far-reaching restrictions on individual liberties. However, illiberal reactions to perceived threats, for instance of terrorist attacks, in fact often present themselves as evidence of functioning democracy: Political elites react strongly to the (actual or supposed) wishes of the population by considerably tightening security legislation – sometimes in keeping with long-cherished aims.

Democracies rely on the capacity for self-correction

Since the rule-of-law component in democratic governance operates with a delay inherent in the system – courts do not react immediately to legislative measures but only on application – perceived threats quite often provoke excessively stringent security legislation, which can be reined in only much later in the course of democratic and constitutional discussion and reflection. What helps democracies in such situations is that free public debate, civil society engagement, a capacity for political reorientation, and even judicial intervention provide them with tools that permit a kind of self-correction that is inherent in the democratic system.

Summary: After the 9/11 terrorist attacks more restrictive security legislation severely curtailed civil liberties in several Western democracies. During the following decade, civil liberties were largely restored, albeit to varying extent from country to country. Our findings suggest that democratic regimes are capable of correcting their security legislation if they are constrained by rule-of-law institutions that are embedded in a liberal political culture.

Legal Orders
Civil Liberties under Pressure Democracy in Times of Internal Insecurity
Sascha Kneip and Aiko Wagner
Empirical evidence shows, however, that such democratic reconsideration does not take place to the same extent or in the same fashion in all countries. Whereas in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, for example, civil rights have recovered markedly after a period of curtailment up to 2012, this cannot be said for the United States of America and only in some measure for Spain and Italy. How do we explain these differences between democracies?

Political science research on internal security policy generally pursues three major explanatory approaches: The first attributes the differences to comprehensive trends (economic and social conditions, postmodernity/risk society, globalization); the second to the political context (political culture, path dependencies, political institutions, party competition, media system); and the third to the interests and preferences of the actors involved.

From a theoretical standpoint, three sets of explanations for the recovery of civil liberties after a period of massive curtailment seem to be particularly relevant. First, the strength of the rule of law (strong and independent (constitutional) courts render the recovery of civil liberties more likely); second, the degree of liberality of the political culture (the more liberal the political culture of a society is, the more likely liberal civil liberties are to recover even after massive curtailment); and third, the extent of direct involvement in major terrorist attacks (countries hit by major attacks – notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain – can be expected to experience weaker regeneration of civil liberties. The attacks in Belgium, France, and Germany after 2012 did not occur in the period under study).

When the experience of terror does not matter

While the first two propositions proved to be empirically correct, the third, interestingly, did not. In other words, while strong rule of law and a liberal political culture increase the chances that democratic societies in fact re-establish civil liberties even after they have been curtailed, the question whether a society has been directly hit by terrorist attacks or not has no influence on this process.

We assessed the state of civil liberties on the basis of data from the so-called Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS measures above all state violations of physical integrity rights and the frequency of political imprisonment, that is to say, the historical and normative core of modern civil liberties and fundamental rights. On a five-point scale, the PTS assesses the extent to which violations of habeas corpus guarantees and physical integrity rights occur in a country. Within this scale, civil liberties fare best when there are no curbs on the rule of law, no political imprisonment let alone torture of prisoners, and thus no political terror. In the worst case, state terror, torture, and the murder of citizens is widespread. Such violations of civil liberties are a particularly flagrant failure of the state.

In the set of liberal democracies in the OECD world we examined for the period between 1990 and 2012, no such far-reaching violations of civil rights occurred, but variance this side of any systematic and widespread violation of rights is considerable: whereas New Zealand and Norway, for example, had the top score in the 23 years of the period under study, the United States experienced a massive curtailment of civil liberties after 9/11 from which it had not yet recovered by 2012. The United Kingdom experienced the strongest losses only after the attacks of 2005, but by 2011 had already returned to the base level. In Germany, by contrast, marked curtailment of freedoms occurred in the 1990s, while Spain has had a consistently low score since 2001.

Apart from variance between countries, developments over time are particularly interesting. For the average of civil liberties across all countries there is a clear break between 1990 and 2012 (see figure). In the 1990s, the average was close to the top of the scale. From 2002, however, it was significantly lower. Thus 2001 marks an important change. At the same time, developments after 2002 are statistically significant and positive: from 2002 to 2012 the value rose again
almost to the level of the 1990s. This means that, while reactions to 9/11 brought a significant curtailment of freedom in Western democracies, it had almost fully recovered by 2012.

Moreover, the differences between countries are much greater in the second half of the period under observation. Variance in scores between 2002 and 2012 is twice as high as between 1990 and 2000. This points to considerable heterogeneity in the way the various countries dealt with the challenges of terrorism.

How well civil liberties in a given country can recover depends on the political culture of a society and the position of the judiciary. The more strongly law-and-order thinking dominates and the more dependent and weaker the judiciary is, the weaker regeneration will be. In countries with a very thin law-and-order tradition, the situation for civil liberties improved between 2002 and 2012 by half a point on the five-point scale (all other factors being equal). By contrast, in countries that focus strongly on security policy there was no recuperation. The same is true for a strong *Rechtsstaat* and an independent judiciary: Particularly strong and independent legal systems improve the score from 2002 to 2012 by almost a whole point on the scale.

**Institutions and culture matter**

Democratic societies thus differ in their capacity to correct adverse developments in the field of internal security and their ability to restore civil liberties even after massive curtailment. A well-functioning judicial system can in the medium term help restore civil liberties even if it is unable to prevent their curtailment in the short term. In turn, a liberal culture diminishes the probability that freedom is significantly curtailed at all and makes it more probable that political and legal decisions are being passed, implemented, and accepted that restore freedom. The democratic recovery effect thus has an institutional and a cultural component.

What are the consequences for democratic governance caught between freedom and security? Even more than fifteen years after 9/11, the question of how to deal appropriately with the risk of terror dominates the debate on security policy in Western democracies. However, the picture of democratic societies react-
ing to the threat of terrorist attacks with sweeping curtailment of freedom is just as selective as the impression that civil liberties are steadily declining. In fact, there are many cases in which democratic politics maintain a liberal course even under such threats or in which overreaction in security policy has been corrected in the course of time. Democracies, too, overreact from time to time in matters of internal security; but liberal democracies are frequently in a position to redress matters in due course. In times when the German government installs federal Trojans and is debating the expansion of public CCTV surveillance, this is good news for the future of liberal democracy in the twenty-first century.

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The world seems to be out of joint. Nationalist populism is flourishing, the European Union is showing signs of weakness, and violence is replacing debate. The big picture that countless daily events and reports give is that we are coming to the end of an epoch. At any rate, the liberal world order, shaped by democratic constitutional states, strong international institutions, and by individual and minority rights, is under enormous pressure. Michael Zürn, director of the WZB research unit Global Governance, does not hold with scenarios of doom. Gabriele Kammerer spoke with the political scientist about how he sees the situation of the world.

How would you characterize the insecurity we are experiencing?

Let’s go back a little in history to the optimism of the 1990s. The Wall had fallen, European unification was making progress; the community of states was setting milestones on the road to multilateral understanding with, for example, the founding of an International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. Western notions of a liberal order seemed to be imposing themselves throughout the world. In 2001, optimism received two sudden blows within the space of only a few weeks. First, there was 9/11 – the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. And only six weeks later, there was an event that is often overlooked: Jim O’Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, coined the term BRICs. He saw Brazil, Russia, India, and China as the most promising emerging national economies. For the first time it was stated loud and clear that in 2050 Europe would be only a small regional economy. Today all growth markets are in Asia.

In a certain fashion, these two events signalled a turn at the global political level. Since then, we have been experiencing increasing protests against any further liberalization of the world order. It is voiced primarily by so-called rising powers, the emerging countries, which are stressing their political sovereignty more strongly, but also by many transnational groupings. Second, from Seattle in 1999 to recently in Hamburg, we have seen massive protests against not the international world order as such but against the economically neoliberal part. And, third, for some time now within the Western world, economic and political right-wing populist movements have been calling the economic and political order into question.

What constitutes this liberal order?

Key elements are human rights, open borders, and the importance of international institutions. Despite all the differences between countries, right-wing populist movements have one thing in common: their vehement rejection of these three elements of the liberal order.

Overall, anti-liberal resistance differs strongly.

Indeed, we see no uniform bloc. But we shouldn’t look only at the characteristics of these actors. There’s clearly something in the system that produces this re-

Interview with Michael Zürn
No Alternative to Globalization
The Liberal World Order: Strengths, Weaknesses, Internal Contradictions
sistance. In the economic field, we can call it "neoliberalism." But the other thing is that, especially as far as international institutions are concerned, we have major legitimacy problems. There is a widespread conviction that these international institutions do not always treat similar cases in the same way. Iran is censured because of nuclear weapons, Israel is not. There is a feeling that juridification is lacking, that rules are wanting.

Why are they under pressure to justify themselves at this particular point in time?

Since the world has no longer been divided into East and West, international institutions have become much stronger and a great deal of authority has been transferred to them. They have intervened in national societies, both economically and in support of human rights. The entire European enlargement process was, after all, tied to acceptance of European principles. So suddenly political institutions are actually exercising authority – and only now does the question of legitimacy arise. To the extent that globalization produces many transnational problems, governance needs to be international. The whole of European economic policy cannot be left to Angela Merkel, so that the decisions are made in Germany that affect the Greeks without them having a say. In this sense, we need European institutions in order to make European economic policy – also for democratic reasons and not only on grounds of efficiency. But the problem is that international institutions themselves don’t always keep to these liberal rules.

Where do they fail to do so?

The international separation of powers, for example, is very weakly developed. Take, for instance, the United Nations Security Council: its permanent members perform legislative and executive functions at the same time when they pass resolutions, decide on interventions, and have them carried out. And there’s a structural imbalance in international institutions: their most important decision makers are the secretariats and, with even more weight, the representatives of the most powerful member states. Influential international institutions create hierarchies in this manner – not only between the global and national levels, but also between members differing in strength. This is incidentally also true for the EU. There are fears of a German diktat.

How can the legitimacy of international institutions be strengthened?

To start with, being at home in a Western-liberal tradition, we have to recognize that there are other sources of political legitimacy than democracy and fair participation. The Erdogan and Putin’s have not only short-term political support but also projects for which they stand, the national idea, the struggle against foreign influence, and the preservation of their own culture. These, too, are patterns generating legitimacy for political authority. We probably also have to accept that much of what we had regarded in the second half of the twentieth century as support for the liberal idea was quite simply the desire for Western affluence. We had to learn that in Germany, also in the new states of the federation; we now have to learn it in Eastern Europe, and the same is true for other regions of the world.

Can prosperity be achieved without freedom?

For decades the assumption was that if you wanted to have Western standards of living, you had to follow the Western path to modernization, the road to democratization. But there are other models, as we see in the case of China. Within two decades, 300 million people were led out of absolute poverty. This is a historic achievement. And this historic achievement has had a political impact.
because it is plain to see that growth, consumption, is also possible without – to put it in polemical terms – all the political fuss that Western societies make about it.

Was the liberal world order only a passing phase, then?

Not necessarily. The development of a liberal international order has established the principle that political measures at the national and international levels have to be justified before society and the individual. Chinese and Russian political systems, too, have recognized this need for justification. This is already a step towards recognizing the individual as the ultimate authority. And the legitimation problems of the world order are very clearly perceived by rising powers. Throughout the Middle East we hear the argument – which Putin repeatedly advances – that the West lives by double standards. Western values are evoked to use them against the West. The fact that Western values are still so much at the heart of all patterns of justification gives me hope that a liberal world order can be preserved and developed in the medium term.

So you haven’t given up on the model?

To put it in blunt terms, I believe there is no alternative to the idea of a liberal world order. Going back to national societies would have unimaginably high political costs, up to and including war. And beside globalization there is also digitization. Neither can be reversed. So, at least to some extent, we live in a global society, in a society where the fate of people in Syria is also affected by decisions made in Western societies. And decisions made by the German federal government similarly impact the political and economic fate of Greece. And the fact that in ten or fifteen years the people who live today on beautiful Pacific Islands will have lost their homes because these islands will be under water is not the fault of their own decisions but a consequence of the way of life in industrial societies. We therefore need politics to be internationalized, we need a stable world order that gives a voice to the whole of humanity through their representatives. Nor will the national regulation of financial markets succeed any longer. Protecting the climate is making slow headway, costs a huge amount of money, and causes enormous frustration; but there is no alternative to international climate policy. We have to take the stony path of liberalization and democratization.

And anti-globalization protests?

We shouldn’t see current protests only as a negative movement, as a “stop” call or ”We want our old nation state back!” What we are experiencing is the politization of international politics: it is increasingly becoming the subject of political conflict. And this political conflict offers the potential for change.
Scrutinizing Tradition South Korea: Old Values Are Abjudicated in the Light of Human Rights Norms

Yoon Jin Shin

Tradition can engage with constitutional law in two very distinctive ways. A constitution is sometimes claimed as an embodiment or representation of national identity and tradition. In other occasions, tradition is challenged as a threat to constitutional rights and principles. The question how traditions are envisioned under the constitutional framework provides useful lenses through which to observe cosmopolitan or nationalist self-understanding of constitutional actors. This essay examines two illuminating cases adjudicated by the South Korean Constitutional Court: Domestic laws rooted in traditional values were challenged by citizens as oppressive of their constitutional rights, while tradition was also asserted by other groups as a justification for restricting rights. These cases illustrate how the conflict between traditional values and constitutional rights and principles have been exposed, deliberated and addressed through and within the framework of constitutional review.

One of the most transformative decisions by the Korean Constitutional Court is the case of Household Head System (hojuje) decided in 2005. Hojuje had constituted a foundation of Korean family law, representing and reproducing patriarchal social and family structures rooted in the Confucian tradition. Under this system, every Korean citizen was registered as a member of a “household,” comprised of a “house head,” the eldest male in a family, and his subordinated family members, including his mother, wife and children. This law made a female citizen belong to her father when born, to her husband when married, and then to her son when her husband died, while a male citizen can create his own household and serve as a head. A nationwide coalition of women’s and civil rights groups brought a constitutional claim to the Court challenging this system.

The Court found this family system unconstitutional. The majority opinion held: “the role of family law is not limited to reflecting social reality. […] It should confirm and disseminate the constitutional principle.” The Court points to both Article 9 of the Constitution: “The State shall strive to sustain and develop the cultural heritage and to enhance national culture” and Article 36 paragraph 1: “Marriage and family life shall be entered into and sustained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes.” The Court found that the latter provision indicates a constitutional resolution to no longer acknowledge a long-standing patriarchal family order in the society. The Court articulated that the tradition under Article 9 is a concept with both historical and contemporary aspects, and should be valid and reasonable under today’s standards. If a traditional order goes against constitutional values and principles, that tradition cannot be constitutionally justified by invoking Article 9. The Court found hojuje unconstitutional violating the constitutional principles of gender equality and individual dignity.

The dissenting opinion joined by two justices emphasized that family law reflects “our unique and rational patrilineal tradition.” Reviewing hojuje with the proportionality test, these judges argued that preserving a patrilineal family order can serve as a legitimate government purpose, in light of the state’s duty to uphold traditions under Article 9. The justices found hojuje met the balancing test, asserting that the wife-belongsto–husband family practice has been taken for granted for a long time and that this reality has not changed much until
today, and that this system does not cause substantively discriminatory effects against women.

After this case was decided, an entirely new citizen registration system has been adopted in South Korea. Every Korean citizen is now registered as an individual, neither as a house head nor his subordinated member.

The Confusion tradition appears in criminal law as well. The Korean Criminal Procedure Law prohibits individuals from suing their parents/grandparents for criminal charges (with exceptions for sexual or domestic violence). This law is rooted in Confusion ethics of ‘hyo,’ a filial duty to one’s parents. Reviewing the provision under the proportionality principle, the five justices viewed that depriving a crime victim of the right to sue an offender, for the purpose of preserving a family order based on the Confusion tradition, violates the right to equality of those whose lineal ascendants are criminal offenders. However, the Court did not reach six votes, a required number to invalidate any law in Korea. The other four justices regarded this law as constitutional, with the following rationale: that a victim’s right to sue is not a constitutional right but a mere legal right under criminal procedure law, thus the legislature holds broad discretion in regulating this right; that for the relationship between direct ascendants and descendants, traditional culture and ethics should play more decisive roles than legal regulation; and that respect for one’s parents has been considered as the supreme moral value, and the law embodying this value has a rational basis for discrimination.

These cases illustrate how traditions encounter constitutional rights and principles. A constitutional review process serves as a venue to expose, deliberate and resolve conflicts and tensions between them. The dynamics are more complex than a dichotomous confrontation between universal human rights and cultural relativism. Restrictive laws rooted in traditions need stronger justificatory grounds than the assertion that the law serves traditional values or conventional social order. Rights-based constitutionalism deconstructs traditions and requires them to be justified in constitutional terms when they restrict rights, equality, or other constitutional principles.

In the Korean context, the constitutional dynamics wear more layers, as the Constitution provides for succeeding and developing traditions as a constitutional duty of the state. The Constitutional Court in the first case addressed this tension by interpreting traditions in the contemporary context – excluding oppressive and outdated customs from the definition of tradition to be upheld under Article 9. Finding that preserving a patriarchal social order cannot serve as a legitimate purpose to restrict rights and equality, the Court did not have to proceed further with the proportionality test. In the latter case, the five justices tried to address the tension through proportionality reasoning. While these justices deemed upholding a filial duty to one’s parents as a legitimate purpose of law, they found the law unconstitutional because it excessively restricted rights.

These cases exemplify the ways that tensions and conflicts between rights and traditions are deliberated and reasoned through constitutional review. The majority opinions in each case make clear that a tradition or custom that does not uphold constitutional values and principles cannot provide justifications for restricting rights and equality. Even if some traditional values have continuing merits for contemporary society, the law based on those traditions needs to be justified through a further balancing test. These cases also demonstrate the emancipatory potential of constitutional rights contestation and adjudication processes for the individuals whose rights and equality have been denied under the name of tradition and national culture. As locality and specificity are reasoned through constitutional terms, a rights-based constitutional practice attains a cosmopolitan character with a capacity to accommodate both the locality of contexts and the universality of rights.

Reference
Challenges to Democracy

Democracy under Stress Do Elections Guarantee Legitimacy?
Sascha Kneip and Wolfgang Merkel

Nowadays “elections are primitive and a democracy that reduces itself to elections is in mortal decline,” states Belgian historian David Van Reybrouck in his recently much-acclaimed book “Against Elections.” What are we to think of this? If we ask people in Western democracies what they most readily associate with the concept of democracy, in general, the right to vote in free, fair, and equal elections is the first thing that occurs to them. In fact, in their whole lives as citoyens, most people are unlikely to come any closer to democratic governance than in the democratic act of voting. By electing representatives, they are participating directly in the production of democratic legitimacy.

In representative democracies, the authorization of political power is essentially legitimated by means of the free, equal, and universal election of political parties and individuals. Loaded with republican pathos, we could say that collective democratic self-determination reaches its legitimate – albeit always provisional – culmination in the democratic act of voting.

However, this pathos may ring hollow. Falling voter turnout, waning confidence in political parties, diminishing party power and reputation, public demand for direct democratic procedures and democratic innovation, a perceived decline in the accountability of elected representatives, and shrinking party membership give rise to doubts on the adequate functioning of elections with regard to democratic legitimation. David Van Reybrouck even argues that elections should not be understood as the “crowning moment” of democracy but rather as the cause of a modern “democratic fatigue syndrome.” Elections, he claims, are elitist, aristocratic, and thus stand for the opposite of equal participation.

Are there alternatives to elections?

With much variation, other prominent political scientists like Colin Crouch, John Keane, Pierre Rosanvallon, and Wolfgang Streeck have also bewailed the failing legitimatory force of the democratic act of voting. But do these lamentations get to the heart of the political problem – let alone, do they offer alternatives to elections and parties? To find an answer, we first have to agree on the meaning of democratic legitimacy in the twenty-first century and on the roles that elections, parties, and necessarily also parliaments are playing, must play, and can play.

The functioning of modern democracy depends not least on its ability to incessantly regenerate democratic legitimacy – and thus itself. If the wellsprings of democratic legitimacy dry up or are supplanted by undemocratic alternatives, democracies inevitably plunge into a crisis of legitimacy. This does not have to result in regime change or a collapse of democracy. An internal erosion of democracy or certain aspects of democracy is more likely, at least within the OECD world. This could imply a shift of decision-making power from elected representatives to experts or to citizens randomly chosen by lot.

In abstract terms, democratic legitimacy is characterized by a combination of the idea of ethical individualism – the free and self-determined individual as the reference point for all considerations – with the notion of popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty is contained by a constitutional order that declares freedom, equality as well as basic and human rights sacrosanct.
Institutions and procedures are thus closely tied to the normative substance of democratic orders. They have to be under constant scrutiny concerning the extent to which they are and remain consistent with this substance and translate it into actual policies. This applies particularly to fundamental democratic procedures, actors, and institutions such as universal elections, parties, and parliaments – all of them political inventions of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. They are under no guarantee of perpetuity. In the twenty-first century they will have to prove again that they are able to support and pursue the normative essence of democratic governance, namely collective self-government by individuals under the protection of the rule of law, and that they have not degenerated into simulative façades without substance, dominated by actors without legitimacy.

The factual production of democratic legitimacy is achieved through interaction between citizens and politicians, procedures and institutions, and the outcomes of decision-making processes. Retrospective and prospective evaluation of these procedures, institutions, and decisions by the citizens themselves plays an important role (see the figure). However, acceptance by the citizens alone does not suffice. Every single institution, every political actor has to be subjected to constant scrutiny on the basis of the underlying normative assumptions of democratic governance. For example, it is not sufficient democratic legitimation for the defective democratic regime in Hungary that a majority of the Hungarians approves in elections the illiberal mode of government pursued by prime minister Viktor Orbán. This is all the more true for the elected but nevertheless authoritarian governments of Putin and Erdoğan.

If we understand the democratic political process as an interlocking sequence of input, throughput, and output, democratic elections undoubtedly have their place at the heart of the input dimension. The most important input functions for the production of democratic legitimacy can be identified as the support and demands of citizens, who express them not only but primarily by going to the polls. Throughput lies between input and output. It is the core governmental sector of democracy, where binding decisions are prepared and made (legislature), implemented (executive), and, where necessary, reviewed (judiciary). In democracies, the most important actors to accomplish this translation are still political parties and, to a lesser degree, interest groups that articulate and represent the demands of members and sympathizers.

Over the past three decades, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civic action groups have become important specialized and normatively oriented actors in legitimacy production. They also articulate preferences of citizens, but represent them in different ways. Unlike parties or political elites, NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, WWF or other civil-society associ-
ations enjoy a high degree of public approval and moral authority. However, they have not been authorized to make binding decisions on society by any act of legitimation comparable to elections.

Whether these various modes of articulation and representation produce more or less democratic legitimacy and whether they can complement the classical representative institutions and procedures of democracy (e.g., in the form of civic councils, public meetings, or participatory budgeting) or replace them (e.g. in the case of referendums) remains to be seen. The same applies to action taken by citizens themselves, when they express their demands not in elections but through civic action groups, popular initiatives, referendums, or protest. It can plausibly be assumed that these alternative forms of participation can generate additional belief in legitimacy, but so far there is not enough empirical evidence to this effect.

Referendums are most likely to gain public approval for the political system. Although decisions made directly by the people have doubtlessly legitimacy from the point of view of popular sovereignty, only a socially selective fragment of the demos usually goes to the ballot box. Moreover, the results of such votes often bear an illiberal stamp. Civil society is usually supportive of democracy, which is quite obvious in the cases of Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, but on occasion it has its downsides, witness the example of Pegida.

Groups of voters may be excluded – or exclude themselves

The biggest current challenge in the field of participatory legitimation (input) also has to do with parties and elections. Up to now, the key position of political parties in representative democracies lies in its representative status guaranteed by free, fair, and equal elections. But this relies on comparatively high voter turnout and low social, ethnic, or gender-specific selectivity at elections. If electoral turnout is falling, if certain voter groups are increasingly excluded (or excluding themselves), and if money is exerting a growing influence on election results (notably in the United States), it becomes more and more urgent to examine whether this form of public choice can still claim precedence over other modes of representation and political decision-making power.

In a situation where voters lack information, where parties lose credibility, where the trust of the electorate is declining and where party membership is shrinking, doubts arise about the legitimation figure “elections, parties, parliament, democratic decision-making.” In the light of these representation weaknesses, it is not by chance that more and more democratic theoreticians plead in favor of vesting greater decision-making authority in non-elected representatives such as professional civil servants, bureaucrats, experts, and courts (Rosanvallon), in representatives selected randomly by lot (Hubertus Buchstein), or in civil-society watch dogs (Keane).

From an empirical point of view, it can be observed that demands for unconventional forms of political participation and such participation itself appear to be gaining ground in both young and established democracies. Whether they can really produce more democratic legitimacy is theoretically disputed and empirically hardly investigated.

It is definitely a problem for democratic legitimacy that traditional actors (parties) and traditional forms of participation (elections) are losing public trust and support, while parties remain the most important institutional gatekeepers of policy and decision-making in all established democracies. However, political parties still have more comprehensive forms of ex-ante legitimation (through free and universal elections) and ex-post accountability (e.g., for government policy) than any NGO or non-elected political corporation has or can have. With regard to democratic legitimacy, political parties are thus caught between the rock of dissolving embeddedness in society and diminishing public trust and the hard place of an almost monopolistic access – legitimated through elections – to state decision-making arenas and resources.
These observations are not a farewell to elections or parties, let alone to representative democracy. Under representative democratic regimes, universal, equal, and free elections are unexcelled procedures for legitimation and authorization. At least in the theory of popular sovereignty, only referendums could lay claim to greater legitimacy. In practice, however, referendums have considerable unintended side effects detrimental to democracy. Democratic innovations like civic councils, lot drawing instead of elections, or digital platforms for campaigns and voting can perfectly complement and enliven democracy. However, this refers in the first place to the participation aspect of democracy. For binding societal decisions, their fund of democratic legitimacy is extremely sparse.

The pillars of representative democracy – elections, parties, parliaments – are thus facing not demolition but major challenges. In order to meet them, parties, parliaments, and governments must be reformed and revitalized. Democratic innovations can supplement such efforts, but they cannot supersede the established institutions in most cases. We cannot rebuild democratic legitimacy just by replacing the old with the new: the old must remain in place as long as the new cannot show it leads to more and not less democratic legitimacy.

References


Democracy and Data Capitalism It Is Time to Reevaluate the Relationship between Media and Power

Jeanette Hofmann

Democracy, the shaping of political opinion and the development of media have always been closely interconnected. The most famous investigation of this relationship was Benedict Anderson’s study into the origins of nationalism and the nation state. According to Anderson, it was “print capitalism” – the link between printing technology, the newspaper as an early industrial mass product and the publisher’s capital – that facilitated the emergence of transregional linguistic communities and markets for newspaper. These in turn gave rise to geographically broader public spheres, out of which developed “imagined communities” and national sovereignty.

But the mass ceremony described by Anderson – millions of citizens reading the morning newspaper simultaneously – may soon be a relic of the past. Print capitalism is in decline, and we are seeing the formation of a new data capitalism with a new and lucrative business model: trading in personal information, a currency which no one has ever been short of. What ramifications does this shift pose for the democratic public? And how do democratic traditions and practices impact digital transformation?

Strangely, we know little about the relationship between the new digital media, public transformation, and democracy. This is odd because recent democratic theory has given much weight to the formation and exertion of communicative power in the public realm. According to democracy theorist Nadia Urbinati, citizens have two forms of power at their disposal: the right to vote and the freedom of political expression. The fundamental right to freedom of speech is thus essential to democracy. Democracy researcher Pierre Rosanvallon posits a similar argument, observing a decrease in the importance of voting in favor of other forms of political engagement. Independently of the electoral cycle, society will continually claim for itself the power of political judgment over governmental action. Even the school of deliberative democratic theory inspired by Jürgen Habermas stresses how vital public discourse is for democracy.

New forms of communicative power

Digitalization did not exactly initiate the transformation of political engagement and the public sphere, but it has accelerated this shift and given it a specific technical and economic form, which is directly relevant to the conditions of democratic self-determination. The rise in social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube plays a particular role in this context. The trademark feature of social networking sites is the way in which they curate and share user-generated content, which are a new type of digital information asset and can range from videos of cats to professional blogs and Wikipedia.

Platforms like Facebook and YouTube have become important transnational infrastructures for the societal expression of opinion. In 2016, over one billion people worldwide used Facebook every day; even in Germany, a country somewhat skeptical of Facebook, the number was still over twenty million. In a public sphere traditionally dominated by professional mass media, these platforms give citizens a political voice and thus generate a new form of communicative power. While this development was initially celebrated as a more pluralistic way
to form political opinion and to enable a grassroots push for democratization, a noticeable sense of disillusionment has since set in. And where to look for the cause of this but in the business models of the social media networks themselves, and in the way in which they influence the public sphere?

Since the mid–2000s we have observed an increasing and reciprocal permeation of old and new media. The old media cite and operate blogs. They refer to Tweets and tweet their articles. And since social networks have established themselves as full–fledged news sources, the old media have even been forced to follow their readers onto Facebook. Recent surveys show that the younger generation in particular have turned their backs on traditional media formats and increasingly turn to Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook for their news. This process of relocation is also reflected in public discourse.

**Users have become producers**

Current studies into the politics of digital platforms stress that users are indeed producing, evaluating, and circulating more and more content, but that this stream of information is not controlled by its producers, but by the operators of the social networking sites. The rise of new media is accompanied by a rise in the power of their algorithms, which – in the case of Facebook – currently work to categorize, filter and hierarchize around 500,000 comments per minute. This process works according to rules which are not publicized but which effectively determine and manipulate the whole stream of communication.

It became clear in the context of the US election campaign that Facebook gives primary position in the newsfeed to those posts which have the greatest chances of being shared most widely, and which thus guarantee advertising revenue as well as high levels of interest. This radical separation of the quality and popularity of political news explains why it is targeted pieces of fake news which are often shared most extensively on social networking sites.

In contrast to daily newspapers and radio and television broadcasters, which are also financed through advertising, social networks offer a personalized approach towards its users. It is assumed that the value of advertising rises according to the extent to which it can be tailored to individual preferences and intentions. So the algorithmically curated streams of information, or “newsfeeds,” address us not as political citizens, but as a data source whose presence on the platform needs to be retained, so that continually updated information on our interactive behavior can be harvested.

The flip side of personalized advertising is the emergence of “personal publics” (Jan-Hinrik Schmidt). These are characterized by the sorting of information not according to its journalistic news value, but primarily according to its calculated relevance to the individual. Complex ranking procedures now compete with the sovereignty of journalistic talent. A consequence of these individualized news streams is the formation of so–called “filter bubbles” or “echo chambers,” which disproportionately often contain news and comments which validate our own political orientation and world views.

Another consequence is that our actions within digital environments are subjected to practically constant observation and analysis. Paradoxically, this loss of anonymity and the practice of opaque profiling undermine those very rights to freedom that were initially strengthened by the invention of social media. If we cannot know what information third parties have about us, and if we are afraid that we will face political, social or economic disadvantage because of our personal preferences, then it is quite possible that we have – subconsciously – given up our own democratic rights.

If print capitalism contributed to the emergence of national public spheres, then data capitalism and digital communication services are now paving the way for a structural shift which puts some of their defining features up for negotiation. Changes occurring include the blurring of boundaries between private and pub-
public spheres, between publication and conversation, between production and consumption, as well as the programming and fragmentary specialization of different groups, and the accumulation of the powers of knowledge and communication in the hands of a few global companies.

However, the consequences of digital transformation for the expression of civil rights and liberties do not remain unchallenged. Many parties use digital communication services in equal measure as an empirical resource and as a mouthpiece with which to critically address their mechanisms and technologies. The field of sociological and legal research also plays a considerable role in this task, aiming to understand the technically and contractually normalized structures of social networks and to gain a conceptual grasp over them. An international research community has formed under the umbrella of "new media studies" and "critical data studies," working towards an empirically based critique of algorithms and platform policy. Researchers are examining the ways in which technical code is used to recommend new logics of communitization, how societal groups are categorized and discriminated against, and how their future behavior is computed.

And even users themselves have taken a critical stance. Frequent changes to terms of use and restrictions on informational self-determination have sparked protest. Artists have defended themselves against the terms of publication of their works on YouTube. Twitter users have scrutinized the rules of the "trending" algorithm, which prioritizes certain themes while ignoring others. Facebook users have been protesting against censorship for years, and more recently against the deletion of content. The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten’s protest against the deletion of an award-winning anti-Vietnam War photograph attracted international attention in summer 2016. Facebook argued that the image of a naked fleeing child, whose skin had been burned by napalm, was an infringement of the network’s rules of publication.

This incident became so widely discussed not least because it symbolized a conflict that had been brewing for a long time: that between the right to free speech, including freedom of the press, and the terms and conditions of a commercially run communication infrastructure. Contractual freedom allows operators to define the terms of use of their services at their own discretion, within the framework of national laws. Conversely, private and professional users refer to human rights as a normative frame of reference for their demands for free speech and data protection.

Human rights are rights of defense which democratic states grant to citizens as protection against the asymmetry of power between state and individual. In the wake of digitalization, this vertical imbalance in power has been joined by a horizontal one between citizens and digital platforms. In reaction against this trend, over the past few years new attempts have been made to extend the scope of fundamental rights to encompass parts of the economic sphere. Even in the field of digital rule-making, a growing readiness to take the relevant human rights principles into account has emerged since the revelations of Edward Snowden. The next generation of digital infrastructures, the internet of things, which is equipping more and more of our everyday objects with digital interfaces, will no longer be judged solely according to efficiency criteria, but increasingly according to its consequences for individual and collective self-determination.

The endangerment, active defense, and discursive reinterpretation of fundamental rights is today the realm in which the tension between digital business models and democratic values is perhaps at its most evident.

References
Summary: The experience of two World Wars and genocides has universally strengthened the idea of protecting ethnic and cultural minority rights. The rights of national majorities, however, have fallen outside the accepted normative order. The recognition of majority rights would be logical, more appropriate in the light of the current situation in democratic societies, and a protection of smaller nations against cultural imperialism. Finally, denying the majority’s cultural rights can feed frustration and thus strengthen populism.

With Brexit and Donald Trump’s election victory, the new political fault line that is increasingly dividing and polarizing western societies has become clearly evident. On one side stand those who consider the nation-state an outdated and morally suspect anachronism and deny the existence and legitimacy of national majority cultures. On the other side are those who turn to the nation-state for protection from globalization’s risks and side-effects and who regard national cultures as real and valuable. As Donald Trump said, “Americanism, not globalization, will be our credo.”

Calls from immigrant minorities for recognition and parity of their culture and religion are provoking resistance by members of the majority population who want to preserve and defend their “national” culture. Examples of this conflict are the debates over head scarves and burkas, the rule permitting only German to be spoken in Berlin’s schoolyards, “Black Pete” (traditionally, St. Nick’s companion in the Netherlands), and the controversies over caricatures depicting the Prophet Mohammed. What has made such issues so explosive and ultimately pivotal for the mobilization of right-wing populist politicians and parties?

Since World War II, standards protecting minorities have steadily proliferated. The dreadful crimes committed against minorities during and between the two world wars have indisputably made this a welcome development. But one consequence has been that arguments aimed at defending the rights of national majorities have fallen outside the accepted normative order.

There are four reasons why a normative recognition of the rights of cultural majorities would be appropriate and sensible. The first reason is normative and logical consistency. If one accepts the premise of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities – that “persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities . . . have the right to enjoy their own culture” – then cultural majorities logically also possess such a right. If French Canadians or Pueblo Native Americans from the U.S. southwest have cultural rights, then so must the Danes and the Dutch.

The second reason is that we no longer have a situation, as before World War II, in which unrestricted national sovereignty guarantees national majorities the dominance of their culture and identity. Whereas it has remained, or has become, legitimate for minorities to define themselves as an ethnic group and thereby claim these rights, it appears increasingly illegitimate to define the identities of national majorities as “Dutch” or “Danish,” for example. Today, these national designations are still seen as normatively legitimate only if they refer to purely formalistic aspects such as “anyone living in the Netherlands” or “anyone with Danish nationality.” Since World War II, liberal democratic nation-states have been expected to commit themselves to universalist standards and draw no distinction based on the cultural background of their residents, unless it is about recognizing and protecting cultural minorities.

What used to be a normative advantage for cultural majorities – namely, that they had their “own” nation-states – has become a normative burden – namely, that these nation-states are expected to submit to universalist principles and to cease reflecting or favoring a specific culture. That brings us to the third reason.
The absence of legitimate grounds for cultural demands of the majority is poisoning and polarizing public debate. Cultural majorities can prevail in elections, parliamentary decisions, and referenda. But the results, such as the introduction of simple language tests as a precondition of marriage migration in the Netherlands or the decision by majorities of parents at various Berlin schools that only German shall be spoken in the schoolyard, are then regarded as normatively suspect and populist in broad segments of the population. Whereas the demands of minorities are viewed as legitimate expressions of a call for the preservation of their own cultures, similar demands of the majority are regarded as backward or even racist.

The lack of a normatively accepted basis for the demands of the cultural majority is precisely what seeds the risk of radicalization. If such a basis were to exist, it would not only legitimize some demands but also define the limits of what is legitimate. But when every attempt to defend national traditions is reproached as racist or populist, there is no way to differentiate between normatively legitimate and illegitimate demands of the majority. Where cultural majorities find no normative recognition of their demands, they tend to mobilize the populist power of their numerical superiority.

The fourth and final reason to address the legitimacy of majority demands lies in globalization, which threatens national cultures as well, particularly those of smaller nations. The position of languages such as Dutch or Danish has become precarious in many contexts, whether in higher education, music, or cinema. Moreover, globalization often means Americanization, even in discussions about human and minority rights. An example is the transatlantic diffusion of American sensitivities that stem from the debates there about race relations. Seen through the American lens, the figure of Black Pete is an atrocious case of black-facing of the sort that was common in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American vaudeville, in which white actors wore black make-up to disparage and ridicule Blacks. Blackfacing is rightly repudiated in the United States today for that reason.

But does it follow that black make-up should be considered a form of racism no matter what the location and its traditions? At any rate, this imported sensibility has developed immense normative power of persuasion. By viewing the Dutch tradition through the American lens, the head of a UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent judged that Black Pete was a racist symbol of slavery. "Why," she asked in her own gesture of cultural imperialism, "do you Dutch need two 'Santa Clauses' in the first place?" Certainly, there is no reason for exaggerated concern about the effects of globalization and Americanization. The Dutch, Danish, and other national cultures will not disappear so quickly. But neither are they completely unthreatened. Canadian multiculturalism and international standards protecting persons who belong to minorities grant Quebec a legitimate right to protect its language and culture by, among other things, requiring that immigrants have French language skills. But many national languages and cultures are in a weaker position. With 8.1 million inhabitants, Quebec has a population larger than that of Denmark, Norway, or Finland and about equal to that of Austria or Switzerland. In a world where Anglo-Saxon culture has become the norm, the distinction between dominant cultures and minority cultures can no longer apply solely to groups within nation-states. It must also be considered in light of the disparity between smaller and larger nation-states.

To determine where the rights of cultural majorities lie, one could draw on the definitions used for cultural minorities and indigenous peoples in international agreements. After all, the members of cultural majorities and cultural minorities alike “possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show (...) a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language” (UN Report on Minority Rights). It is also true that they “are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system” (UN Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).
Should not the same rights hold for majority cultures as for national minorities and indigenous people? All three can claim that their identity and solidarity rest on a cultural and political history extending over many generations. For all three, this history is linked with a territory filled with places and sites that recall the past. Places of memory are not necessarily imbued only with positive associations. In Germany they include Dachau and the Berlin Wall as well as Wittenberg and the Lorelei. Cultural identity includes shame just as much as pride, but common to both is the impulse to transmit them to future generations. If they contradict the aspirations of national minorities, the demand of the minority weighs no less, but also no more, than that of the majority. The solution could be either a system of monocultural dominance in the areas where a group constitutes the majority (as in Belgium) or a system of mutual minority rights (as in Canada).

However, the Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka points out that things look different if demands of the majority group come into conflict with those of ethnic groups stemming from immigration. In that case the aspirations of the majority carry more weight because the majority, like national minorities and indigenous people, has a historical link with the territory and its cultural history and has no other place on earth where public life is shaped by its language and cultural traditions. Kymlicka designates this with the term "societal culture."

In German it could be called Leitkultur (dominant culture) if the term were not so morally suspect, so let us leave it at "societal culture." According to Kymlicka, immigrant minority groups have voluntarily forsaken their right to live within their own societal culture. Applied to the example of the language spoken in the schoolyard during breaks, it means that the desire of a parent majority to have that language be German counts more than the argument of Turkish organizations that this stance discriminates against their language. Parents of German-speaking children can assert their desire only in Germany – just as parents of Turkish-speaking children can legitimately assert the analogous wish in...
Turkey. Emigration does not entail the right to take that demand with you. What Frisians and Sorbs in Germany are arguably entitled to does not necessarily extend to Turks and other immigrant ethnicities.

Similarly, the fact that we in Europe observe Christian holidays does not automatically mean that immigrant religious minorities should receive the right to have their red-letter days recognized as public holidays. Nor is it illegitimate from the outset to restrict an immigrant group’s public expression of religiosity (e.g., burkas) if that form of expression is viewed by the majority as incompatible with its core values, especially in institutions such as schools and courts.

Acknowledging certain claims of cultural majorities to be legitimate would accommodate most people’s intuitive sense of justice better, by acknowledging that historical ties to places matter. Incidentally, the normative consequences need not radically diverge in practice from the currently observable results of cultural conflicts. The important difference, however, is that the demands and arguments of the majority group would be taken seriously in the process leading to such results and would not be divested of their moral legitimacy out of hand. Even if the outcome were to be the same, it would make a significant difference to the acceptance of arbitral rulings to know whether they are based on a victory or a defeat of the majority’s numerical superiority vis-à-vis a minority’s normative right or whether they result from a process in which both sides could claim the legitimacy of their arguments and call for their consideration.

The desire for respect for cultural traditions that we find so legitimate and understandable when it comes to minorities should not be suddenly belittled and impugned in the case of the cultural majority. Only by avoiding that division can we also keep the Trumps and Petrys in this world from continuing to make political hay from majorities’ injured pride and their frustration over the double cultural morality of the cosmopolitans.
Populism in Europe

Europe’s Crisis of Trust: The Economic Crisis Has Fed Distrust in Government

Chase Foster

The most striking development in European politics over the past decade has been the strengthening of populist parties that call into question core features of the institutions of liberal democracy and economic integration that have guided European policymaking in increasing measure since the end of World War II. Vote shares for right and left parties espousing populist rhetoric have gradually increased since the 1990’s, but the trend has markedly accelerated since the global financial crisis. In recent elections, right-wing populist parties that marry Euro-skepticism with cultural nationalism and hostility toward immigration have commanded one fifth to one half of total votes in Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Poland and Hungary, while activism by the right-wing populist group UK Independence Party (UKIP) led to a slim majority of the British public endorsing exit from the European Union.

Although less prominent, left wing populist parties that focus their animus on processes of economic liberalization that have increased inequality and worsened employment protections have also been on the rise, with candidates receiving support from one quarter of the electorate in countries such as Spain and France in recent years. What unites populist parties on both ideological poles is an antagonistic conception of politics that places a corrupt political establishment on one side, and a virtuous people on the other, with majoritarian elections viewed as the only source of political legitimacy.

Scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the rise of populist parties. The most predominant view is that populism is driven by a backlash of older, less educated, mostly white and male voters against cultural changes caused by increased immigration, gender equality, and acceptance of the LGBT community. Other accounts have framed the growing appeal of populists as stemming from the erosion of national sovereignty: a reaction against transnational governance and the Europeanization of public policy. Finally, a third set of explanations emphasize how economic change has increased the appeal of populist parties among the relative “losers” of globalization and technological change.

While each of these theories help account for political developments that likely have cultural and economic roots, studies of populist voting are limited in their capacity to effectively identify general, cross-national factors that have contributed to the appeal of populist parties. Multi-country electoral studies, by necessity, collapse populist parties together, obscuring the heterogeneous origins and goals of populist programs, while only partially accounting for major cross-country differences such as the level of fragmentation in the party system and the degree to which mainstream parties have incorporated populist platforms, both of which influence voter behavior.

Examining public opinions associated with populist voting, such as citizen trust in government, is an empirical strategy not only more amenable to capturing cross-country trends, but also one that can shed insights that complement the findings from electoral studies. Virtually all empirical studies that consider the subject agree that the rise of voting for populist parties is associated with a decline in trust in government. While a lack of trust in government does not necessarily lead to support for populist parties, most populist voters have low levels of civic trust, and polities with lower levels of aggregate trust tend to be auspicious environments for populist entrepreneurs to expand their support. Better under-

Summary: The loss of confidence in government that underlies the rise of populism in Europe is largely the result of the region’s economic difficulties. Faith in existing political institutions has collapsed most where economies have struggled most. New data show: people who have suffered more from difficult economic times are more likely to have lost confidence in national governments and the European Union.
standing the determinants of citizen trust across multiple countries can thus provide insight into the social forces that have contributed to the recent surge in support for populist parties.

In a recently published article in *European Union Politics*, Jeff Frieden and I analyze the determinants of trust in government across 27 European countries from 2004-2015. Our longitudinal analysis shows that there has been a general decline in trust since the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, but that the shift has been starker within the countries of the Eurozone South that have experienced the brunt of the crisis. As can be seen in the figure, the percentage of people in Eurozone debtor countries indicating that they trust or mostly trust their national governments has declined from 40-50 per cent before the crisis to below 20 per cent in 2015.

We then conduct multiple logistic regression analysis on more than 600,000 responses to the Eurobarometer to assess the economic, political, and cultural factors that have contributed to the decline in trust in recent years. We demonstrate that the pattern of trust is highly associated with economic indicators: macro-economic performance on the national level and employment status on the individual level. The creditor countries in the Eurozone North that have fared relatively better over the last decade express more consistent levels of trust over time, while citizen confidence has plummeted within the debtor countries reeling from double-digit levels of unemployment and facing externally-imposed structural adjustment programs.

Furthermore, throughout Europe, the decline in trust is more pronounced among the unemployed who have most directly and personally experienced the effects of the economic downturn, and less acute among the professionals who have better weathered the crisis. We estimate that every one-point increase in aggregate unemployment lowers the probability of a respondent indicating trust by two percentage points, while becoming unemployed during the crisis years reduces a person’s likelihood of trust by an additional three percentage points.

Although cultural and political factors remain important baseline influences on citizen discontent, there has been no significant change in political and cultural identities over the last decade, even as trust has plummeted in some countries and Europeans have voted for populist parties in record numbers. And while

![Graph showing trust in the EU and national governments from 2004 to 2015 for creditors and debtors.](image_url)

*Source: Frieden and Foster (2017).*

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domestic control over central policy questions has undoubtedly been reduced within the countries forced to adopt structural adjustment programs, our findings suggest that the decline in trust in these countries has been the result of the reduced economic output that has resulted from these programs, more than the fact that national policy sovereignty has been circumscribed.

What implications does our study have for the future of political and economic liberalism in Europe? On the one hand, our findings indicate that at least part of the recent decline in trust – and by extension, the strengthening of populist parties – is self-inflicted: the failure of wealthy Eurozone countries to share the burdens of economic adjustment, and the imposition of stringent austerity programs together have wrecked the economies of the Eurozone South leading to a collapse in citizen confidence in government, and a concomitant expansion of the pool of discontented voters to which populist parties can readily appeal. But on the other hand, our analysis suggests a way forward for supporters of European integration and liberal democracy. Europeans have neither wholly embraced far right or far left ideology nor become more nationalist in political identity, even if economic circumstances have made them more willing to support populist parties to protest the status quo. This suggests that if European policymakers can enact policies that produce better economic results for citizens – perhaps by pooling economic risks across countries, providing more comprehensive protection and retraining for workers facing employment loss, or embedding liberal markets within more robust social welfare systems – popular support for liberal democracy would be strengthened, and the appeal of populist alternatives reduced.

References


Summary: "Populism" can be defined, conceptualized and measured on the two dimensions anti-establishment and anti-pluralism. When supplemented by typically left or right wing political items, left and right-wing populism can also be empirically defined and measured. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) shows itself to be a right-wing populist party not only in terms of its platform and at the level of party officials and candidates but also because the majority of AfD voters are right-wing populists. With the AfD, an unambiguously right-wing populist party has established itself also in Germany ahead of the federal parliamentary elections in 2017.

Since Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States, many observers have been talking of a new “age of populism.” They predict a populist future for the liberal representative democracies of the West. Populism appears to be becoming a defining trait of democracy in the 21st century. But in public discourse, populism is an inexplicit concept: politicians, parties, and voters are described as “populists,” “right-wing populists,” or “left-wing populists.” So what is “populism”? How can it be empirically measured? And how populist are the people who vote for the party Alternative for Germany (AfD).

Most scholars now agree that the two determining dimensions of populism are anti-establishment and anti-pluralism. Anti-establishment refers to populist criticism of the people and institutions who constitute the “Establishment” in society, such as established parties, parliaments, and politicians as typical representatives of democracy. Critical attitudes towards the media, the European Union, and the constitutional state also belong to this dimension. Characteristic of the second dimension of populism is an anti-pluralist stance citing an alleged general popular will and rejecting the institutions and procedures of pluralist consensus formation and decision-making.

These two dimensions enable us not only to define but also to measure populist attitudes. The more strongly voters, parties, and politicians adopt anti-establishment and anti-pluralist attitudes and positions, the more populist they are. Populism is primarily neither left-wing nor right-wing. As a substantively empty, “thin” ideology, it understands societal disputation as contention between the “one people” and allegedly corrupt political elites. Populist parties, politicians, and voters can be recognized in party platforms, rhetoric and attitudes by calls to overthrow the prevailing political order so as to give greater influence to the popular will. They demand that the political system be reformed, corruption fought, and popular influence in politics enhanced; and they assert that they alone represent the true will of the people.

The specifics of populism

Such “general populism” can be supplemented by specifically right or left-wing populist attitudes towards political content and programmes. Political (self-)placement on a left/right scale can be used in analysis. Over and above this, right-wing populism is often measured in terms of concrete attitudes against migration, minorities, and gender equality and in favour of a stricter law enforcement. Typical left-wing populists, by contrast, argue in favour of greater redistribution or expropriation of the wealthy, demand more participation for socially disadvantaged sections of the population or call for a general ban on arms exports on pacifist grounds.

Prominent examples of general populist movements that cannot be labelled either left or right in terms of their political programme are Nowoczesna in Poland and Ciudadanos in Spain. On the left-wing populist pattern of many Latin American movements, by contrast, are Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece. Examples of right-wing populism are the Front National in France and the UK...
Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain. But (right-wing) populism is also showing itself in Germany. Above all the Alternative for Germany (AfD), founded in 2013, has often been described in public debate and the media as a right-wing populist party.

Quite rightly. Recent studies by the Research Unit Democracy and Democratization show that at the level of candidates and political platform, the AfD is clearly a right-wing populist party in comparison to others. But how right-wing populist are its voters, the some ten per cent of the electorate in Germany who told pollsters that they intended to vote AfD at the federal election in September 2017?

To answer this question, the outcome of a representative survey carried out by Infra test dimap for the Bertelsmann Foundation was analysed. Between 13 and 30 March 2017, a total of 2,371 voters and abstainers in the 2013 federal election were asked about their political attitudes and voting intentions for the 2017 federal election. The sample included 364 AfD voters. How populist AfD voters’ attitudes are was measured on the basis of the extent to which respondents agreed ("strongly agree," "mostly agree," "mostly disagree," "strongly disagree") with the following eight general populist statements:

1. Important questions should not be decided by parliament but by popular referendums.
2. The people are often in agreement, but the politicians pursue quite different goals.
3. I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.
4. Political parties only want peoples’ votes but do not care about their opinion.
5. The politicians in the German parliament need to follow the will of the people.
6. The people in Germany agree in principle on what should happen politically.
7. The political differences between citizens and politicians are greater than the differences among citizens.
8. What they call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s own principles.

Whereas statements 2, 3, 4, and 7 address the antagonism between the political elite and citizens and thus the anti-establishment dimension of populist attitudes, statements 1, 5, 6, and 8 address the idea of the public as a homogeneous unit and thus reflect the anti-pluralism dimension of populism. Three groups were identified on the basis of agreement with these eight statements: respondents who “strongly agreed” or “mostly agreed” with all eight statements were defined as populist. Respondents who agreed with at least the majority of statements (five out of eight) and also did not strongly disagree with any of the statements were defined as leaning towards populism. All other respondents who mostly agreed with not more than half of the statements and/or strongly disagreed with at least one statement were defined as non-populist.

In order to measure their right-wing orientation, we drew on the self-location of AfD voter respondents on a left/right scale, where they could place themselves from 0 (“left-wing”) to 10 (“right-wing”). In addition, typical right-wing statements on particular political topics were presented for reaction.

For the empirical location of AfD voters ahead of the 2017 federal election, this analysis produced the following picture: far more than half (56 per cent) are populists as defined and a further third (32 per cent) lean towards populism. This means that nine out of ten AfD voters hold populist attitudes. Far more AfD voters have populist views than the average for the whole electorate. The proportion of populists among AfD voters is approximately twice as great as in the whole electorate (29 per cent). Vice versa, the proportion of non-populists in the electorate (41 per cent) is more than three times greater than among AfD voters (12 per cent). The comparison between parties, too, shows that the AfD has by far the most voters with strong populist views. While 56 per cent of AfD voters are populist, the figures for the other parties as 29 per cent for the SPD, 23 for Die Linke (Left Party), 22 for the FDP, 14 per cent for the CDU/CSU, and 10 per cent
for the Greens. By contrast, the proportion of non-populist voters who opted for the AfD, only just under 12 per cent, is far lower than that for the Greens (57 per cent), the CDU/CSU (56 per cent), the FDP (43 per cent), the SPD (38 per cent), and Die Linke (36 per cent).

The situation is similar when it comes to self-placement of AfD voters on the left-wing/right-wing scale (0 = "left-wing" and 10 = "right-wing"). More than two thirds (67 per cent) placed themselves right of centre, one quarter even on the far right (8 to 10 on the scale). Another 42 per cent see themselves within the centre-right spectrum (6–7).

By comparison, only four of ten FDP voters and only every third CDU/CSU voter place themselves right-of-centre, and only 7 per cent of FDP voters and the same proportion of CDU/CSU voters on the far right. The average position for AfD voters on the left/right spectrum is 6.6, far to the right of that for the FDP (5.5), CDU/CSU (5.3), SPD (4.2), Greens (3.4), and Linke (2.2).

The findings on typically right-wing attitudes on specific political issues also confirm this result: 85 per cent of AfD voters far more frequently agree fully with the statement "Immigrants should be required to adapt to German culture" than the average of all voters (55 per cent). Almost as frequently (84 per cent), AfD voters totally agree that "People who break the law should be more severely punished," while only 64 per cent of all voters take this view. Still more marked are the differences on the statement "Germany should accept no more refugees from crisis areas": almost three quarters of all AfD voter strongly agree with this compared to 30 per cent of all voters.

In sum, almost nine out of ten AfD voters have populist attitudes and more than two-thirds place themselves right of centre. The probability of voters opting for the AfD increases with the degree of their right-wing orientation and their sympathy for populism from almost zero among left-wing non-populists to more than 60 per cent among strongly right-wing populists (see figure). A typical right-wing populist is therefore more than six times more likely to vote AfD than the average of all voters. Vice versa, the typical AfD voter is a right-wing populist and, as regards its constituency, the AfD is also clearly a right-wing populist party.

But "right-wing populist" as defined does not necessarily mean "right-wing extremist" or someone "hostile to democracy" in principle. What proportion of AfD voters are right-wing extremist was not explicitly addressed by the measurement concept applied. Moreover, more than eight out of ten AfD voters strongly agreed (37 per cent) or at least "agreed" (47 per cent) with the statement "Democ-
racy is – all in all – the best political system.” Only 14 per cent “mostly agreed” and no more than 2 per cent “strongly agreed” with the statement. The vast majority of largely right-wing populist AfD voters are thus no enemies of democracy, but much more frequently adopt right-wing positions on policy and political issues and are, above all, much more populist in their assessment of the functioning of democracy, its institutions, and those who currently exercise political responsibility. What we have established for AfD candidates and the party platform thus also applies to those who vote AfD: the brand essence of the AfD is right-wing populism. Before the 2017 federal election, a right-wing populist party, indisputably so also in the empirical preferences of its voters, has thus established itself in the German party landscape: the AfD.

References


Movement? Party? The Rightist AfD’s Political Strategies Vary in State Assemblies

Wolfgang Schroeder, Bernhard Weßels, Alexander Berzel, and Christian Neusser

Already in the 2013 federal election there were signs that the party system in Germany was facing diversification and that the structure of political competition could change. Starting almost from scratch, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 4.7 per cent of the second vote (for party lists) at the polls, falling just short of the score needed to enter the German Bundestag. In all state assembly (Landtag) elections since the federal election on 22nd September 2013, the AfD made it into the state parliaments. In seven states, they reached double figures.

What does the presence of a new party whose role in the work of the Landtage is still unclear mean for political competition and for political mobilization of the electorate? Drawing on material and publications, and above all on focused interviews with parliamentary group leaders of all parties in parliament in the ten state assemblies where the AfD won seats between 2014 and 2016, the research project “The AfD in State Assemblies” examines these questions.

In two assemblies, the AfD with over 20 per cent of the vote is the second largest party and in another two the third largest. They have thus driven the so-called established parties from their accustomed places. A total of 153 AfD candidates have been elected to the Landtag by almost two-and-a-half million voters. It is not so much the size of AfD parliamentary groups as their political style that poses a challenge to other groups in state assemblies.

Members and officers (chair, secretary) of parliamentary groups other than the AfD agree that the presence of the new party has changed parliamentary work. Discussions on how to handle the AfD have come to a clear conclusion: excluding and ignoring the newcomers is not a viable approach. The better answer is dissociation without exclusion.

The challenges posed by the AfD are far greater than the conflicts to which the traditional parliamentary parties in most state assemblies are accustomed. Above all, the presence of the AfD in Landtage introduces communicative uncertainty – provoked by the conduct of the AfD, which on occasion flies in the face of usual parliamentary practices. Verbal and non-verbal provocations sometimes make any purely political and substantive reaction difficult, according to officers from other parliamentary groups in almost all state assemblies.

This might be due to the bipolar structure that characterizes the AfD in state assemblies: a clear division of labor between provocateurs and pragmatists. This makes it difficult for competing parties to devise strategies for handling and countering the situation politically. Regardless of whether the distribution of roles is strategic – as members of other parliamentary groups sometimes surmise – or whether it merely reflects plurality within AfD groups, it makes it hard to deal with them.

Also striking in most assemblies is the disparity that prevails between plenary and committee activities. Whereas AfD members in the first and second rows in plenary sessions are quite active, they contribute little or nothing to work in committees.

This is because, first, the majority of AfD members of state assemblies have hardly any prior experience in elected representative bodies, so that they (still) lack the necessary qualifications. AfD parliamentary group officers have to some extent also admitted this. Second, plenary sessions offer more possibilities
for garnering attention outside parliament in the mass media. A member of another parliamentary group put it thus: “the plenary assembly is the extended arm of Facebook.”

Despite congruence in how the party presents itself and how it is seen in the ten state assemblies, there are a number of differences that give a more mixed picture. Thus within AfD parliamentary groups there is not only bipolarity between those that pursue the development of a movement-oriented party and those that advocate a pragmatic, parliament-oriented role with the prospect of participation in a future government. There are also differences between the parliamentary groups of different assemblies. The attempt to establish a typology of AfD parliamentary groups in state assemblies is based first on strategic orientation and second on the policy dimension.

The strategic orientation of the groups in the parliamentary system is determined by their leadership – only about half of parliamentary group chairs can be described as “parliament-oriented.” The assemblies concerned are first of all Berlin, Saxony, and Rhineland-Palatinate and, with some reservations, Hamburg. The chief protagonist on the movement-oriented side is the Thuringian parliamentary group. Also to be counted among the “movement-oriented” forces are the groups in Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. Not least because of the role played by their leader Meuthen as party chairman, the Baden-Württemberg political group adopts no clear positions, but leans towards movement-oriented opposition. Here, again, we find a double structure with clear bipolarity across all state assemblies.

Is such a bipolar structure also to be found in matters of policies? As far as can be judged by their motions and minor interpellations, parliamentary groups also differ quite strongly on content. Overall, AfD parliamentary groups place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Date Election</th>
<th>Result in %</th>
<th>Result absolute*</th>
<th>MdL Start of LP</th>
<th>Strength Parliamentary</th>
<th>Direct-mandate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>13/03/2016</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>809,564</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3. Force</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>14/09/2014</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>120,077</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4. Force</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>10/05/2015</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>64,368</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6. Force</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>15/02/2015</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>214,833</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6. Force</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg-West Pomerania</td>
<td>04/09/2016</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>167,852</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2. Force</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td>13/03/2016</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>268,628</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3. Force</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>31/08/2014</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>159,611</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4. Force</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
<td>13/03/2016</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>272,496</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2. Force</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thuringia</td>
<td>14/09/2014</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>99,545</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4. Force</td>
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almost twice as much value as other parties on issues of asylum, refugees, migration, and integration. Surprising is the comparison on matters of internal security, i.e., crime, security, order, and police. Although regarded as a "law-and-order" party, this makes no visible impact on their parliamentary work. Among the just under 4,700 minor interpellations by AfD parliamentary groups in ten state assemblies, the two issue areas together were addressed by about one third; for other groups by less than one fifth.

However, there are major differences in how the topic cluster asylum/refugees/migration/integration, and internal security are treated. This shows whether AfD parliamentary groups concern themselves predominantly with only a few issues or whether they take a broader part in parliamentary work. We take as our yardstick the other parliamentary groups in the given state assembly and, second, the average for AfD groups in the assemblies under study.

Although thematization by the AfD differs somewhat from state to state, in principle the profile of the party remains the same. In Berlin and Thuringia, migration was the issue most frequently addressed (35.7 % and 23.6 %), and in Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt it was the least frequently raised topic (13 and 11 per cent). Internal security is brought up by the AfD most often again in Berlin and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (20 % and 16.2 %) and least often in Rhineland-Palatinate (5.2 %) and Saxony-Anhalt (8.3 %). Nowhere are AfD parliamentary groups below average in addressing migration and integration, but they are so in the question of internal security in the two states in which this topic is least often brought up.

No clear connection is apparent between concentration on the two fields asylum seekers/refugees and internal security/order and strategic orientation (parliament vs. movement). Parliamentary groups with a more parliamentary orientation, such as in Berlin or Saxony, concentrate between 35 % and 55 % of their minor interpellations on these topics, as does the movement-oriented group in Thuringia. By contrast, the parliament-oriented group in the Rhineland-Palatinate assembly, like the more movement-oriented Saxony-Anhalt group address these topics in fewer than 20 % of interpellations. Parliamentary groups that adopt a movement orientation can therefore not be accused of limiting themselves to one or two issues, of being "single-issue" groups. Similarly, parliament-oriented groups cannot be said to take a broader range of substantive positions.

The activities and positions of the AfD thus vary; they present a uniform picture neither vis-à-vis other political actors nor the public. For the other parties, this heterogeneity and bipolarity bring uncertainty and difficulties in political competition. So far, the AfD possibly owes its attractiveness to this variation, because the party and its parliamentary groups cover every facet of dissatisfaction and thus enjoy broad mobilization. It remains to be seen whether duality up to and including conflict within the AfD will remain a recipe for success. Structural bipolarity will at any rate continue to shape the course of the party.

References


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For more than ten years, we have been witnessing the global rise of behavioral public policy. In 2017, based on a survey in 23 countries, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concluded that it is more now than just a fad. Earlier, the European Union, the World Bank, and the United Nations already documented their efforts to apply behavioral insights in policy fields as diverse as developmental, energy, consumer, gender equality, migration, or anti-corruption policy. One might join the OECD and speak of a paradigm shift, or one might continue to regard the rapidly growing adoption of behavioral public policies as exhibiting the typical features of fads. Paradigm shift or fad: we do not know, because theory-based, systematically comparative studies examining the extent of the globalization of behavioral public policy, the conditions facilitating its emergence, and its consequences do not exist.

In the WZB-based project "Studying the Changing Orders of Political Expertise" (SCOPE), we developed approaches for performing such a systematic analysis. To add depth, we also used network data collected in the "Global Networks of Behavioral Expertise" project, funded by the University of Singapore and hosted by Humboldt University Berlin and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Many of our insights were gleaned from interviews with practitioners during a Villa Vigoni Conference in spring 2017 specifically organized for this purpose.

At its core, behavioral public policy encompasses all those political instruments and forms of coordination that address individual or collective behavior based on insights from behavioral economics, psychology, behavioral and neuroscience.

There is a wide spectrum of instruments in behavioral public policy. "Nudges," for example, are aimed at automatic, spontaneous elements of the cognitive system, drawing on scientific findings about mental biases. The resulting nudges are designed to trigger changes in behavior without using coercion or strong incentives. Other measures are meant to simplify political and administrative communication. The spectrum also includes risk education methods for decision-making in uncertain situations ("boosts") or norms of social behavior ("social norms marketing"). Finally, there is governmental regulation of commercially motivated behavioral interventions ("budges").

The rise of behavioral public policy is closely linked to the Behavioral Insights Team (BIT), the ministerial strategy unit specifically created to develop and apply nudges, dubbed "Britain's Ministry of Nudges" by the New York Times. Originally set up as an eight-person team within the Cabinet Office, the BIT has become a model for similar institutions worldwide, expanding rapidly after its foundation in 2010 and currently employing some 120 staff at its London headquarters and overseas offices.

Yet the earliest example of a strategy unit devoted to behavioral public policy is found in Singapore. At the Home Team (HT), a cluster of police, internal security, and prison agencies reporting to the Minister of Home Affairs, the Home Team Behavioral Sciences Center (HTBSC) was established as early as 2006. Along with

**Summary:** Over the past decade, public policies that are informed by behavioral insights have spread across the world. While we can distinguish a limited variety across Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, Continental and Latin-American countries, behavioral public policy has also reached the European and transnational level. We argue that the global rise of behavioral public policy can only be understood by taking into account boundary-crossing expert networks gaining political and scientific authority.
The Behavioral Insights and Design Unit at the Ministry of Manpower and other teams of behavioral public policy experts in the Singaporean government, the HTBSC was among the BIT’s first international partners.

The fact that behavioral public policy also finds fertile ground in the context of autocratic regimes has been largely ignored by research, even though this case is particularly suitable for studying the conditions facilitating the emergence of such policies, the cultural and ideological factors that come into play, as well as the implications in terms of democratic theory.

This brief overview suggests the varieties of behavioral public policy, which do not follow a uniform pattern and show substantial international differences. In a first internationally comparative analysis, four behavioral public policy clusters, or country families, may be identified:

The governments of Anglo-Saxon countries, especially the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, early on began institutionalizing behavioral public policy in a systematic manner, creating action units at the ministerial level. Nudge co-author and legal scholar Cass Sunstein, during his term as Administrator of the US Office for Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) between 2009 and 2012, pushed for the implementation of the concept. Executive Order 13707, issued by Barack Obama in September 2015, directs all executive departments and agencies of the US government to review all policies and programs with regard to the applicability of behavioral science insights and to implement suitable behavioral interventions. In the United States, a main field of behavioral public policy is a wide spectrum of policies addressing consumer protection (such as the regulation of credit cards as mandated by the 2009 Credit CARD Act), health, retirement, taxes, education, and administrative policy. These are also the main areas pursued by the Behavioral Insights Unit of the New South Wales Department of Premier and Cabinet (NSW BIU), the Productivity Commission, and the Behavioral Economics Team of the Australian Government (BETA), as well as the Ministry of Finance of New Zealand. All of these organizations collaborate closely with BIT UK or BIT Australia.

In the Scandinavian countries, especially Norway and Denmark, it is mostly cross-sector networks that develop and test behavioral public policies. The Danish Nudging Network (DNN), an alliance of civil society representatives, policymakers and administrators, business leaders, and behavioral scientists, was founded in 2010 at Roskilde University and the University of Southern Denmark. It has strong ties, including personnel ones, with iNudgeyou, the "Danish Nudge Unit"; furthermore, it collaborates with MindLab, a policy laboratory co-funded by several Danish ministries and the city of Odense. In a similar fashion, Norway’s GreeNudge, founded in 2011, brings together scientists, business leaders, and civil society representatives in behavioral public policy projects to test interventions aimed at promoting waste reduction, healthy lifestyles, or food safety. Moreover, the Scandinavian approaches are characterized by their special emphasis on interventions related to environmental, energy and health-related issues.

Countries in continental Europe, including Germany, Italy, Austria, or the Netherlands, tend to adapt behavioral public policies mainly at the level of individual ministries or departments. In Germany, behavioral science insights have mainly been used by the Federal Environmental Agency (UBA), the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in cooperation with the IZA Institute of Labor Economics, and the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection with its advisory body, the Advisory Council for Consumer Affairs (SVRV), when developing or evaluating policy measures. The controversial concept of a proposed "Deutschlandrente"—a supplemental government pension fund—draws on insights from behavioral economics. In the Chancellor’s Office, the project group “Effective Governance” (Wirksames Regieren) was set up in 2015 to pursue cross-departmental approaches. That group, however, has hardly been visible in public so far—presumably owing to the politicized media responses following its creation—and does not think of its own role as similar to that of the Anglo-Saxon nudging strategy units. In Italy, behavioral public policy interventions...
are tested in a decentralized fashion much like the German approach. In addition, behavioral science insights have informed recent efforts to simplify administrative processes, leading to the Agenda per la Semplificazione 2015–2017 and the creation of the corresponding Ministro per la Semplificazione e la Pubblica Amministrazione. In the Netherlands, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), beginning in 2009, has increasingly pointed out the importance of behavioral science insights, which are used primarily to inform departmental policies, as in Germany and Italy. The Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment has been particularly active in developing behavioral public policies; the same may be said about the Tax and Customs Administration (Belastingdienst), which is part of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Economic Affairs serves as a joint hub coordinating the behavioral public policy efforts pursued by individual ministries.

A fourth country cluster includes the countries of Latin America, which have increasingly adopted behavioral public policies. The emphasis here is on behavioral interventions in tax and social policy, now implemented in Costa Rica and Guatemala in close cooperation with BIT and the World Bank. Mexico, with its Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCT) “Prospera,” established in 1997, is a particularly prominent and influential case for testing policies designed to change people’s behavior. In cooperation with Mexico’s Presidential Office, the civil society organization Qué Funciona para el Desarrollo (QFD), and UNICEF Mexico, BIT is currently testing an interactive text messaging system designed to encourage pregnant women and mothers to go to the clinic for pre- and postnatal examinations. Since 2015, “Prospera Digital” has now been tested at more than 300 clinics. Other planned interventions include behavioral policies to fight corruption in cooperation with public authorities in Argentina, Mexico, and Columbia.

There are additional countries in which expert teams in behavioral public policy based on the BIT model are already in place or about to be created. Examples include India’s think tank NITI Aayog in cooperation with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Qatar Behavioral Insights Unit (QBIU) of the Qatari government, Japan’s Ministry of the Environment, or, most recently, NudgeLebanon.

The behavioral public policy wave has long reached organizations at the transnational level as well. In 2015, the World Bank’s “Mind, Behavior and Development (eMBeD)” team presented its “Mind, Society and Behavior” development report—the first to systematically connect the foundations, fields of application, and development opportunities of behavioral public policy on a global scale. The United Nations established the UN Behavioral Initiative (UNBI) and are currently testing behavioral interventions to address poverty, gender equality, the environment, and migration as part of the Agenda 2030 process. The OECD recently presented a report as well, presenting interventions addressing energy efficiency and environment, mobility, water management, and food safety, thereby focusing on the “nexus” between these policy fields first discussed at the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos. Nongovernmental organizations working at the transnational level, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, ideas42, or the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), also experiment with behavioral interventions cutting across the established policy fields.

As recent studies have shown, the European Commission has been busy in this field for at least a decade, developing behavioral interventions in an increasingly wide spectrum of policy areas ranging from health policy strategies to fight obesity to the introduction of CO2 labels for cars and measures to combat addiction to online games. In 2014, the Commission founded the Foresight and Behavioral Insights Unit (FBIU), which is charged with developing, coordinating, and implementing behavioral public policies throughout Europe.

In summary, the inter- and transnationalization of behavioral public policy is driven by multi-actor networks transgressing national borders, regulatory levels, and policy fields, enabling experts and political actors from diverse contexts to engage in mutual exchanges. Doubtlessly, behavioral public policy is also an expression of the zeitgeist. But its rise can only be understood by taking into
account such boundary-crossing networks of experts successfully gaining political and scientific importance and authority.

An in-depth analysis of the questions and arguments raised here requires at least three lines of research that go beyond earlier, somewhat agitated debates about nudging. First, we should analyze the global networks of behavioral public policy to gain more precise knowledge of the key actors and their evolution over time. Second, with regard to the varieties of behavioral public policy outlined here, we should identify the diverse factors at the national and regional level—some running counter to, some reinforcing each other—that facilitate the adoption and translation of certain instruments into local policies. That would also enable us to make statements about the conditions particularly conducive to a rapid proliferation of behavioral public policies and those obstructing their adoption. Third, the next step would be a more detailed analysis of the unknown secondary effects of behavioral public policies. At this point, we know very little about their long-term consequences, their compatibility with other policy instruments, and the circumstances under which behavioral public policies simply fail to achieve the desired outcome. Although nudges have been heavily tested in controlled situations, it is still unclear how they work under the increasingly complex, multi-layered conditions of political regulation.

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Interview with Steffen Huck and Dorothea Kübler

Influencing without Restricting If Behavioral Economics Takes a Political Turn

It is a somewhat gross example that is almost exclusively cited to illustrate the concept of nudging: the image of a small fly etched into urinals in public men’s restrooms. Introducing this target is reported to have significantly improved the accuracy of men’s aim, reducing spillage by 80 per cent – a feat accomplished without sanctions and moralizing, simply by providing a playful incentive. Influencing human behavior by using information from behavioral economics has become a popular strategy, not only in marketing but also in politics. This is even reflected in the 2017 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, which was awarded to Richard Thaler, who coined and popularized the term “nudging.” Gabriele Kammerer talked to WZB economists Steffen Huck and Dorothea Kübler about nudging, leaving out the flies.

Congratulations on the Nobel Prize for your discipline! Does the prize affirm your research?

Dorothea Kübler: It definitely does. Behavioral economics is still largely under-represented in economic research and economic policy. If you look at Germany’s economic research institutions – the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin, the ifo institute in Munich, the Mannheim Center for European Economic Research, and also the main scientists working there – then most of them do not have an emphasis on behavioral economics.

Steffen Huck: Then again, media coverage about the Nobel Prize should not tempt us into thinking of behavioral economics as the new redeemer of economic research. There is no doubt that experimental research in particular, with its many highly robust insights into fairness, impatience and fear of loss, has given us better models. But we are still pretty much at the beginning, because we don’t know exactly where to draw the line: where do we need the new approaches of behavioral economics, and where are we doing just fine using the traditional ones?

Let’s talk about the new concept of nudging.

Huck: Behavioral economists assume that people do not simply act rationally when making economic decisions. They have “richer preference structures,” as we call them. It’s these non-rational motives that behavioral economists seek to identify. Nudging represents an attempt to use these insights to influence human behavior.

Kübler: Nudging refers to measures that influence people’s behavior without restricting it. It’s about small stimuli, not about prohibition or strong economic incentives. There are no clear lines here, however: Richard Thaler and his co-author Cass Sunstein also refer to emissions trading as a form of nudging, although it involves enormous amounts of money. To them, that system too is an economic policy instrument that only provides soft regulation, because after all, people are still free to emit CO2 when buying these certificates.

What are some of the fields where nudging plays a role?

Kübler: There are some fields that have already become classic examples: People are more honest when filing their tax returns if they begin the process by sign-
ing a statement saying they will complete all forms to the best of their knowledge and belief. There are many studies on healthy food: How do I have to arrange food in a cafeteria if I want to nudge people into eating an apple for dessert instead of the chocolate pudding? Another field is old-age provision. People are more likely to save for retirement if they are automatically enrolled in a pension plan when they start a new job. The status quo is redefined. By the way, this example is also a good case in point for showing why the nudging hype we are experiencing started in America. The US offer far fewer welfare state benefits – for instance regarding retirement – and much more room for measures motivating people in a soft manner. In Europe, we are less reluctant to use or tolerate economic policy measures that restrict individual freedoms.

What is the government’s role when it comes to nudging?

Kübler: Originally, these methods were used for marketing purposes. But as the chief economist of the World Bank once put it so nicely, if companies can make use of this concept, it would be unfair not to use it in the public interest as well. The 2015 World Development Report, for example, was devoted to this issue: How can we make productive use of behavioral economics in developmental policy? This was based on the idea that nudging is everywhere, that companies are using all kinds of tricks. Why not use the same tricks for a good cause?

But who says that governments know better and may tell citizens what to do?

Kübler: That’s an important objection. Richard Thaler talks about “libertarian paternalism” for good reason. There are different responses to that criticism. First, many laws in Germany are in fact paternalistic. Forcing motorcycle riders to wear helmets, for example, is simply a rule. The same principle applies to nudging measures and all other rules and regulations: there must be strong political reasons to justify them. The second response is that we try to arrive at a systematic understanding of what people want and what sorts of systematic mistakes they make. And then we go and say, based on scientific evidence: Okay, we are pretty sure that this type of behavior runs counter to these people’s long-term interests. In that case, we do know a little better.

The Chancellor’s Office allegedly has a department called “Effective Governance” …

Kübler: That’s a small group of people – three as far as I know – who are rarely seen or heard of. Their job is not so much to raise public awareness of certain issues, as nudging teams in other countries definitely do. They rather respond to inquiries from the various ministries regarding specific projects. But as I said earlier, in Germany we are not under this heavy pressure of having to justify restrictions to individual freedoms. In the US, nudging is also a kind of make-shift solution. Over here, we don’t have so many qualms about banning firearms, for example.

Some think of nudging as a threat and fear manipulation, especially in the digitalized world.

Huck: And that fear is justified to some extent. Companies have been, and always will be, the grandmasters of nudging. Consumers are well-advised to be a little skeptical, especially in their online transactions, where it is so easy to collect enormous amounts of data. We have done some research on pricing policies. We looked at how people changed their buying behavior if prices are presented as “3 for 2,” for example, or divided into their various components, a basic price plus a credit card fee, plus a flat fee for shipping and handling. It was alarming to see how even highly intelligent and highly concentrated consumers can be misled.
Kübler: The New York taxi market is another drastic example. If you pay by card, the machine gives you preloaded tip amounts. You’re free to customize the tip, of course, but if you’re lazy, you just pick one of the default choices. And nowadays that’s 20, 25 or 30 per cent. As a result, tipping has doubled! This is just a small example of how much human behavior can be influenced, how consumers’ wallets can be emptied. Making people more aware of companies’ nudging schemes may also be a strategy. In other words: anti-nudging!

What can be done to avoid harm?

Huck: In some cases, the answer to that must surely be better regulation, one that incorporates the insights of behavioral economics. But this needs to be done carefully, because regulation may also backfire. My colleague at University College London, Ran Spiegler, has come up with some very impressive examples in that regard. He shows that it’s not sufficient to simply be aware of the existence of a behavioral bias, that is, a deviation from rational decision-making. We need to decode the psychological mechanism that fuels the deviation. And we are still far from having done so, even with many deviations for which there is plenty of empirical evidence.

Researchers therefore must not stop at merely describing deviant behavior.

Kübler: In the first decades, it was frequently enough for a high-quality publication to simply document a strange behavioral effect. Today, the leading journals fortunately ask for more than that, and that certainly does encourage researchers to look deeper into the causes of deviations from rational decision-making.

Does the research in your departments explore such causation?

Huck: Of course. At the moment, we are primarily concerned with the roots of non-rational expectations, for instance regarding the phenomenon of hyper-optimism frequently found among entrepreneurs. We are working on a paper studying, in an experimental setting, the extent to which a sheer lack of data analysis skills can generate such hyper-optimism. Entrepreneurs always see only the success of other companies that were actually founded. If you forget that others may have had the same idea but never got off the ground in the first place, you can easily become overly optimistic.

Are researchers prone to that fallacy as well?

Huck: Yes, absolutely. Whenever you think you have this great idea that hasn’t been discussed in the literature, you should ask yourself whether that’s really because no one else had the same thought before. It may also be because the idea ends up leading nowhere. If you follow that principle, you can save yourself from many errors.

But they do still exist, those completely new ideas in behavioral economics, don’t they?

Kübler: They do, but if they’re completely new and possibly even good, you must never give them away.
Bribing the Self
Self-Deception in Financial Advice
Roel van Veldhuizen

Our life as modern consumers is not easy. Whenever we want to buy a new smartphone or car, decide how to invest our money, or even decide what treatment to obtain for our back issues, it is easy to find ourselves bedazzled by a plethora of options. In many cases, the number of possible alternatives can be simply overwhelming. For example, Amazon.de currently lists over 1,500 items in the “smartphone” category. In other cases, it can be hard to evaluate the quality of different options even when there are few. For example, is the added storage space of the newest smartphone worth the extra cost? Or should we consider having back surgery instead of physiotherapy, when we don’t know the advantage of each of these treatments?

In situations like these, we as modern consumers often rely on expert advice to help us make the best decisions. We ask salesmen to advise us on the type of car that best fits our needs. We ask financial advisors to tell us how to invest our money. And we ask doctors to recommend the best type of medication for our physical ailments. We benefit from the expert’s knowledge, and the expert benefits from the fees we pay for their advice.

While this relationship is often mutually beneficial, in some cases we are not the only ones who pay the experts for their advice. Salesmen may get higher bonuses for selling certain types of (expensive) products. And financial advisors and doctors may get commissions or bonus payments from investment funds or pharmaceutical companies in exchange for convincing us to choose an expensive investment plan or treatment. This creates a potential tension in the advisor’s mind. On the one hand, she may be internally motivated to give good advice, for example because she wants to adhere to professional standards or feels like it is the right thing to do. On the other hand, a high commission may also look appealing. In other words, there is a potential conflict between money maximization and a desire to behave honestly.

Homo oeconomicus vs. homo moralis

Uri Gneezy, Silvia Saccardo, Marta Serra-Garcia and I study the behavior of advisors in cases where such conflicts between money maximization and morality may exist. We differentiate between three types of advisors. First, there is homo oeconomicus, who cares only about his self-interest, and therefore always chooses the advice that comes with the highest commission. Second, there is homo moralis, who cares about behaving morally and therefore always chooses the advice that is in her client’s best interest. Finally, there is an intermediate type of advisors who want to behave honestly but are not totally certain about what honest behavior entails. These advisors may in some cases be able to conveniently deceive themselves into believing that the advice that maximizes their self-interest is also the one that is most beneficial to the client. Specifically, these advisors may be able to convince themselves that the product or treatment that comes with the highest commission or bonus is also in their client’s best interest. This allows them to retain a self-image as a moral person while still maximizing their income and thereby effectively get the best of both worlds.

We study self-deception in financial advice using a series of laboratory experiments done with students at the University of California, San Diego. The experiments were simple. Students were invited to a computer room and asked to take...
on the role of a financial advisor. Each financial advisor was presented with two products (A and B) on their computer screen. They were then asked to provide advice to a client using a simple written message: “I recommend you choose product A/B”. Clients had no information on the quality of the two products, and therefore were completely dependent on their advisor’s recommendation. We constructed the two products such that product A was less risky than product B, while product B had a higher rate of return. Hence, neither of the two products was clearly better than the other. Indeed, in a baseline version of the experiment where advisors did not receive a commission for either product, both products were recommended by a substantial portion of advisors.

In addition to a baseline without payments, we also introduced two versions where advisors obtained a bonus for recommending the less risky product (product A). These two versions differed only in when the advisors found out about the bonus payment. In the first case, we informed advisors about the bonus at the beginning of the experiment, before they first saw the products. In the second case, we first let them examine the products and only informed them about the bonus just before they made their decision. All other elements of the experiment, including the size of the bonus, were the same.

Three types of advisors

How does changing the timing of the bonus payment information affect the advisor’s decision? For homo oeconomicus and homo moralis, the timing is irrelevant. The homo oeconomicus will happily recommend the product with the bonus and the homo moralis will provide honest advice in both cases. Indeed, the timing only matters for the third type of advisors: those who engage in self-deception. When these advisors find out about the bonus at the beginning of the experiment, they can deceive themselves into believing that product A is in fact the better product. This allows them to recommend the product and follow their self-interest while retaining their self-image as an honest and moral person. By contrast, when advisors only find out about the bonus at the end of the experiment, self-deception is harder. Having already convinced themselves that one product is superior, it is no longer possible to choose the product with the bonus without compromising their self-image. Hence these types of advisors should be less likely to recommend the bonus product in cases where they only find out about the bonus at the end of the experiment.

Consistent with this line of reasoning, we find a sizable difference between the two versions of the experiment. When advisors find out about the bonus at the beginning of the experiment, approximately 60 per cent of advisors recommend the bonus product. When advisors only find out about the bonus at the end, this fraction falls to approximately 30 per cent, which is similar to the fraction observed without the bonus. This implies that approximately 30 per cent of advisors in our experiment engage in self-deception: they recommend the bonus product when self-deception is possible, but choose the other option when it is not.

Consumers should be aware of bonus effects

These results therefore demonstrate the existence of self-deception in financial advice among a sample of student participants. In so doing, our results illustrate that bonus payments may distort the decisions of expert advisors for two different reasons. The first is a direct effect: self-interested advisors will recommend the product with the highest commission simply because it is in their interest to do so. Our results also point to a second, more indirect effect: the commission may also change the advisor’s judgment, convincing her that the product with the highest commission is also the better product. Hence, our results illustrate the potential of bonus payments to distort even the decisions of advisors who see themselves as honest people, by changing how they rank the two options. This also implies that as consumers we should be doubly wary of advisors who receive third-party commissions: even when they themselves
genuinely believe that they are acting in our best interest, they may have deceived themselves, and may in fact may only be pursuing their self-interest.

Our results also suggest that subtle changes in the choice architecture—in our case, a slight change in the timing—can have important effects on the behavior of advisors. In follow-up work, we also show that moving to a more objective environment has the potential to limit, and possibly even remove, the scope for self-deception. For example, providing an expert with information on the types of products a client typically prefers may make it harder for the expert to convince herself that a bonus product is also the better one. Even in such cases, we as consumers would do well to be wary of expert advice and consider the role of self-deception on their behavior.

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“How satisfied are you with our service? Did the product meet your expectations?” Today, nearly every transaction in the digital economy comes with a request to give evaluative feedback. User or customer views are collected to optimize products or to improve marketing. Aside from ratings on various scales, customers are often asked to give written feedback in the form of reviews, which then may be rated by other customers to create a hierarchy out of the multiplicity of reviews. “Did you find this review helpful?” Positive responses boost the reviewer’s calculated reputational rating, helping them climb the ranks of top reviewers, which serves as an incentive to write even more reviews.

One episode of the Netflix series Black Mirror unfolds a detailed scenario in which the ubiquitous John Doe rating serves as a new form of social control. The series paints the grim picture of a society based on a system of mutual ratings, in which the individual’s only concern in every social interaction is getting as many likes as possible to increase their own reputational score. Ratings are given for every encounter or service. The rating is done by both parties, in real time and available online for all to see. The protagonist, Lacie, provides a great illustration of how the person-centered score governs individual behavior as soon as reaching a high numerical rating is not only motivated by one’s narcissistic needs but necessary to obtain a certain socioeconomic status. For ambitious Lacie, a seemingly small difference between 4.2 and 4.5 on the five-point rating scale becomes an insurmountable obstacle on her path towards upward social mobility.

When trust in quality erodes

Like the Lacie character in Black Mirror, who hires a consultant to give strategic advice on how to raise her reputational rating as quickly as possible (to move into a more luxurious residence), researchers too can take advantage of numerous pieces of advice – some sincere, some cynical – to maximize their own impact rating. One article on the networking site Academia.edu, alluringly entitled “How to Increase Your Papers’ Citation and H Index,” has already garnered some 50,000 views. The author’s ironic strategic recommendation: drastically increase the number of self-citations to attract the necessary attention to your work. This short piece, which reveals the ethically questionable publishing practices of an Indonesian physics professor and presumably those of the author’s colleagues, illustrates a problem of indicator-based performance assessments heavily discussed in academia: The focus on usage statistics in evaluative practice triggers gaming activities that undermine the meritocratic principle of equal performance assessment based on scientific quality criteria, possibly leading to an erosion of trust.

For quite some time, scientists in particular have been arguing over the extent to which qualitative characteristics may be translated into quantitative measures in a meaningful way. In addition to the classic instrument for qualitative assessments (i.e. the peer review system), the introduction of new public management at higher education institutions has added quantitative indicators, for instance when it comes to allocating grant money.

As evaluation research has shown a while ago, any kind of output control using quantitative indicators is accompanied by a neglect of content. One-dimensional

Summary: Evaluation practices are shaping the digital economy. Users are constantly encouraged to evaluate products and services in order to improve them and, in doing so, themselves are becoming objects of evaluation. These reciprocal evaluation practices are the main characteristics of the Web 2.0 culture, which find their analogue precursor in the science system and the peer review system. The article explores the implications of digitalization based on the case of altmetrics, i.e. tools that measure the web impact of scientific outputs.
indicators may cause trade-offs in the system. Marshall W. Meyer and Vipin Gupta speak of a “performance paradox” if indicators can no longer be used to distinguish strong performance from poor performance. When it comes to citation-based indicators in science such as the h-index or the Journal Impact Factor, “gaming the system” takes place on various levels: It concerns authors, editors, and publishers. The means to sanction ethically questionable publishing or citation practices are limited, as we all know.

Digitalization adds a new dimension to the focus on impact rates in science: The neologism altmetrics was coined to refer to methods for measuring a wide spectrum of web reactions to publications. The concept is fueled by the impetus to democratize science by creating an open and fairer system of performance assessment. That, in any case, was the thrust of the 2010 altmetrics manifesto, which served as the discursive cornerstone for further socio-technical development.

Altmetrics incorporate the full spectrum of research outputs such as journal articles, books, datasets, blog posts, and slide sets, as well as the multiple ways in which these outputs are used below the citation level (e.g. bookmarks, downloads, views). Unlike journal- or author-level metrics, altmetrics are an article- or rather an output-level rating tool. Instead of considering only the citation statistics of a set of source journals, such as those listed in Web of Science or Scopus, web-based measures refer to a repertory of sources that can be expanded to include all kinds of sources.

The Altmetric donut

If we take the service provider Altmetric.com as an example, the range of defined sources for the automatic measuring of impact includes social networks such as Facebook, microblogging services such as Twitter, video platforms such as YouTube, as well as international and national media outlets. However, Altmetric.com – a portfolio company of Digital Science, a subsidiary of Macmillan Publishers Ltd. – is best known for its attention score. Based on an undisclosed algorithm, the Altmetric score is displayed in the form of so-called badges. One of the most popular badges is the Altmetric donut: a ring whose coloring offers information about the type of achieved impact, that is, about sources (blue for Twitter, red for newspapers, and so forth). A nice technical gadget, one might think, but irrelevant for science. The proponents of altmetrics, who are found in parts of academia, the IT sector, libraries, and scientific publishing houses, think differently. They want altmetrics to become the catalyst in revamping the academic reputation system. But how are Tweets or Facebook likes supposed to tell us anything about scientific quality or relevance?

Even as this decisive question in terms of methodology remains unanswered, the comprehensive implementation of altmetrics tools in digital publication infrastructures continues. Large international publishers such as Elsevier, Wiley, or Springer, as well as the top journals Science and Nature have already integrated them into their portfolio. The social network ResearchGate also uses altmetrics based on the collected publication data and the personalized usage statistics – the one difference being that ResearchGate additionally provides an author-centered score. This score puts researchers in relation to one another. Transparency is created by showing ResearchGate members and all their readers the exact calculation of the percentile into which the individual score falls. The score is cumulative but subject to minor and sometimes confusing ups and even downs. Users receive weekly statistics detailing the usage of their own and other people’s contributions. To keep users motivated, ResearchGate transfer a classic feature of the gaming sector into scientific communications: announcing users’ entry into a new level, based here on achieving a certain threshold of citations or clicks or a top position in the institutional ranking. As in digital gaming environments, ResearchGate too provides users with tips on how to raise their individual score, such as: “Boost your stats by adding more research.”

By means of such incentive systems, the digital platforms ResearchGate and Academia.edu gradually collect more and more data of all kinds. Big data, there-
fore, is the foundation of their business model, the outlines of which have so far been blurry at best. In 2016, Academia, the US counterpart of the German start-up ResearchGate, introduced a premium account option for an annual membership fee of 99 US dollars. As far as content is concerned, there is still hardly any difference between the premium feature and the freemium account – the only difference is that premium members have access to a detailed overview of how each of their contributions is used, including user or reader characteristics, listed by person or aggregated by institutions, countries, and so forth.

Formerly, digital platforms focused on rating scientists as authors; now, scientists are also measured as readers with regard to their individual usage patterns. It seems doubtful that paywalls can be established in scientific communications, given the strength of the open science movement. But the offer to learn more about who reads your publications meets the genuine needs of researchers, who – unlike literary authors – cannot turn to book sales to get an idea of their publications’ reach. Whereas traditional citation measures only showed the tip of the iceberg, as it were, altmetrics now show the full scope of how research output is used beyond formal citations in scientific journals, making that usage the basis on which scientists are rated. This approach satisfies the narcissistic needs of researchers and possibly offers extra informational value for institutional research evaluation. The key question, however – what do altmetrics actually measure – remains unanswered.

The short circuit between impact and quality

The dominant research approach in bibliometrics (i.e. conducting empirical studies comparing citation rates and altmetrics of all kinds) does not help much in this case. To be sure, citation may be theoretically conceived of as a form of social recognition of scientific achievement. But trying to identify differences in scientific quality based on the sheer number of citations leads to a short circuit between impact (i.e. popularity) and quality. Based on my own work on the medialization of science, I propose a different assumption: First and foremost, altmetrics – like citation rates – signal popularity. High impact rates may in fact coincide with scientific quality, but they may also result from news factors such as entertainment, scandals, or celebrity. The explanatory power of altmetrics (and citation rates) may thus be reduced primarily to measuring marketing success. Marketing success – in the sense of achieving high impact rates – can indeed be an indicator of special scientific quality, but the political sensitivity or currency of an issue, the prominence of the author, or simply well-placed advertising are equally conducive to high impact.

One good example to illustrate the argument that scientific ratings may conflict with news ratings when it comes to measuring impact is the annual ranking of the top 100 articles per Altmetric score. In 2016, the number one article appeared in the prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association. Its author, however, is not a medical researcher, as one might expect, but the then-President of the United States of America, Barack Obama himself, writing about US healthcare reform. It is obvious that the honor of getting the highest Altmetric score has little to do with criteria of scientific relevance. Against this background, it is even more surprising that altmetrics have hardly been questioned in the scientific community.

Paul Wouters and Rodrigo Costas have referred to the altmetrics concept as a “narcissistic technology.” This presumably also explains its rapid rise. The question is: Will it continue to enjoy this immense popularity once it mutates into an actual “monitoring technology”? Although altmetrics have not yet been officially introduced as an evaluation tool into institutional performance assessments, their implementation, for instance for measuring societal impact, seems only a matter of time. But any kind of performance assessment is bound to trigger a behavioral response and is not without consequences for the system. The kind of reactivity criticized as “gaming the system” may also be viewed as a successful adaptation to misguided indicators. The game is an old one: With the impact factor, gaming primarily involved the journals (via editorial choices and PR);
with altmetrics, it is now the authors themselves who come into play. Their job is to engage in successful reputation management and to steadily boost their own click rates by advertising themselves on social media, rating other people’s work, or communicating with just the right target groups. The pursuit of maximum reach, however, requires different means and is not a genuine goal of scientific work. Rather, it is a response to the conditions of the attention economy in the digital age – including all the possible consequences with regard to the quality of the produced knowledge in the overall process of knowledge formation.

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Black Mirror. Series 3, episode 1 (“Nosedive”), was first broadcast on Netflix, October 2016.


Social research can encompass a vast range of themes, data, and methods. Many researchers concentrate on a special subject, with a more or less empirical or theoretical focus. A few build bridges between approaches, methods, and fields of research. The Irish political scientist Macartan Humphreys is one of these. Since 1st July last year, he has headed the new research unit Institutions and Political Inequality and coordinates the newly established research area Political Economy of Development. He has retained his Professorship in Political Science at Columbia University in New York.

What makes Macartan Humphreys a bridge-builder? First, his cross-disciplinary academic training on both sides of the Atlantic in political science (Ph.D. and A.M. at Harvard), economics (M.Phil. at Oxford), and history (B.A. at Trinity College Dublin). In his work, Macartan Humphreys combines wide-ranging methodological approaches – from experimental research design to survey research and formal theory. As he says himself, Macartan Humphreys is concerned above all to understand the conditions under which knowledge can be profitably gathered: “When are individual findings to be believed or not and when and how can one start making broader inferences from individual cases to understand populations and broader processes?” Macartan Humphreys is a founding and active member of the “Evidence in Governance and Politics” network (EGAP). He is also president of the Experiments Section of the American Political Science Association and is a member of the Association’s Committee on Human Subjects Research.

The list of research topics Macartan Humphreys addresses also shows diversity: economic questions of political development, political inequality and violence, democracy, and governance. He is particularly interested in the conditions under which marginalized populations gain a voice in the political system. In brief, how does political inequality come about and how can it be dealt with? To answer this question, Macartan Humphreys investigates factors such as institutional arrangements and the economic structures of a country. He is also interested in political communication or how state action can lead to the discrimination of minorities. His field studies have taken him to many parts of the world: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Haiti, and Indonesia.

Macartan Humphreys, former Trudeau Fellow and Scholar of the Harvard Academy, has had his work published in many leading journals, including the American Political Science Review, World Politics, and The Economic Journal. Recent books include Political Games, whose subtitle sounds like an episode from House of Cards, offering 49 game-theoretic insights into “fighting, voting, lying & other affairs of state.”

The WZB is no unexplored territory for Macartan Humphreys. Since 2012 he has paid several research visits to Berlin, most recently as K. W. Deutsch Visiting Professor in 2015. As a director he will now be contributing intensively to the scholarly portfolio of the WZB with his topic of political inequality, a more burning issue than ever.
Questions for Hugo Ferpozzi: What Does Sleeping Sickness Have to Do With Us?

All of a sudden, tropical diseases have also become a problem in developed countries. Why is that? As a result of climate change and migration flows, new scenarios are becoming a reality, and this has caused shifts in public health discourses. Is there a sense of fear among the general public? At first, I assumed that anxieties were fueling the debate, but they are not particularly widespread. Then I examined the discourses more closely: Who is raising the issue, for what reasons, and with what consequences for public perception? Is the issue equally topical in Europe and the US? There is more awareness of these diseases in the US, where there is a higher level of immigration, but also stronger voices within this field of research. According to them, these diseases will become a huge problem if they are not addressed promptly by politicians.

Who is involved? First and foremost, institutions such as the World Health Organization. But also scientists and politicians who are committed to raising the profile of this entire field – tropical diseases, migration, global health – within the public health agenda. Which interest groups are implicated? Some want to provide those most at risk – such as migrants – with access to the health system. Others, particularly in Germany, think that this branch of research as a whole is underdeveloped. Of course it then becomes a question of funding. Finally there are the NGOs, working to promote human rights and a truly global medicine.

What do you think is missing from the discussion? The needs of those affected haven’t been given enough consideration. It’s important to me to promote an empathetic, multidisciplinary, inclusive approach, rather than the technical strategy that’s been favored up until now.

Hugo Ferpozzi, social scientist from the University of Buenos Aires (Argentina), was a ISSC Global Fellow at the Global Humanitarian Medicine junior research group.

Interview by Gabriele Kammerer

Photo: Martina Sander
Research Unit Inequality and Social Policy

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Preventing an auction: raising funds for a refugees support group at the WZB. [Photo: WZB]

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From bottom up: a seminar break. (Photo: David Ausserhofer)

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**Giebler, Heiko**/Banducci, Susan


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**Junior Research Group Global Humanitarian Medicine**

**Edited Collections of Readings**


**Articles in Referred Journals**


**Articles in Referred Journals**


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View with a room: evening work. [Photo: David Ausserhofer]
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"Shall we build a tower?" That sounds like building blocks and having fun. Despite all the theory and precise observation, it is just as much a pleasure to read Jörg Potthast’s eponymous WZB discussion paper, first published in 1998 and now reprinted as a facsimile. There are – names changed – Tom, eloquent formulator Claus, Alfred, and of course Professor X, the head of the firm. In the late 1990s, the team designed a tower block for Berlin-Charlottenburg without being commissioned and with little prospect of seeing the project realized. Sociologist-to-be Jörg Potthast observed them for weeks; to begin with no-one was quite sure who had sent him, but he soon won their trust and earned “weak participant status.”

It is a godsend that Jörg Potthast’s field study (and diploma thesis) is available again 20 years after it was first published – thanks to Christian Berkes from botopress, plattform für architekturen, städte, technologien & fiktionen. He took up
a suggestion of Bernward Joerges, formerly director of the then Research Group Metropolitan City Studies at the WZB. As the director wrote in his introductory essay to the high-rise volume, the group was concerned with “the period of the material redesign of the new Berlin.”

Potthast’s reissued study on the “architectural firm as laboratory of the city” enlivens the resurgent debate on high-rise development in Berlin. The book invites us to think about the time dimension of the design process. The Berlin tower block whose design was the subject of the study was finally completed in the summer of 2017, even though it looks quite different. The plans of 20 years ago, which envisaged three tower buildings with a paradisiacal garden have given birth to the “Upper West,” a 119 metre-high building, which together with the neighboring Waldorf-Astoria tower has since the beginning of this year formed a completely new gateway into Breitscheidplatz – and thus to Berlin’s “City West.”

And residential towers are currently under debate to remedy the housing shortage on the overheated Berlin property market. Some discussions, for instance about high-rise development on Alexanderplatz have been going on for years. Others, like those on new plans for Ernst-Reuter-Platz have only just begun. Now the Berlin Senate is working on a framework plan for high-rise development intended to ensure that tall buildings make an effective contribution to the urban fabric. On the art market, too, tower designs are much sought after: photos of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s 1921 design for a high-rise building on Friedrichstraße – never to be built – recently fetched top prices at a Berlin auction.

The book gives space not only to Bernward Joerges and Jörg Potthast himself, now professor of sociology in Siegen, but also to the sociologist Michael Guggenheim from Goldsmiths, University of London. The empirical field research of the period is thus joined by other perspectives, which make just as fascinating and amusing reading as the original study.

“What do architects do when they design?” is the simple question that Jörg Potthast asks at the beginning of his study. What constraints are there? How are ideas documented? How is the work carried out in concrete terms? How do the proportions of a building come into being? How politicized is the field? Over and beyond technical or urban policy debates, his work casts an ethnographic eye on the practices of architectural design with the architect as the object of scrutiny. In 1998, the young sociologist was thus one of the first to study “the architect’s office as an analogon for the laboratory.” The laboratory under study becomes a pars pro toto: “Innumerable architectural firms work incessantly, not infrequently round the clock, on alternatives to the existing building stock of towns and cities. Only a negligible number of projects are ever realized. From this point of view, architectural firms are repositories for variously condensed, unrealized projects,” according to Jörg Potthast.

Coincidentally, in the end, the building was constructed by the architect Potthast had been studying. Christoph Langhof or “Prof. X,” as he is referred to in the study, was the only Berlin architect who at the time let the ethnographer into his “laboratory” as observer. Years afterwards, by a circuitous route, Langhof and his team landed the contract to build the Breitscheidplatz tower. The then student and the architect now found themselves discussing the architectural study over a relaxed dinner, chatting about the business of high-rise development in Berlin, which “moves in waves in a what has always been an inhospitable milieu for tower buildings.”

Reference
In a children’s game it seems easy. A lack of specific clothing means: a man. Adding the baguette and the beret makes him a Frenchman. The kilt or the bagpipe will without doubt be identified as marks of a Scotsman. Fine feathers may make fine birds, but do they really constitute national identity or even legal status? Liav Orgad and his WZB project group International Citizenship Law analyze this issue way beyond folklore and clichés: What could a citizenship law for the 21st century look like? Would a system of coordinated transnational assignation of citizenship be feasible? Liav Orgad presents the group’s research agenda in a short film that is part of the new WZB series „My research in three minutes“. Fabian Hickethier designed the above sets of typical national dresses; Vladimir Bondarenko set the attires in motion for the film. The short film can be accessed via the WZB’s vimeo channel („My research in three minutes“), the direct link is: https://vimeo.com/273264225.