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**(Re)constructing Community in Berlin;
Of Jews, Turks and German Responsibility**

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Zusammenfassung

In Diskussionen über das Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht und Nationalitätskonzepte diente Deutschland der Wissenschaft als Paradigma ethno-kultureller Exklusivität. Bis zu den jüngsten Änderungen in der Gesetzgebung folgte Deutschland dem Prinzip des *jus sanguinus*, nach welchem die Staatsbürgerschaft fast ausschließlich aufgrund deutscher Abstammung erworben wird.

Das vorliegende Papier befaßt sich mit der finanziellen Förderung der jüdischen Gemeinde und den speziellen Einwanderungsrechten für sowjetische Juden. Ferner wird diskutiert, warum solche Ausnahmen nicht bei Türken gemacht werden, die in den 60er Jahren als Gastarbeiter einreisten und keine kulturellen oder historischen Verbindungen zu Deutschland geltend machen können. Die Fallstudie analysiert die Gründe für die Unterschiede in der Unterstützung der jüdischen und türkischen Gemeinden durch die kommunale Regierung in der Hauptstadt Berlin. Eine Reihe von Interviews mit einflußreichen städtischen Verwaltungsbeamten und Politikern sowie jüdischen und türkischen Gemeindevorsitzenden wurden im ersten Halbjahr 1999 durchgeführt. Dieser elitenorientierte Ansatz verdeutlicht die Motive und Formen, mit denen Akteure ihre Handlungen in bezug auf Minderheitenpolitik verstehen und rechtfertigen.

Das Hauptergebnis der Studie ist, daß die Definition der deutschen „imaginären Gemeinde“, wie er von den politischen Eliten benutzt wird, zu einer institutionalisierten Aufnahmepolitik gegenüber Juden ungeachtet ihrer Nationalität einerseits und zu begrenzter Integrationshilfe für Türken andererseits führt.

Abstract

In discussions of citizenship law and concepts of nationhood, Germany has served scholars as a paradigm of ethno-cultural exclusivity. Until recent legislative changes, Germany adhered to the *ius sanguinis* principle where citizenship is acquired almost exclusively through German ancestry. This paper focuses on the financial aid for the Jewish community and the special immigration rights for Soviet Jews. In addition, it discusses why such exceptions are not made for Turks who arrived as guest-workers in the 1960s. The case study analyses the reasons for differing local government support of the Jewish and Turkish communities in the capital city, Berlin. A series of interviews were conducted with influential city administrators and politicians and Jewish and Turkish leaders during the first half of 1999. This elite-centered approach sheds light on the motivations and the ways in which actors perceive and justify their actions in relation to minority policies.

The main finding is that the notion of the imagined community which is used by German elites leads to an institutionalized inclusive-minded policy towards Jews, regardless of nationality, and limited integration help for Turks.

(Re)constructing Community in Berlin; Of Jews, Turks and German Responsibility*

Jonathan Laurence**

1. Introduction

In discussions of citizenship law and concepts of nationhood, Germany has served scholars as a paradigm of ethno-cultural exclusivity: a state which defines its citizenry by “genealogical rather than territorial coordinates” (Brubaker 1992: 119). In contrast to countries like the United States, Great Britain or France where *ius soli* reigns (being born within national borders suffices to be automatically American, British or French), Germany has adhered to the *ius sanguinis* principle wherein citizenship is acquired solely through German ancestry. In migration studies, disparate treatment of the country’s largest immigrant groups is often invoked as concrete proof of Germany’s ethno-cultural policy bias (Koopmans 1999: 167). Ethnic German *Aussiedler* emigrating from eastern Europe are immediately enfranchised, granted citizenship and given linguistic and economic integration help by the state. Turkish guest workers and their kin, meanwhile, suffer political exclusion, must wait eight to fifteen years for a German passport and are left, largely, to integrate (or segregate) on their own. Of foreigners who wish to naturalize and receive political rights, it is expected that they will renounce any other nationality and particularistic identity. “Multiculturalism” is a term laden with negative connotations, and the danger of non-German “parallel societies” is forewarned against across the political spectrum. But one risks oversimplifying Germany’s complex national identity when questions of socio-political inclusion and exclusion are linked only to the presence or absence of blood lines. If *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* are opposing rights-granting regimes on a national or macro level, a close examination of ethnic minority treatment at the local level reveals a more complicated situation. The following case study focuses on the reasons for differing local government

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support of the Jewish and Turkish communities in the capital city, Berlin. A series of interviews about German attitudes towards these two minorities was conducted with city administrators and politicians as well as Jewish and Turkish leaders during the first half of 1999; this elite-centered approach sheds light on the official motivations and, sometimes, personal justifications for ethnic minority policy directions.

This paper examines how stark contrasts in minority group treatment arise. A country's national identity necessarily distinguishes among insiders, outsiders and those somewhere in between. Elite actor perceptions of how much a given minority group "belongs"—the key variable in material resource allocation—are formed in a subtle process not always bound to strict legal interpretations. Rather, an informal consensus among decision-makers develops in interaction with domestic and international pressures.¹ In interviews, some officials contend that exceptions to the rule of *ius sanguinis* are possible only when small numbers are involved—Jews, for example, account for around 100,000 residents in Germany, and Turks more than twenty times that. Others posit that it is a question of organization—if Turks had more unified central organizations lobbying local governments, they might benefit to the same extent as Jews from funding for religious and cultural activity. Yet "that is only the half truth," maintains Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, the former *Bundesausländerbeauftragte*. (Federal Commissioner for Foreigners) "It goes deeper: [Turks] are 'so foreign,' no? 'It's so foreign!' You will have noticed, for example, that many people simply confuse Islam, the world religion, with religious fundamentalism."² This kind of "confusion" that Schmalz-Jacobsen refers to is of course not unique to Germany; the refusal to recognize Islam as an official religious community, however, is revealing of a more general reluctance to accept even second- and third-generation Turks as anything but *Ausländer*, or foreigners. But how are these symbolic boundaries drawn? What makes some foreigners more acceptable than others? Is there a definitive category into which Germany's relationship with its minorities can be placed? The labeling of belonging plays the crucial role in determining recognition of a group's right to be present in Germany, and consequently what kind of state support a group might expect. Approaching these questions on the micro-level, this research offers some explanation of the divergent experiences of the Turkish and Jewish Communities in Berlin.

¹ The post-war American emphasis placed upon exemplary German-Jewish relations was also important for this development, a point which will be addressed below.

² Private interview with Cornelia Schmalz Jacobsen, 26.2.99

2. Useful Foreigners?

How does one begin to look at the official political and financial arrangements of these two minority communities living in Berlin in a comparative light? There are, on the one hand, an infinite number of differences between the history, makeup, and interests of the respective Jewish and Turkish communities in Germany. A close examination of the treatment of the groups not only brings out surprising similarities between the two but also highlights important shortcomings in German ethnic minority integration politics. A throughline of this research is the selective application of the denominations “German” or “foreign” by the state—and the awarding or withholding of all accompanying benefits—for largely *political*, not humanitarian or means-tested reasons.

Post-war Germany invited significant Jewish and Turkish influxes beginning in 1952 and 1961, respectively, to reinforce its spiritual and economic recovery from Nazi devastation. Though both arriving groups were almost entirely of non-German ancestry (Borneman 1996: 145), the permanent settlement of Jews was encouraged, out of deference to the past and hope for the future, while Turks were viewed as a more temporary labor flow to be cut off at the appropriate moment. Differing integration measures were taken according to these expectations. In the coming decades, world political events would alter the Turkish and Jewish landscapes beyond what Chancellor Adenauer’s advisers could have imagined. In confluence with the oil crisis, German unemployment doubled to 2.6 per cent, or nearly 600,000 between 1973-1974 – up from around 150,000 at the height of the guest worker program. The government ended the program, and the guest workers responded by staying where they were. At the same time Soviet Jews began to arrive in both Berlins, and by the dissolution of the USSR a united Germany was committed to accepting any who chose to come. As the two immigrant populations—Jewish and Turkish—begin to resemble each other in quality if not in quantity, one must ask what is being served by the emergent political inequalities between the groups. The vast majority of Jews and Turks in Berlin are not European Union citizens, arrive without German language knowledge, and have no German ancestry. Continued magnanimous treatment of Jews, strangely, reveals how neutral policy towards guest workers becomes counterproductive when applied to their immigrant heirs.

The interpretation of moral responsibility to history and the assumed “Germanness” of ostensible non-Germans has enabled the Berlin administration to compartmentalize its handling of and not conflate minority groups, even when objective criteria—or a different

interpretation—might lead to other conclusions. The sociologist Y. Michal Bodemann has controversially suggested a certain historical continuity in German policy towards its Jewish population:

Although under different conditions, even today the Jewish minority as an incorporated group must carry out ideological labor [in Germany]. And in different ways it is instrumentalized by the German state for both internal and external political ends (1986: 52).

What could Bodemann mean here by “instrumentalization?” Perhaps that the special treatment of the Jewish community is used as a certification of German rehabilitation and, at the same time, an excuse to demand what sacrifices it will of other minorities in Germany. An enormous amount of money is poured into the Jewish Community in support of a myriad of different activities. But in a sense one does not know how much this has to do with Jewish needs as it does with German needs. “The Jews can thank the bad conscience [of Germans]... for [the] special role [they play in the Federal Republic]—which they themselves did not [ask for],” comments Hans Jakob Ginsburg (1986: 109). The “specialness” of this rapport is undoubtedly crucial and beneficial to presently flourishing Jewish life in Germany. But it is equally if not more crucial to Germany’s own self-understanding. The most recent desecration of former Jewish Community chairman Heinz Galinski’s grave, for example, inspired the following justification of funding for the Jewish community from Berlin’s interior ministry:

This created a lot of worries in Berlin. It was evidence for how important it is to prevent such incidents for the sake of our system's political stability... Just imagine what kind of discussion would take place in Berlin, or maybe all of Europe or even world-wide, if anything happened to a member of the Jewish Community which could have been avoided had the Berlin Senate handled things differently.³

The official who stated this is obviously concerned with the safety of Jews in Berlin. But he is also acutely aware of Germany’s “*political stability*” and the potential for damaging “*discussion*” at the expense of the country’s hard-earned post-war reputation for tolerance. Qualifying and demystifying the Jewish reparation package allows one to view German

³ Private interview with Malte Krause, 27.1.99; (Galinski’s grave has been assigned a 24-hour police guard (*Der Tagesspiegel*, 16.2.99))

policy towards immigrant Turks with a new perspective. If Germany is willing to accept the presence of millions of Turks and/or Muslims in its territory, and one cannot exclude that it is, then it is only under very specific assimilationist conditions which are simply not demanded of that other non-Christian group, Jews. Cultural difference is allowed, even sponsored, in the Jewish community, but feared and forewarned against in the Turkish one. The lubricant for achieving the mainstream ideal of more successfully integrating its ethnic minorities, i.e. state money, is also withheld where it would be most useful—among the Turkish population. The Jews, this paper will suggest, are at once Germany's albatross and its license. Ever remorseful for the senseless murder in its past, Germany courageously carries the burden of showing all who will look that it did wrong, and hopes to redeem itself. But the Ancient Mariner who shot the albatross only understands his error—and is finally freed of its burden—in appreciating what lessons to draw from his action: appreciating “the beauty” of all “happy living things” of the sea (Coleridge 1798). There is the danger that the self-flagellation over the mistakes of pre-Federal Republic Germany focuses exclusively on reviving the albatross, as it were, and fails to apply its lesson to the greater picture.

3. Reconstructing the Jewish Community

In 1933 at least 170,000 German citizens of Jewish persuasion called Berlin home, roughly one-fifth of the pre-Third Reich German-Jewish population.⁴ This community, which disposed of schools, libraries, synagogues, a museum, community centers et cetera, was violently reduced through (self-)exile and genocide to merely 5,000 twelve years later. Its possessions, establishments and cultural presence went the way of their previous owners, inhabitants and participants. In the wake of the catastrophic severance of German-Jewish ties, a bundle of reparation-minded policies emerged from the proactively contrite heirs of National Socialism. The early 1950s witnessed the introduction of a vigorously liberal immigration policy for foreign Jews and a *Wiedergutmachung* (reparations) policy towards Jews living in Germany that would continue strong through the following half-century. That

⁴ In *Gedächtnistheater*, Y. Micha Bodemann argues that the 1933 Jewish population stood at circa 1 million (p.18); the author of the Berlin foreigner commissioner's brochure on Jewish immigrants suggests the number was about half that: Kessler, Judith, „Von Aizenberg bis Zaidelman: Jüdische Zuwanderer aus Osteuropa in Berlin und die Jüdische Gemeinde heute,“ Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats, Dezember 1997; others estimate the number of Jews in twilight Weimar Germany to have been 600,000 (cited by Prof. Dr. Karl-Josef Kuschel, Univ. Tübingen, at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Veranstaltung, 3.2.99)

which could be replaced with taxpayer money, i.e. the rebuilding of infrastructure and support of cultural and religious activity, was.

For the reestablishment of Jewish life and community in Germany would be a test of regaining the faith not only of a group integral to German history, but indeed that of the anxiously on-looking world. General Lucius Clay, the American military governor, memorably stated Allied success in the democratization of Germany would be measured by how the country treated its Jews (Nachama 1998); from early on, the USA pressured Adenauer's government to formulate an unambiguous policy towards Jews and Israel. The American High Commissioner John McCloy enunciated clearly in July 1949 that "the world will carefully observe the new west German state, and a decisive test will be its relationship with the Jews, and how it handles this" (cited in Bodemann 1986: 62). Germany was quick to recognize its own interest, both symbolic and economic, in repairing the rifts. The counsel of Adenauer's adviser Herbert Blankenhorn offered during 1950 cabinet meetings is of particular salience here: "The new German state will only win back trust, esteem and credibility in the world when the federal government distances itself from the past with an impressive material reparation package"; and "if we are able to manage the Jewish question in the world, then our economic life would reap the benefits," reads Blankenhorn's advice to the Chancellor (cited in Bodemann 1986: 58).⁵ Receptive of cues from across the Atlantic, and genuine in its will to redress the wrongs of the past, the government would create a safe haven for Jews without historic precedent (with the exception of newly-founded Israel) in the deliberate hope of setting a new, positive tone in the fledgling Federal Republic.⁶

The opening paragraph of the state contract governing the relationship between the Berlin government and the Jewish Community captures the spirit of resultant post-war arrangements:

⁵ This is not unlike the logic employed by Schröder the candidate and later, the Chancellor, in pressuring Volkswagen AG (spring 1998), Deutsche Bank AG (spring 1999) et al to settle WWII slave-labor and war-crimes claims in the interest of present-day German investment and merger interests – on the February 1999 day that DB announced its complicity in the financing of Auschwitz, its share value dropped precipitously.

⁶ When a television interviewer asked Adenauer if the post-war reparation policy could be seen as the moral high-point of his career, Adenauer responded „Vergessen Sie nicht, wie mächtig die Juden in Amerika sind!“ (cited in Ginsburg in *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland seit 1945*, 109); even Erik Honecker subscribed to this belief – his creation of the Neue Synagoge Stiftung in Berlin with DM80m capital during the waning years of the DDR was seen as a tactic to flatter his way to Washington. Joel Levy comments on this logic „... going to the white house helps your regime and okay, how do you do that, you do something for the Jews. This incredibly anti-semitic assumption that the Jews control everything, but there it is.“ (Private interview with Joel Levy, 23.12.98)

Out of responsibility for German history, which is imprinted with the persecution and annihilation of German and European people of Jewish belief and origin, and in acknowledgment of the loss that Berlin and Germany have suffered as a result, Berlin affirms... that it will protect and secure the avowal and exercise of the Jewish faith for all time.⁷

In practical terms, this amounts to dedicating a sizeable portion of the state budget at the disposal of the Community for both determined and unspecified Jewish activities. Berlin's Culture Ministry alone annually doles out DM25m for costs associated with Jewish prayer and education. That is nearly 20 per cent of its DM145m religion budget for a group that accounts for 0.58 per cent of the population!⁸ Then there is the financial support of Jewish artists; cemeteries; Russian-Jewish immigrant integration⁹; community building maintenance; security; synagogue programs, and so on. As the state-recognized representative of a religious community (the only other two in Berlin are the Protestant and Catholic Churches), the *Jüdische Gemeinde* also has 90 per cent of personnel costs paid for its private school employees. "Nowhere in Germany does the Jewish Community have so much financing as it does in Berlin," claimed one Culture Ministry official proudly.¹⁰ In all, the Jewish Community receives DM45m of its DM48m annual expenses from the Berlin government.¹¹ This may seem like a lot of accommodation for a small group—indeed the per capita allotment tallies to roughly DM3000 per Berlin Jew; "with respect to our smallness we get a rather considerable portion of state support," said Andreas Nachama, leader of the Jewish Community.¹² The late president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, put it in a different light: "One can't look at it per capita. One religion teacher can teach 60 children. But for three children you also need a teacher. That is the difference. Our small number doesn't mean we have different needs."¹³ As Hans Jakob Ginsburg observes in a different context, the disproportionate financial support could be

⁷ Gesetz zum Staatsvertrag über die Beziehungen des Landes Berlin zur Jüdischen Gemeinde zu Berlin, Ges.Nr.94/61/3B, 8.2.94

⁸ Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur; Leistungen an die Kirchen

⁹ The classification of Russian Jewish immigrants as political refugees under the Geneva Refugee Convention will be discussed in detail below.

¹⁰ Interview with Manfred Becker conducted for MERCI project, (Ruud Koopmans, director of German study).

¹¹ Cited by Y. Michal Bodemann during „Galut 2000—Aufbruch zu einer europäische-jüdischen Identität,“ Kolloquium im Centrum Judaicum Berlin, 6.12.98, only DM9.8m are considered as official reparations payments (Private interview with Andreas Nachama, 23.02.99)

¹² Interview with Andreas Nachama, conducted by Ruud Koopmans for MERCI project, 19.02.99

¹³ Private interview with Ignatz Bubis, 13.5.99

seen “not as the representation of a few thousand living, but rather that of millions of murdered Jews” (1986: 108).¹⁴ Until Berlin has 170,000 Jewish citizens again, some feel, there is a void which one must attempt, somehow, to fill.

4. Multicultural Germany?

But the legacy of the Third Reich and the creation of the Federal Republic has endowed Germany with responsibility for more than just looking after Jews. Malte Krause, of Berlin’s Interior Ministry, noted that a result of what he called “those twelve years” was the notion that “Germany should be especially foreigner-friendly, especially receptive, regardless of how much that would cost.” In the post-war logic, the only way to prevent a return to Germany’s “original self-understanding,” Krause stated, was “to permit the largest possible arrival of foreigners, and allow a multi-cultural society to develop.” The goal was to establish “the image that there are different cultural spaces which can peacefully coexist, without the obligation that German norms and values dominate society.”¹⁵ Bodemann sees the influence of “American democratic pluralism, articulated as the respect of the values of ethnic minorities in society” as having played an important role in the early days of the Federal Republic. A fascinating outcome of the *Wiedergutmachungspolitik*, however, is that the welcoming, acceptance and promotion of Jews as a form of repentance *is the end in itself*. If Germany is a prisoner of its past, it interprets its sentence in a selective manner. The mood, tone or philosophy of the policy is not extended to other groups, regardless of their size or need to be integrated and supported in German society, such as the Turkish population living in Germany.¹⁶ “When you just look at the size of the population represented,” Malte Krause observes, “there are about 10,000 Jews and roughly 150,000 Turks. If you compare the [respective] financial support for the Turkish and Jewish Communities, you could of course say that this is unacceptably disproportionate.”¹⁷ To give an idea of “disproportionate” one need only look at the Berlin *Ausländerbeauftragte*’s (Senate Commissioner for Foreigners) budget for its support of the 35 or so Turkish

¹⁴ Ginsburg discusses the number of permanent Jewish seats on public broadcasting stations’ advisory boards

¹⁵ Private interview, Malte Krause, 27.1.99

¹⁶ I do not mean to include post-war asylum policy in this discussion; my focus is, rather, state support of integration (social and economic) in addition to that of political and religious activity of ethnic minorities

¹⁷ Private interview, Malte Krause, 27.1.99

umbrella organizations and individual groups: DM1.5m, or put in other terms, DM10 per Berlin Turk.¹⁸

Why? The official answer reads as follows: “we do not support other minority groups in the same way [as we do Jews] because the reparation aspect, luckily, does not exist with these other groups,” explains Barbara John, Berlin’s Foreigner Affairs Commissioner. “That would have been horrible if the Germans had done to other minorities [what they did to the Jews]—they would have certainly, given the chance—but luckily these other groups were not here.”¹⁹ Some Turkish leaders have a hard time forgiving the extent to which different standards are applied. Typical were the remarks of Sabri Adak, president of the 40,000-member *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*: “One must understand that the Jewish Community has another situation, it’s a question of history, and it is therefore somewhat different than with other foreigners.” He then continued: “10,000 Jews live here, but 180,000 Turks. The Jews get millions and millions, but as Turks we get DM54,000 here. That’s just rent and electricity, telephone... And for example we get DM20,000 a year for social work. But the Jews get 350 social workers paid the whole day through.”²⁰ The numerical logic at work in Adak’s response—accurate or not—demonstrates a recognition of injustice and hints at some envy. The president of the *Türkischer Elternverein*, a small educational equality lobbying group, put it rather succinctly: “every time a Jew opens his mouth, he has money and all sorts of things poured into it.”²¹ The state resources earmarked for ethnic minority cultural or religious activity are seen as a common pool of funds— but the official status accorded to immigrant Turks demonstrates why this is not at all the case.

5. Immigration and “National Interest”

Studying the distinction made by authorities between types of immigration—best expressed with the terms *Einwanderung* and *Zuwanderung*, although their usage is not always consistent—provides a useful interpretative schema for understanding the differential

¹⁸ This does not include the costs associated with training for teachers to better deal integration-related challenges; “There are teachers in Kindergarten who specially handle integration assignments, who are paid for by the State of Berlin, and this money is not counted in the same way” Private interview with Jörg Schönbohm

¹⁹ Private interview, Barbara John and Robin Schneider, 17.12.98

²⁰ Private interview with Sabri Adak, 14.12.99

²¹ Private interview with Kasim Ayden, 16.12.98

treatment and attitudes afforded the two groups.²² The first term, *Einwanderung*, is reserved for American-style selective immigration policy, whose conditions and quotas are dictated by so-called “national interest.” The 1965 Foreigners Act codified this principle, making “the entrance and tenure of foreigners dependent on the interests of the Federal Republic” (cited in Chapin 1997: 13). In the American case it is often the state of the labor market that determines this policy. If there is an unmet demand for engineers or nuclear physicists, for example, it is in the country’s national interest to apply a different standard to naturalization or immigration applications submitted by members of those relevant groups. The same is true for foreign investors who may create jobs for natives (and, some may argue, large enough contributors to political parties). The term *Zuwanderung*, on the other hand, connotes that settlement is mostly in the interest of the migrants themselves, not that of the host country. This would be applied to those who migrate in order to better their economic situation or those who flee political oppression, for example.²³

Turkish workers were invited to Germany beginning in the early 1960s in what one could call a mutually beneficial arrangement, whereby the guest workers could earn comparatively favorable wages and Germany could meet its demand for labor. This was not an immigration policy, however. It was never intended that these guest workers would settle in German cities, and a revolving-door system was set up in order to discourage such. The rotation principle showed its flaws as early as 1967, when notwithstanding a negative economic growth rate most Turkish workers stayed in Germany (Chapin 1997: 12). This trend would only increase in the six remaining years of the guest worker program, and the 1973 freeze in recruitment actually provided an incentive for non-EU workers to remain in the country (Chapin 1997: 11).²⁴ Turkish migrants began to spend more of their income in Germany, with the savings rate dropping from 45 per cent in the 1970s to 16 per cent in the 1980s and investments in real estate and life insurance simultaneously increasing (Schmalz-Jacobsen 1997: 167). The non-German population grew from 3.5 million in 1973 to 4.5 million in 1980 (Chapin 1997: 16) and has just less than doubled in the years since.

It is these chance settlers, their German-born children and grandchildren who now enjoy the title of *Zuwanderer*. As a policy maker in Berlin’s Interior Ministry said: “The greatest number of foreigners who came to Germany did not come here because we had defined it in

²² The extent to which these two terms have actually permeated public discourse is debatable. They are useful, however, in introducing two distinct classes of immigration—which sometimes go unlabelled—that emerge in interviews conducted for this research

²³ I am grateful to Barbara Schmitter-Heissler for my discussion with her on this topic

²⁴ This is what Chapin refers to as the „Boomerang Effect.“

our national interest, but rather as after-effects of the guest worker program from the 1960s.” The four million foreigners who arrived in Germany between 1987 and 1994, the official continued, “came, for the most part, as asylum applicants or family members. This [development] was not the expression of Germany’s national interest but rather they came because of some emergency, some worries, [they fled] a war zone or they simply wanted to be with their family.”²⁵

“The Turks have profited from the fact that they came to Germany; they were recruited as guest workers and stayed because it was useful and good for them,”²⁶ observed an official in Berlin’s Commission for Foreigner Affairs. Herein implied, of course, is that it was not necessarily “useful and good” for Germany; namely, that the settlement of guest workers and their families was not in the country’s *national interest*. In the absence of a national immigration policy, ad hoc measures providing for the arrival of family members were developed. But Germany had not explicitly planned for this eventuality, and the momentum of this unexpected immigration took on a life of its own.

As has been amply discussed in migration studies, there is something problematic about statistics and “foreigners” in Germany. Nine per cent of the Federal Republic’s population fall into the category of *Ausländer*: permanent residents without German ancestry. Though many *Ausländer* are German-born, second- or even third-generation immigrants, they do not receive German nationality unless they initiate naturalization—a rare occurrence because of waiting times and the reluctance of many to give up their “native” passport. Millions of ethnic German *Aussiedler* and their families, however, have automatically received a German passport (and integration help) upon arrival, notwithstanding their more tenuous links to present-day Germany than the so-called *Ausländer* (who may have grown up speaking German and attended school in Germany). It is precisely in this context that the present study need be situated—why and how have some non-ethnic German foreigners been quietly appropriated as “native Germans” while others, visibly, are not.

The first officially-perpetuated fiction in need of debunking is that today’s Jews in Berlin are Germans and the Turks, well, Turks. The *Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats* supports 80 organizations, 30-35 of which under the rubric “Turkish.” When asked how many Jewish groups received state subventions, the Senate Commissioner for Foreigner Affairs replied that the information must be gleaned from the Culture Senator, as the

²⁵ Private interview, Malte Krause, 27.1.99

²⁶ Private interview, Barbara John and Robin Schneider, 17.12.98

Ausländerbeauftragte “does not deal with German organizations.”²⁷ But of the 12,000 registered members of the *Jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin*, 8,000 or 75 per cent are Russian-born; the majority (5,000) of this immigrant group arrived in Berlin in the years since Reunification, the rest beginning in the mid-1970s (Burchard 1999). The actual number of Jews in Berlin is thought to be slightly less than twice the official Community membership, with the same proportion of those Russian-born holding steady.²⁸ Contrast this with the fact that thirty percent of the “foreign” Turkish population was born in Berlin (40,510 out of 137,111) and that another 23 per cent (31,830) has lived in the city for more than twenty years.²⁹ The *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin*, the largest umbrella organization of Turkish and Islamic groups, estimates that one-third of its 30,000 members were born in Germany, and that an additional third has lived in Berlin for twenty plus years.³⁰ We are thus presented, from one perspective, with contradictory rules of classification: In the eyes of the Berlin Senate, one 75 per cent foreign-born community enjoys the title of “German” while another 70 per cent foreign-born group is relegated to the status of “non-German.” Were this a discussion about *Aussiedler*, that would be an unremarkable distinction in the taboo, if not uncontroversial, realm of bloodline-based citizenship law. But members of neither group under consideration in this study can claim rights under *ius sanguinus* or trace their ancestry back to the territory of even the most expansive, pre-war definition of Germany.

6. Jewish “Contingency Refugees”

This disjunction between technical terminology and real life can be traced back to the *Zu-* versus *Einwanderung* distinction. For the reasons explored above, one group’s immigration and presence is declared to be in the national interest and the other’s is decidedly not. Once this classification is established, the gate is then opened to create exceptional policies and regulations. “There are... limits which *Zuwanderung* should not be permitted to overstep,” explained Malte Krause. “But this feeling is not present with respect to the Jewish Community. Therefore there are special rules.”³¹ The 1991 *Kontingentflüchtlingengesetz*, for

²⁷ Private interview, Barbara John and Robin Schneider, 17.12.98; this has partly to do, also, with the reluctance of German authorities to meddle with Jewish Community affairs: the money is simply transferred to the Community, which is then responsible for administering integration programs etc. on its own.

²⁸ Private interview with Joel Levy, 23.12.98

²⁹ „Nichtdeutsche nach ausgewählten Herkunftsgebieten und Aufenthaltsdauer am 31.12.1997“ in Bericht zur Integrations- und Ausländerpolitik 1996/1997, Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats

³⁰ Telephone interview with Sabri Adak, 4.2.99

³¹ Private interview with Malte Krause, 27.01.99

example, allows all former Soviet citizens of Jewish descent to claim full refugee status based not on individual persecution but rather on their membership in a persecuted group (Doomernik 1997: 53-54). The idea was that these Jews could carry out their lives more freely in Germany; as Manfred Becker of the Berlin Senate's Culture Ministry says, "they come to Germany to have a home, a spiritual home."³²

Ignatz Bubis describes "two factors" in the mid-1990 negotiations he and Heinz Galinski (chairman of the *Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland* at the time) conducted with then-Chancellor Kohl and Interior Minister Schäuble, that led to the decision to classify Soviet Jews *Kontingentflüchtlinge*.

I said two things: first, 600,000 Jews used to live in Germany. Today, it is 28,000. It is not the Jews' fault that they became so few. There is a moral duty. And just before, Germany had accepted 30,000 Vietnamese boat people—so I said, that is a humanitarian gesture, with the boat people. That is already 2,000 more than there are Jews. Vietnamese never had any relationship to Germany. The second thing I said, was something Germany should view as important. If Jews want to live in this Germany, that is something that today's Germans should appreciate and say 'Jews have trust in German democracy.'³³

According to Bubis, Kohl particularly agreed with his second point. On January 9, 1991 the state governors of all *Länder* decided to allow Jews living in the ex-USSR who wanted to come to Germany to apply for classification as "contingency refugees" under the Geneva Convention. Jews arriving within eight months of the fall of the USSR with only tourist visas could claim "immediate, unlimited right to residence, and federally-financed integration facilitation like language courses, job placement, enrollment for study, etc."³⁴ After February 1991, the proper application would need to be filled out at the German consulate or embassy in the Jews' country of origin before departure (as is required of *Aussiedler*) and any Jews arriving without proper permission would be subject to the same regulations as all other non-EU foreigners. But Jewish migrants continued to arrive well after the established date with only a tourist visa (if any visa at all) and the Senate found it impossible to treat them as any other foreigners. The *Jüdische Gemeinde* pressured the Senate to allow Jews who had any living relatives in Berlin to be accepted indefinitely as

³² Private interview with Manfred Becker, 11.2.99

³³ Private interview with Ignatz Bubis, 13.5.99

³⁴ Referent für Ausländerrecht, Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, Vermerk, IV A4 – 0345/2446, 10.November 1998

Kontingentflüchtlinge, “a regulation which was ‘bought’ by the political parties as a one-time exception, even though it was actually a group status regulation which would have required a special procedure by the Federal Interior Ministry.”³⁵

The official justifications for the “Contingency Refugee Law” are founded on a very loose interpretation of these settlers’ situation. The “persecution” of Jews in Russia, for one, is acknowledged to be at least partially fictive. “Although there are anti-Semitic voices in Russia,” one Culture Ministry official said, “we all know there are no pogroms taking place.”³⁶ Even their Jewishness is, to a large extent, inchoate. Many of the refugees are Jewish only to the extent that the so-called “Fifth point” on their Soviet passports said they were. Manfred Becker acknowledges that “some of them have no knowledge at all of Judaism. They know nothing of Judaism. They don’t even know a single Hebrew word.”³⁷ The Russian Jews who choose to come to Germany, in sum, are those for whom religion is relatively unimportant; in the words of one Jewish organizer, they were those who “didn’t really want to go to Israel.”³⁸ But they are those who are perhaps drawn by Germany’s relatively attractive economy and generous state assistance. This immigration allowance has rather little to do with the motivations of the Jews themselves; the law, rather, fits into the framework of Federal Republic *Wiedergutmachung* philosophy, which was to recreate a “blooming Jewish Community,” in Adenauer’s words (cited in Bodemann 1996a: 158). That this has to be done with *ersatz* Jews is simply a practical reality. “We don’t discuss the fact [that they’re Russian]. We simply don’t discuss it... Once they make the decision to stay in Berlin,” Becker says, “then they *become* Germans of Jewish persuasion.” Berlin’s former Interior Minister Schönbohm also speaks of the Russian Jewish immigrants as “returning” to Germany (*wiedezurückgekehrt*), to escape from “difficult conditions in Russia.”³⁹ Like other politicians, Schönbohm classifies the immigration under a sentimental rubric, perhaps taking comfort in the idea that victimized Jews are being saved from persecution in another land. “Turks come here to participate in the German economy, to earn money,” said Schönbohm. “... Jews come here because it was their home, or the home of their parents, and they want to live here. That is a different motivation [than for Turks], so to speak.

³⁵ Vermerk, IV A4 – 0345/2446, 10.November 1998, p.2

³⁶ Private interview with Manfred Becker, 11.2.99

³⁷ Private interview with Manfred Becker, 11.2.99

³⁸ Private interview with Irene Runge, 20.1.99

³⁹ Private interview with Jörg Schönbohm, 26.3.99

Perhaps with some of them the economic situation plays a roll. But there are above all differences in the motivation for why they come to Germany.”⁴⁰

7. Capacities to Organize and Integrate

The official consensus on differing motivations for Turkish and Jewish migration, and the divergent roles that the two groups are then assigned once in Germany, strongly influences these minorities’ respective capacities to organize political pressure and, in the long run, to integrate themselves into German society. The logic by which Berlin government internally distributes the labor of minority group support mirrors the *völkisch* citizenship-granting procedures of the *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht* of 1913. Namely, administration of subventions for Turkish associations occurs uniquely within the Senate’s Commission for Foreigner Affairs. This goes for matters of politics, culture and religion. Manfred Becker, who is responsible for the Culture Senator’s religion office, states: “we have close to zero contact with the Turkish communities. They speak first with the *Ausländerbeauftragte*, even when religion is the issue.”⁴¹ In the Culture Senator’s *Religionsangelegenheiten* budget there is not a single expense listed for the Islamic community, which unlike the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish Communities, is not a “corporation of public law.” Since the Jews are appropriated as Germans, regardless of national origin, they enjoy treatment of the opposite extreme. The Jewish Community’s contacts include “the individual Senators who are responsible for us, in particular the Culture Senator..., with whom we meet every 4-6 weeks... and of course the Governing Mayor of Berlin... then we have of course good relations with the Senator for Construction...”⁴²

But it is also, apparently, an organizational question: Becker cites the confused, diffuse state of Turkish representation in explaining the impossibility of providing Turks the same opportunities in a religious context. “Cooperation could exist... but the Turks are rather unorganized. Islam itself is a structure-poor religion... very diffuse and informal.”⁴³ Andreas Nachama, head of the Berlin Jewish Community, also states that the “incalculable” number of Turkish communities and groups is their weakness—“when they build up one or two central organizations [like ours] then they will get the same help.”⁴⁴ Barbara John

⁴⁰ Private interview with Jörg Schönbohm, 26.3.99

⁴¹ Private interview with Manfred Becker, 11.02.99

⁴² Interview with Andreas Nachama, conducted by Ruud Koopmans for MERCI project, 19.02.99

⁴³ Private interview with Manfred Becker, 11.02.99

⁴⁴ Private interview with Andreas Nachama, 23.02.99

commented that the “privileges that [the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish] religious communities have are obtained through their recognition as a *Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*, and there is not this recognition for Islam... Islam is simply an existing world religion.”⁴⁵ If they had their act more together, so to speak, then they might have the opportunity to put their hand in the till as well. But the very formalizing of Turkish or Islamic interests, as such, is seen as the biggest potential threat that dual nationality, for example, poses to German democracy—for such an articulation of group-specific interests would mean, in the words of Berlin’s Interior Minister Werthebach, the “segregation from the value consensus of the majority culture.”⁴⁶

Partisan rhetoric on what, exactly, is expected from Turks in Berlin is confused at best. When Turkish parents send their children to study in Turkey, this is depicted as proof of the unwillingness of Turks in Germany to commit to the Federal Republic, to learn German, etc. (and of their wiliness: they exploit a 16-year old age limit to “sneak” their kids back in to Germany on time for permanent residence requirements). But if they send their kids to school in Berlin, the discussion takes on a hysteria as politicians discover that several schools in Berlin now have not a single “German” student enrolled!⁴⁷ If the treatment of Jews could be described as the constant search to create loopholes in the constitution to ensure their peaceful existence in Germany, then the discussion around Turks can be said to focus on their *exploitation of loopholes*, ranging from the area of family reunification to the matter of their children’s education. As Becker states: “[Our treatment of the Jewish Community] is a form of gratefulness. It is not self-evident that Jews would stay in Germany, organize themselves, or want to stay any longer. We thankfully recognize the fact [that they do].”⁴⁸ This echoes former Chancellor Kohl’s 1988 Rosh Hashanah address to the Jewish Community in Berlin: “we appreciate with thankfulness and great respect for every Jewish citizen, that today there is again an active Jewish Community in Germany. It is a great encouragement that you are able to recognize in Germany your home” (cited in Bodemann 1996a: 175).

⁴⁵ Interview with Barbara John, 11.03.99, conducted for MERCI project, (Ruud Koopmans, director of German study); this status of „public law corporation“ allows religious communities to benefit from state funding for religious and educational activities

⁴⁶ Positionspapier Ausländerpolitik in Berlin, Senatsverwaltung für Inneres Berlin, Grundsatzangelegenheiten der Innenpolitik/Planung, 8.12.99, 6

⁴⁷ Both Malte Krause and Manfred Becker raised this point in Private interviews.

⁴⁸ Private interview with Manfred Becker, 11.02.99

There is a difference in attitude with respect to historical responsibility, for one, but also regarding the perceived *capacity for integration* of one population compared to the other. This departs from the statutory realm of immigration status and enters a more subjective world perhaps having more to do with *desirability*. Malte Krause of the Berlin *Senatsverwaltung für Inneres* observes the following: “There are strong differences between the Jewish and Turkish Communities: in the Jewish Community there is a group of people who, as Germans in Germany with a specific religious alignment, pose no problems either for security or religious tolerance. Insofar as there are questions of integration, they pose themselves of course only with the Turkish community.” When pressed, Krause acknowledges that:

for Russian Jewish immigrants, who perhaps cannot master the German language, and who lived for a long time under a dictatorship, there are integration problems of course. But the German state is ready to do anything necessary so that integration succeeds.⁴⁹

A former Interior Minister of Berlin also conceded that “I know from talks with members of the Jewish Community that there are difficulties in the community and, in part, with integration... but if the Jewish Community looks for help, we help in any possible way.”⁵⁰ John Borneman has written that “non-Jewish Germans tend to project onto the [Jews] qualities and meanings that [Jews] had no part in generating.” That these foreign Jews can be accepted and adopted immediately as Germans of Jewish persuasion—regardless of their original Russian, Ukrainian or Lithuanian etc. citizenship—reflects German assumptions about religious and national identity politics. Namely, they are expected to assimilate in a way that Turks are portrayed as incapable of. “Turks see themselves much more as a nation. But I don’t know that the Jews who live in Russia feel Israeli, rather they feel like Jews! And that is also what differentiates them from the Turks”⁵¹

The concept of *Integrationsbereitschaft*—or readiness to be integrated—the lack of which is assumed in the Turkish community and whose presence is ascribed to the Jewish community, is hard to quantify. Ignatz Bubis maintains that the main difference between Turks and Jews is the question of willingness to leave their old identity behind: “We have Jews today from the ex-USSR who are not of German origin. But they come here to live

⁴⁹ Private interview with Malte Krause, 27.01.99

⁵⁰ Private interview with Jörg Schönbohm, 26.3.99

⁵¹ Private interview with Jörg Schönbohm, 26.3.99

and to become German. 99 per cent of the migrants from the ex-USSR ask ‘when can we finally become German?’ Turks don’t ask that. That is the big difference.”⁵² Krause refers impressionistically to a gap between the Turkish and Jewish communities in terms of “the question of give and take.” An apt metaphor might be that of a one-way versus a two-way street. The Berlin Senate reaches its hand out to the Russian Jewish community and, it is satisfied, has it shaken in return: Officials in Berlin administration and the Jewish Community all expect the integration process to take place within the next generation. As Nachama of the *Jüdische Gemeinde* said, “it is always the children who are the first to integrate. It always takes a generation before they start reading German literature and German newspapers.”⁵³ The Turks are expected to reach their hand out first—and no one can guarantee it will be grasped once they do. The *Kontingentflüchtlingsgesetz* offers Jewish settlers German citizenship after seven years, often tacitly allowing them to retain their original passport. Turks must wait fifteen years just to apply for naturalization, and then often spend an additional two years waiting for the bureaucratic procedures to be complete—and double nationality is not permitted.⁵⁴ The relevant *Integrationsbereitschaft* has little to do with either the Jewish or Turkish communities, it seems, but rather with the German state. “It is a fundamental belief of the Berlin Senate to demonstrate a great readiness to accommodate [the Jewish settlers],”⁵⁵ Malte Krause states. But of Turks it is expected, as the Culture Ministry official phrases it, “that they will stop being Turkish.”⁵⁶

Historical responsibility aside, these positions can also be explained by the belief of that *in generally supporting Jewish culture, one is supporting German culture*—however recuperatively nostalgic or ironic such a concept might be to some Berlin Jews. “The cultural legacy of German Jewry is German!” Barbara John states emphatically. “It is not Turkish or Rumanian or anything else!”⁵⁷ Malte Krause, of the *Innensenator’s* office, also supports this approach: “Germany sees the [present] fruition and construction of the Jewish community as the recovery of a part of its own historical culture. It is therefore also in our *national interest* to strengthen and support the Jewish Community.”⁵⁸ It is in this light that the Russian Jews can be seen as “returning” to Germany; the revitalization of the

⁵² Private interview with Ignatz Bubis, 13.5.99

⁵³ Private interview with Andreas Nachama, 23.02.99

⁵⁴ New citizenship law—the so-called *Optionsmodell*—will take effect January 2000, allowing double-nationality for those born in Germany until the age of 23, when they must choose one or the other.

⁵⁵ Private interview with Malte Krause, 27.01.99

⁵⁶ Private interview with Manfred Becker, 11.02.99

⁵⁷ Private interview, Barbara John and Robin Schneider, 17.12.98

⁵⁸ Private interview with Malte Krause, 27.01.99

neighborhood of Jewish stores and community buildings in and around the Oranienburger Straße, where Hebrew, Yiddish, or Russian can be heard spoken, is charming and touristic—a stroll through a lost golden age.⁵⁹ But the Turkish equivalent concentrated at the Kottbusser Tor is widely denounced as a “ghetto” or “parallel society.”⁶⁰ As Bavaria’s Interior Minister Beckstein (CSU) commented, “we do not want Chinatowns and Polish cities like there are in the United States.”⁶¹ Along the same lines, the Social Democrat in charge of religious communities in the Berlin *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur*, Manfred Becker, creatively named these isolated communities “biotopes.” He defines this as “a strong concentration [of non-Germans] which is evident from both the way the streets look and the whole atmosphere, which makes you say ‘I am definitely somewhere else.’” Becker insisted that no comparable phenomenon existed for Russian Jews.⁶² But one need only take a stroll around the Rykestraße synagogue or through certain neighborhoods in *Neukölln* or *Wilmersdorf* and count the number of stores with names starting with the word *Russkie* or *Zarja* to question the veracity of this assumption.⁶³ Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen offered a worthwhile comparison to the case of German *Aussiedler*:

When I go to an *Aussiedler* settlement—and in my former electoral district there are such things—one doesn’t feel like one is in Germany anymore, because everyone is speaking Russian... But we put a template over them and say, ‘these are Germans!’ And we put the same template over the Jews. ‘God knows where these people were born, but somewhere there were German roots, and they must all be taken care of and financed.’⁶⁴

This does not extend to the Turkish migrant population, which, as this paper has sought to explore, has a rather different template laid over it by German authorities.

⁵⁹ Julius Schoeps, head of the Moses Mendelssohn Center for European-Jewish Studies at the University of Potsdam, characterizes the recent rise of philosemitism in Berlin as „the result of the fact that the non-Jewish society is not yet prepared to face history. This is the opposite of normalization. This is folklore“ (quoted in Wöhlert, Meike, „Der Hype um den Davidstern,“ *Zitty*). The active promotion of a Jewish profile at the expense of other minority groups does not restrict itself to officialdom: Ms. Wöhlert also wryly observes that „newspaper readers would be hard pressed to not get the impression that there were more Jews in this city than Turks and Bosnians combined“

⁶⁰ Private interview with Malte Krause, 27.01.99

⁶¹ Cited in „Union befürchtet ‚Chinatowns‘“, *Der Tagesspiegel*, 5.2.99; it is, assumedly, no accident that he did not cite the example of Crown Heights, Brooklyn, where there is a great concentration of Hasidic Jews that lives in relative isolation from mainstream society.

⁶² Private interview with Manfred Becker, 11.2.99

⁶³ Irene Runge even hopes for such a development – she sees the Turkish biotope as a model for how older settlers might feel more at home in Berlin; Doomernik (1997) also notes the development of stores catering to Russian clientele in.

⁶⁴ Private interview with Cornelia Schmalz Jacobsen,

8. Conclusion

The reparations and *Wiedergutmachungsverträge* for Jews in Germany are admirable, remarkable and historically unique, especially in light of their extremely attentive and sensitive nature. As a result, “Germany has the fastest growing Jewish presence in the world outside Israel.”⁶⁵ But the first real challenge to German democracy’s ability to absorb or tolerate an ethnic minority or *Fremdkörper* in its midst after the catastrophe of the Third Reich has experienced questionable results. Here is not meant individual cases, of course, as more than forty years’ liberal asylum policy and generous state assistance for guest workers and their families demonstrated the good will of republican Germany. But obsessive in its commitment to its contract with the Jews, the Federal Republic may have missed the forest for the trees. The letter of the American-influenced law is followed to a T. But the spirit gets somewhat lost. Germany is struggling with its past, its responsibility, and indeed in the process of hammering out a self-identity in anticipation of its first decades as a united country – the question begs itself, will the moral of multi-cultural values remain?

Migrant Jews from the former Soviet Union have been “converted” into Germans for many legal and rhetorical purposes in a process not unlike that undergone by ethnic German *Aussiedler*. The measures for their insertion in German society have been introduced without public controversy or debate (except for the rare accusations of non-Jews filing false immigration requests)—perhaps in part because of the small numbers involved, but largely because of the symbolic value that a new Jewish presence lends to Germany. This paper argues that generosity towards non-German Jews not only rewards the image of a tolerant post-war Germany but also serves as an alibi for the sometimes unwelcoming messages that immigration and integration practices characteristic of Turkish migrants’ experience in Germany. Germans have proven themselves able to accept and even promote cultural difference (in the Jewish community), the logic may go, so they do not exert themselves to make the same efforts in the Turkish community—where the loss of German cultural sovereignty could be more apparent. If there are already ample complaints about the visibility and potential rivalry of a large, amorphous Islamic presence in Berlin, it is not hard to imagine what reaction might meet the funding requests with which an official Islamic Community would lobby the Senate. The fierce debate over the teaching of Islam in

⁶⁵ „The best revenge,“ *The Economist*, 12.02.1999

(non-mandatory) Berlin school religious courses in 1998-1999 provided a preview of the difficulties that state-subsidized accommodation of Turkish demands would encounter.

The debate over *ius sanguinus* versus *ius soli* citizenship regimes has often taken place in the context of how much Germany ought to do in compensation for the crimes of its past. Some maintain that if the nation accomplishes significant humanitarian works, its debt will have been paid; others posit that until Germany recognizes its ethnically diverse population with egalitarian policies, the legacy of “Germany for the Germans” will continue to tarnish the national image. Recently, the first non-Christian Democratic government in sixteen years set a new course for citizenship law in Germany with the abolishment of the strict *ius sanguinus* requirements. Beginning in January 2000, elements of *ius soli* will be introduced for all born in the Federal Republic so that the “second-and-a-half” generation of immigrants will be automatically granted citizenship. Upon the Constitution’s fiftieth anniversary in May 1999, also, the new German President made a point in his inaugural address to say he would serve as representative of all Germans, “especially those still without a German passport.” The legal landscape is thus in flux. As this paper has shown, however, elite consensus remains fixed in certain areas with regard to who “belongs,” and therefore which minorities receive material support for cultural, political and religious activities. To what extent an overnight change in law will radically alter the organizational experience of “non-German” minorities will be a fruitful area of research in the future.

Interviews

Kenan Kolat	18.11.98*	Türkischer Bund Berlin- Brandenburg, Geschäftsführer (SPD)
Sabri Adak	14.12.98*	Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, Vorsitzender
Ismail Kosan	15.12.98*	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen AL, Berliner Abgeordnete
Kasim Ayden	16.12.98*	Türkischer Elternverein, Präsident
Barbara John	17.12.98*	Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats von Berlin (CDU) u. Robin Schneider
Joel Levy	23.12.98*	Ronald Lauder Foundation, President
Ralf Meltzer	29.12.98*	Anti-Defamation Forum/B'nai Brith Youth Org., Präsident
Moische Waks	06.01.99	Jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin, Mitglied des Präsidiums
Sevim Celebi	11.01.99*	Günes e.V. - Interkulturelle Arbeit, Vorsitzenderin
Irene Runge	20.01.99*	Jüdischer Kulturverein e.V., erster Sprecher
Malte Krause	27.01.99*	Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, Grundsatzangelegenheiten der Innenpolitik u. Planung, Leiter (CDU)
Manfred Becker	11.02.99*	Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur, Referatsleiter Kirchen, Religions- und Weltanschauungsverbände (SPD)
Andreas Nachama	23.02.99*	Jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin, Vorsitzender
Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen	26.02.99*	ehem. Bundesausländerbeauftragte (FDP)
Klaus Eschen	26.02.99	Rechtsanwalt
Jörg Schönbohm	26.03.99*	Landesvorsitzender CDU Brandenburg
Johann Legner	27.04.99	ehem. Pressesprecher, Cornelia Schmalz Jacobsen
Herr Niekisch	04.05.99	Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, Innenpolitik u. Planung
Herr Hemper	04.05.99*	Senatsverwaltung für Inneres, Referent für Ausländerrecht
Ahavia Scheindlin	13.05.99	Survivors of the Shoah GmbH, Vice President for W. Eur.
Ignatz Bubis	13.05.99*	Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland, Vorsitzender
Cem Özdemir	25.05.99*	B90/die Grünen, Innenpolitisches Sprecher
Robin Schneider	25.05.99*	Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats

*recorded, transcribed

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